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Context
The National Centre for Social Research’s BSA 34 comes at a time 
when Britain seems split in two on many of the biggest questions. 
A close referendum decision to leave the European Union has been 
followed by a snap UK election resulting in a hung parliament. 
Before that, we had a narrow majority UK government itself preceded 
by another hung parliament. And in Scotland speciically, the country 
was split by the question of whether to remain a part of the United 
Kingdom. Each vote produced an outcome in which the country 
seemed starkly but often evenly divided.
At each moment there were strident voices on every side and 
sometimes higher than usual turnout. Fears about political apathy 
have been displaced by worries about national unity. The results 
have seen some accuse fellow citizens of ‘betrayal’ or ‘revenge’, of 
voting with their ‘gut’ not their heads, or of being ‘naive’, ‘stupid’ or 
‘selish’ (Foges, 2017; Perring, 2017; Ridley, 2016; Wilkinson, 2016; 
Woodward, 2016). One commentator has even asked whether the 
country is ‘ungovernable’ (De Quetteville, 2017).
Despite all of this, we have seen great moments of national unity, like 
One Love Manchester and the Great Get Together, but these have 
sadly too often been in response to acts of terrorism. After moments 
of togetherness, too many of us are left wondering whether we really 
know or understand our neighbours and fellow citizens. Overlapping 
theories now abound about whether we are seeing a fundamental 
realignment in previously irm views, trends and dividing lines.
For some, the country is divided into what author David Goodhart 
calls the ‘anywheres’ and ‘somewheres’; a split evident in the 
EU vote (Goodhart, 2017). ‘Anywheres’ are the degree-educated 
geographically mobile who embrace new people and experiences, 
and deine themselves by their achievements. In contrast, 
‘somewheres’ have an identity rooted in their hometown and ind 
rapid change, such as that brought on by immigration, unsettling. 
Others have drawn parallels with the US and suggested we might 
be beginning our own ‘culture wars’ (Bagehot, 2017). Here the 
dividing lines are no longer class or left versus right, but a clash 
between liberalism and a resurgent conservatism, with the latter 
angered by issues like same-sex marriage and a sense of runaway 
multiculturalism.
Before this, there was the suggestion that this is the age of the ‘open’ 
versus the ‘closed’: those embracing an open economy and tolerant 
society versus those looking to lock out competition and change1. 
For some, however, the splits and trends in society today are still 
best seen through the lens of economics and class; a lens which 
contrasts those who are successfully riding the waves of globalisation 
1  Tony Blair (then prime minister) speaking to the Trade Union Congress conference, 
Brighton, 12th September 2006. Full text available here https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/
sep/12/tradeunions.speeches 
Author
Roger Harding,  
Head of Public Attitudes, The National 
Centre for Social Research
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and technological change and those increasingly ‘left behind’ by the 
market, austerity and automation (Doane, 2016). On this view the 
rising inequality of the late 20th century and the consequences of the 
inancial crash underpin much of the changing political currents we 
see today. 
The stark split in voting behaviour by age in the recent general 
election2 has also reignited debates about whether we are seeing 
a clash of generations; contrasting baby-boomers against a ‘jilted 
generation’ left without secure jobs, good pensions and affordable 
housing (Howker & Malik, 2010). 
Finally, many have picked up a growing feeling of ‘anti-politics’ (for 
example: Clarke et al., 2016) bridging left and right that encompasses 
all or part rejection of current politics and parties, scandal-hit 
institutions, ‘political correctness’, and/or an ‘elite’ or ‘establishment’. 
Our conclusion is that none of these theories tells the whole story. 
Instead, every BSA survey seeks to look beyond the headlines to 
uncover the deeper attitudes and trends that shape our country. This 
year is no different, and we have found that the country, while divided 
on many questions, does have an underlying state of mind - that of a 
kind-hearted but not soft-hearted community. 
‘Narratives’ and conclusions about events are now formed rapidly, 
often before basic information is known and veriied. The BSA survey 
unashamedly takes a slower, more considered approach, rooted in 
some of the most rigourous social research available.
Key indings
In this year’s report we explore the trends and divides that lie 
beneath recent events to see how Britain is changing. We do this by 
examining attitudes to the EU, immigration, a mix of personal issues, 
beneits and tax, the role of government and civil liberties. 
The result is, perhaps unsurprisingly, a diverse set of trends, some 
suggesting national unity and others showing important divisions. 
Together they resist simple dichotomies and conclusions but broadly 
we ind a country that is becoming kinder-hearted but unmistakably 
not soft-hearted, more socially liberal but very divided on immigration 
and Brexit.
Kinder: after 7 years of government austerity, public opinion shows 
signs of moving back in favour of wanting more tax and spend 
and greater redistribution of income. We also ind that attitudes to 
beneit recipients are starting to soften and people particularly favour 
prioritising spending on disabled people. 
Not soft-hearted: the public in general continues to take a tough line 
on the response to threats at home and abroad. The majority want 
the authorities to be given strong powers to respond to terrorism and 
crime, and record numbers want defence spending increased. 
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After pensions being protected from austerity, the public are losing 
sympathy with the idea that this should be a priority for further 
spending. 
The public takes a dim view of beneit fraud and tax evasion, with 
many thinking that exploiting “legal loopholes” is also wrong. Further, 
more people consider beneit fraud wrong than tax evasion. While the 
proportion who prioritise more spending on increasing the beneits 
for disabled people has risen, there is little support for more spending 
on beneits for the unemployed, perhaps because half of people think 
the unemployed could ind a job if they wanted to.
Socially liberal: the onward march of social liberalism continues 
with record proportions of people being comfortable with same-sex 
relationships, pre-marital sex and abortion, among other issues. 
While younger people are still more liberal on these subjects than 
older people, the difference is narrowing.
Divided: the country is however clearly divided by age and education 
on views about the EU and immigration; young degree holders are 
much more positive about both than older people with no formal 
qualiications. 
A backlash against austerity? 
After seven years of government austerity programmes by the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition and then Conservative 
majority government, the public is turning against spending less. 
For the irst time since the inancial crash of 2007-8, more people 
(48%) want taxation increased to allow greater spending, than want 
tax and spend levels to stay as they are (44%). More people (42%) 
agree than disagree (28%) that government should redistribute 
income from the better off to those who are less well-off. Shortly 
before the inancial crisis fewer people supported redistribution than 
opposed it (34% and 38% respectively in 2006). 
However, while these represent notable changes as compared with 
recent years, they still only represent a partial move back to an 
earlier mood. The 48% of people who now want more taxation and 
spending compares with a joint-record low of 32% in 2010, but highs 
of 63% in 1998, and 65% in 1991.
People’s top priorities for more spending remain as they have always 
been – health and education. Around 8 in 10 think the government 
should spend more or much more on health (83%); 7 in 10 on 
education (71%), and 6 in 10 on the police (57%). 
A major focus of the austerity programme was on policies to reduce 
welfare spending on those of working age via reductions in beneit 
levels and new assessments of who could receive what support 
(DWP, 2015). As many of these changes have now been implemented 
it is interesting to see two notable changes in how favourably people 
view beneit recipients. First, the proportion who say most dole 
claimants are “iddling” has dropped from 35% in 2014 to 22% in 
NatCen Social Research
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2016 – its lowest level since the question was irst asked on the 
survey in 1986. Secondly, we ind the proportion of people (21%) that 
agree that most social security claimants do not deserve help is at 
a record low, down from 32% in 2014. We will need to see whether 
these drops are still in evidence in future years before we can be 
sure they represent a major change of outlook. In the meantime, 
depending on your outlook, you can either see this as the response 
to successful efforts to ensure beneits go to those most in need; 
or, more negatively, more people feeling that recent changes have 
shown recipients to be more deserving than previously thought.  
In contrast to help for those of working age, retirement age beneits 
have largely been protected from austerity and the State Pension 
has in fact had signiicant growth due to the ‘triple lock’3 (Thurley & 
Keen, 2017). Whether the ‘triple lock’ should be kept became one of 
the key battlegrounds of the recent election. This year, for the irst 
time in more than 30 years, pensions are not the public’s top priority 
for extra spending on beneits. The proportion identifying retirement 
pensions as being among their top two priorities for extra welfare 
spending is now just 60%, down from 72% in 2014 and the lowest it 
has ever been. It seems that the public have recognised the fact that 
successive governments have been successful in raising the relative 
incomes of pensioners and this may be an area where people are 
beginning to feel increased spending is no longer needed.
Tough on threats home and abroad
While attitudes haven’t moved in a constant direction, the growing 
desire for more tax and spend sits alongside continued high support 
for a strong state on issues of crime and terrorism. This is with 
ieldwork being completed before the recent terrorist attacks in 
Manchester and London.
During a time of suspected terrorist attack, half of the public (53%) 
support the government being able to detain people indeinitely 
without putting them on trial. The current legal limit is just 14 days. 
Outside of the two world wars, internment has only briely been 
permitted twice during the 20th and 21st centuries. Once was very 
controversially in Northern Ireland between 1971 and 1975, as an 
attempt to deal with ‘the troubles’. The other occasion was in respect 
of international - and therefore non-UK - terrorist suspects, between 
2001 and 2005 following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. In 
addition, the majority of the public (70%) also support authorities 
having the right to stop and search people at random during times of 
terrorist attack. 
One issue raised by recent terrorist attacks is whether the security 
services have adequate powers of surveillance in order to stop 
an attack in the irst place. A signiicant majority (80%) think the 
government should have the right to monitor people by video in 
public areas, and 50% think the government should also have the 
3  The ‘triple lock’ is a guarantee that the basic State Pension will rise by the higher of 
inlation, average earnings or 2.5%. 
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right to monitor emails and other information exchanged on the 
internet.
On international threats, 4 in 10 people (39%) back more spending 
on defence, whereas only 2 in 10 (20%) want to see it cut. Support 
for more defence spending has never been higher, even though – and 
perhaps in some instances because – no less than 72% think the 
government has been successful at dealing with threats to Britain’s 
security. The trend may also be a reaction against the long-term 
decline in UK defence expenditure, and the uncertainty created by 
well-publicised conlicts in Ukraine and Syria where the post-Cold 
War sense of order and international rules have been up-ended 
(Observer, 2016). 
Tough on beneits fraud and tax evasion 
While the public is softening its attitudes to beneit recipients, it is 
nonetheless clear that beneit fraud is wrong, even if the abuse does 
not involve eye-watering sums. Nearly everyone (91%) thinks that 
using false information to support a claim is usually wrong, and this 
falls only slightly if the person is using a “legal-loophole” (to 61% and 
48%, respectively). This suggests it is the spirit of the rules that often 
matters for people, not just whether the strict legal rules have been 
obeyed. 
Overall, people are slightly tougher on beneit fraud than tax evasion. 
Sixty-eight per cent of people think it is wrong to not declare casual 
work to the beneit ofice to gain £500, compared with 56% thinking 
that it is wrong not to declare casual work for tax purposes to gain 
£500. This gap suggests that for some, money taken from the public 
purse is worse than money denied to it. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, we 
ind that those on higher incomes and those who are on the right are 
more relaxed about tax loopholes. Conversely, those on the left tend 
to be more relaxed about people using beneit loopholes.   
Personal freedom: the continued rise of 
social liberalism 
The EU referendum vote result led some on the left and right to 
speculate that this was the result of a backlash against greater social 
liberalism (Eagle & Baird (2017); Lawson (2016)). We ind no evidence 
that there has been a public turn against same-sex relationships, or 
indeed on many other personal issues. In fact, on some issues such 
as same-sex relationships, the long-term increase in socially liberal 
attitudes has actually accelerated. 
Two-thirds of people (64%) now say that same-sex relationships 
are “not wrong at all”, up from 59% in 2015, and 47% in 2012. 
On pre-marital sex, a signiicant majority of people (75%) say that 
it is “not at all wrong”, an increase of 11 percentage points since 
2012. Interestingly, this liberalisation in attitudes to both same-sex 
relationships and pre-marital sex is occurring in every age cohort.
NatCen Social Research
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Record levels of people say an abortion should be allowed if a 
woman decides on her own she does not want the child (70%) or if a 
couple cannot afford any more children (65%). Most remarkably, the 
proportion of Catholics who agree an abortion should be allowed if 
a woman does not want the child has increased from 33% in 1985 
to 61% in 2016, which precedes a recent softening of the Catholic 
Church’s position on abortion during  
2015-16 (Povoledo & Stack, 2016). 
Prejudice about transgender people is examined for the irst time in 
this year’s report. We ind that the vast majority of the public (84%) 
describe themselves as “not prejudiced at all” towards transgender 
people. However, less than half of people say that a suitably qualiied 
transgender person should deinitely be employed as a police oficer 
or primary school teacher (43% and 41% respectively), suggesting 
that there is a notable gap between the theory and practice of 
people’s attitudes.  
So on personal issues, Britain emerges an increasingly socially liberal 
country. However, it is important to add that we should not assume 
that this applies to other issues. One important area, for example, 
not covered here and needing further research is our attitude to 
race; forthcoming work by NatCen suggests that no such similar 
liberalisation of attitudes has occurred in that area (Kelley et al, 2017). 
Brexit and immigration: a country divided
What the 2016 EU referendum decision actually gave a mandate 
for in the Brexit negotiations is a matter of near-daily debate in 
parliament and the media. While our report does not address this 
issue, it can help settle the hotly contested topic of what issues were 
at stake when voters went to the polls.
Our analysis suggests that the idea that the referendum was a 
lightning rod for a rising ‘anti-politics’ tide is wide of the mark. 
People’s level of trust in government at most played only a minor 
role in inluencing how they voted. Instead, the result relected the 
concerns of older, more ‘authoritarian’ or social conservative voters 
who were particularly worried about immigration. Any suggestion that 
immigration was not at the heart of this vote runs counter to what we 
have found. 
The division about immigration that was evident in how people voted 
in the EU referendum is mirrored in attitudes to immigration itself. In 
the years leading up to the vote there was a stark and growing divide 
between young people with a degree education and older people 
with no formal qualiications in their views about the economic 
impact of immigration. For example, 62% of those with a degree, 
and 48% of those aged 18-29 now believe immigration has a positive 
impact on the economy. In contrast, just 29% of those with GCSEs 
as their highest level of qualiication or no qualiications and just 29% 
of those aged over 70 hold the same view. Our analysis of the latest 
NatCen Social Research
British Social Attitudes 34 | Key findings 7
European-wide data on this subject shows that this social divide 
in attitudes towards immigration is bigger than anywhere else in 
Europe. 
Although views about attitudes towards immigration may have 
polarised, it is not clear that people have become more concerned 
about immigration. However, there is widespread agreement that the 
country should be selective in who it allows to come here. Signiicant 
majorities feel the ability to speak English (87%, up from 77% in 
2002), a commitment to the British “way of life” (84%, up from 78%) 
and possessing needed skills (82%, up from 71%) are important 
criteria for selecting migrants.
Conclusion
We started by highlighting the range of theories that now abound to 
explain the current state of the nation. Our report shows that none of 
them quite tells the whole picture.
The differences in EU Referendum vote choice were more marked 
by education level than class, and early indications from the recent 
general election suggest the differences were most marked by age. 
Therefore, the ‘anywhere’/’somewhere’, ‘open’/’closed’ and ‘culture 
wars’ theories seem worth exploring more. However, they all suggest 
or imply that the social conservatism of older people will hold out 
against the liberalism of the young. This thought does not sit easily 
with the liberalisation of older people’s attitudes to pre-marital sex 
and same-sex relationships, especially as the change seems to be 
accelerating. Generational divides on these issues remain, but they 
are closing. If anything, views on personal relationships are now a 
source of growing cross-generational unity rather than division. 
The idea that a rising ‘anti-politics’ was at the heart of the EU 
referendum decision is also found wanting. While it is a factor, it is 
apparently only a small one. The theory that we are split between 
those doing well economically from globalisation and those ‘left 
behind’ is not, in contrast, undermined, but it is not the only or even 
necessarily the most signiicant divide on the EU question. Working-
class people did lean towards Brexit, but a person’s education level 
was far more important in identifying how they voted than class. 
Cultural concerns about immigration, identity and sovereignty 
mattered, not just concerns about the economic consequences of 
globalisation.  We are, it seems, a country split on the intertwined 
issues of the EU and immigration, and especially between younger 
graduates and older people without qualiications.  Indeed, it seems 
that the gap on attitudes towards immigration is widening and has 
become one of the most signiicant in Europe.
Looking down more traditional left versus conservative  political 
lines, supporters from either side can be buoyed by these indings 
(they would therefore be wise to not just read the parts of the report 
they ind most appealing). For those on the left, it does seem that 
the country is tiring of austerity. There are also signs that attitudes 
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to beneit recipients are softening, and the majority think even low-
level tax evasion is unacceptable. However, conservatives  can 
be reassured that people remain committed to wanting a strong 
response to crime and terror, and the proportion wanting an increase 
in defence spending is the highest yet. While most people are tough 
on tax evasion, they are even tougher on beneit fraud. In both cases 
many of the trends that we see in these areas are important but not 
revolutionary. Anyone looking to use them to make stark claims about 
the end of this or that era, ideology or creed will not be someone too 
troubled by actual evidence. 
It is perhaps always the National Centre for Social Research and 
the BSA survey’s job to cut across our desire to explain events with 
simple narratives. However, on balance, we do seem more socially 
liberal, keener on more tax and spend and tough on law, order and 
security, while we are very clearly divided on the EU and immigration. 
Whatever our views, let us hope there is always unity on the need to 
explore our differences with civility, and on the importance of robust 
social research to measure them.
NatCen Social Research
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The data for Figure 1 are shown below. 
Table A.3 First and second priorities for extra spending on social beneits, combined, 
1983–2014
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995
Beneits for 
disabled people
58 55 58 58 54 60 59 58 51 57 58
Retirement 
pensions
64 66 64 65 68 67 65 63 63 64 68
Child beneits 20 22 23 23 24 30 32 35 31 34 33
Beneits for single 
parents
21 16 18 18 16 17 18 19 18 14 12
Beneits for the 
unemployed
32 35 31 33 33 25 21 22 32 26 25
None of these 1 1 1 * 1 * 1 * 1 1 1
Unweighted base 1761 1675 1804 3100 2847 3029 2797 2918 2945 1167 1234
1996 2000 2001 2003 2005 2007 2010 2012 2014 2016
Beneits for 
disabled people
54 61 57 54 53 54 53 59    60 67
Retirement 
pensions
71 74 76 79 80 78 72 72    67 60
Child beneits 30 33 35 38 39 42 42 35    37 36
Beneits for single 
parents
12 15 14 16 15 15 14 14    17 18
Beneits for the 
unemployed
26 13 12 10 8 7 11 12    13 13
None of these 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2      4 3
Unweighted base 3620 3426 3287 3272 3193 3094 3297 3248 2878 2942
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Tax avoidance and 
benefit manipulation
Views on its morality and prevalence
There has been a sharp shift in the perceived prevalence of beneit manipulation but people 
are more likely to think this is wrong than tax avoidance.
The proportion who say most dole claimants are ‘iddling’ is at its lowest level since 1986
The public is more disapproving of beneit manipulation than tax avoidance
NatCen Social Research
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A double standard
Around half of the public think tax avoidance is wrong, but people are more likely to think 
that beneit manipulation is wrong.
• 61% think it is wrong for beneit claimants to use legal loopholes to increase their payments, 
compared with 48% thinking it is wrong to use legal loopholes to pay less tax.
• 68% think it is wrong to not declare casual work to the beneit ofice to gain £500, while 56% 
think it is wrong to gain £500 by not declaring casual work for tax purposes.
More deserving claimants?
There has been a sudden sharp shift in the perceived prevalence of beneit manipulation.
• The proportion agreeing that most dole claimants are ‘iddling’ has dropped from 35% in 2014 
to 22% in 2016 – the lowest level recorded in 30 years.
• People are less likely to say that they would conceal casual earnings for tax purposes than they 
used to; 40% said this in 1996, compared with 24% now.
Overview
This chapter identiies a double standard in attitudes to tax avoidance and beneit 
manipulation: while around half or more regard both as wrong, beneit recipients are judged 
more harshly than tax offenders for what might be considered similar ‘offences’. This double-
standard varies across different groups: people in the highest income group and who are 
right-wing are less likely to say that tax avoidance is wrong, while people who hold liberal 
views are less likely to say that beneit manipulation is wrong. There has been a sudden drop 
in the perceived prevalence of beneit manipulation, which, if sustained, indicates a major 
shift in attitudes towards beneit claimants.
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Introduction
It is unusual to consider the public’s perceptions of loopholes around 
tax and beneits simultaneously (Doig et al., 2001; McGee 2012). 
Not only are taxation and social security different normative and 
administrative systems, but the social groups engaged in these 
practices may also be quite different: the groups most likely to 
manipulate their beneits claim are not necessarily the same as those 
trying to avoid tax by using clever accounting (Tunley, 2011). Yet 
despite these differences, there are important similarities: both tax 
avoidance and beneit fraud are normatively questionable practices 
used to increase personal incomes at the expense of the state. 
Moreover, for both systems, questionable activities can be either 
illegal (‘tax evasion’ and ‘beneit fraud’) or legal (‘tax avoidance’ and 
what we here term ‘beneit manipulation’).
Media coverage
A cursory glance at the print and television media suggests the 
public is far more interested in and concerned about beneit fraud 
and manipulation than tax avoidance and evasion (Wiggan, 2012; 
Scott-Paul, 2013). All of the major terrestrial television channels 
have, over the last few years, commissioned programs exploring the 
lives of those who are receiving social security and who are living in 
poverty (Biressi and Nunn, 2010; Jensen, 2014). Indeed, when we 
ask respondents to the 2016 survey “How many TV programmes, 
newspaper or online articles about beneit fraud do you remember 
seeing in the last 6 months?”, 27% report seeing none, 30% recall 
viewing one or two, 21% remember viewing three to ive, while a 
further 21% have seen six or more such programmes or articles. 
Moreover, there is a general consensus that the media is critical, 
rather than sympathetic, in “the way it portrays people who engage in 
beneit fraud”, with 71% of those who remember seeing at least one 
programme or article describing it as “very critical” or “somewhat 
critical”. Furthermore, shows such as )LULÄ[Z:[YLL[, Skint, 7LVWSL
Like Us, 6U)LULÄ[Z and 7YV\K, among others, have become 
vehicles through which righteous indignation can be legitimately 
expressed regarding how certain elements of the population live, 
especially when such lifestyles are supported by taxes paid by 
‘hard-working families’ (Jensen, 2014). The protagonists of these 
shows are often represented as part of an ‘undeserving underclass’ 
that is fraudulently or dishonestly receiving support from the state 
(Lundstrom, 2013). 
As yet, there have not been any television shows dedicated to 
exploring the lives of tax avoiders or evaders (perhaps partly because 
they are less willing to receive such publicity). Tax avoidance and 
evasion have, of course, not been completely absent from public 
debate in the mass media (Levi, 2006). The Panama papers pushed 
the tax affairs of David Cameron’s father into the spotlight, ‘non-
doms’ dominated the 2015 general election for a few days, and, in 
It is unusual to consider 
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recent years, a number of celebrities have been embroiled in tax 
avoidance scandals (Robinson, 2015; Usborne, 2016; Morgan and 
Riley-Smith, 2016) . At the same time, there was also much criticism 
of the Conservative Treasury Minister David Gauke, who in 2012 said 
that paying tradesmen in cash to avoid VAT was “morally wrong”1, 
suggesting that public attitudes here are not straightforward. 
Notwithstanding these events, most of the media attention on issues 
related to tax and beneits has focussed on the bottom of the income 
distribution rather than the top, suggesting that tax avoidance and 
evasion and beneit manipulation and fraud may not be considered 
moral equivalents. 
Previous research 
Given this intense media interest, there are surprisingly few 
studies looking at the public’s relative perceptions of tax and 
beneit loopholes. A number of studies have looked at the public’s 
perceptions of beneit fraud – for example, Geiger (2016) identiies 
ive different recent surveys, which consistently show that the 
average person believes that around one quarter to one third of 
claims/spending is fraudulent. Typically these igures are compared 
with the Department for Work and Pension (DWP)’s own exhaustive 
estimates of beneit fraud based on tens of thousands of case 
reviews, of which the latest igures show that 0.3%-4.1% of spending 
is due to fraud (depending on the beneit) (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2016). This is a reasonable comparison for those questions 
that refer to the share of spending that is fraudulent, but some 
questions refer to the share of claims that are fraudulent, which tends 
to be slightly higher for the few beneits for which DWP data are 
available (1.9%-10.0% depending on the beneit).2 
Fewer studies have looked at the perceived prevalence of tax 
avoidance, but over 60% of the public believe it to be ‘widespread’ 
(Shah, 2015). The government has published some estimates of 
the scale of tax avoidance but, like beneit fraud this is by its very 
nature dificult to track and much less effort has gone into doing so 
(National Audit Ofice, 2015). There are therefore no widely accepted 
comparable igures regarding public perceptions of beneit fraud and 
tax avoidance against which to compare public perceptions. While 
11% of the population admitted in one survey to ‘legally’ avoiding tax 
(YouGov, 2015), even studies that have compared tax inspectors’ and 
tax experts’ opinions have not reached consistent conclusions over 
what constitutes tax avoidance (Onu, 2016).
Potentially we can compare the oficial beneit fraud estimates to 
people’s perceptions. What makes this an especially tricky issue 
to analyse quantitatively, though, is that there are differences 
1  BBC (2012), ‘Paying Tradesmen Cash in Hand Morally Wrong, Says Minister’, BBC News, 
available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18964640 
2  For example, according to the DWP estimates for 2015/16, 3.1% of JSA cases vs. 2.9% 
of JSA spending was fraudulent. The equivalent igures for Universal Credit are 2.8% (claims) vs. 
1.9% (spending), for ESA are 2.8% (claims) vs. 1.9% (spending), and for working-age Housing 
Beneit are 10.0% (claims) vs. 5.0% (spending). 
There are surprisingly 
few studies looking at 
the publics relative 
perceptions of tax and 
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between what is legally considered fraud/evasion and what actions 
people believe are fraudulent (Geiger, 2016). DWP’s estimates refer 
to legally-deined fraud, such as claiming to live alone in order to 
receive beneits when actually living with a partner. Yet, the public 
may interpret the word ‘fraud’ as including people who are judged 
to be ‘undeserving’ regardless of whether they are engaging in any 
illegal activity. For example, someone may have another child in order 
to gain additional inancial support – support to which this individual 
would, in fact, be legally entitled. However, in an Ipsos MORI survey 
in 2013, just over 35% said that their deinition of ‘fraud’ included 
“having more children so that they are entitled to more beneits” 
(Geiger, 2016). Moreover, 36% believed “people claiming beneits 
who haven’t paid any taxes/national insurance” constituted fraud; 
and 46% reported that “people from abroad/immigrants claiming 
beneits” was also fraudulent. None of these activities constitute 
fraud in the legal sense.°
When it comes to the perceived morality of using these legal and 
illegal loopholes, most of the existing research has focused on the 
wrongness of tax avoidance rather than beneit manipulation. Over 
60% of the public believe tax avoidance is ‘unacceptable’ because 
it is unfair to those who pay their taxes (Shah, 2015), and a YouGov 
poll similarly found that most people believe that ‘legally’ avoiding 
tax is ‘unacceptable’ (YouGov, 2015). It also seems that this varies 
by income, with more afluent households saying they were slightly 
more likely to participate in tax avoidance schemes if they were 
unlikely to get caught (YouGov, 2015). (It is worth adding in brief that 
the public makes similar moral judgements about tax avoidance by 
multinational corporations (ComRes, 2013), though this is not our 
focus in this chapter). In contrast, there may be situations – such 
as receiving cash-in-hand payments – that are technically illegal 
but which many believe are normatively acceptable (McGee, 2012). 
Data collected as part of the 2006 British Social Attitudes (BSA) 
survey suggest that only around 40% of people thought that paying 
someone cash-in-hand to avoid VAT was wrong, and that over 
70% said that they themselves would do it (reported in a blog by 
Baumberg, 2012)3.
The only studies that have compared the perceived morality of tax 
and beneit fraud simultaneously are Edlund (1999) and Halla & 
Schneider (2014), both of which use one item apiece on tax and 
beneits. For example, Edlund compared responses to the questions, 
“Do you feel it is wrong or not if… (i) A taxpayer does not report all of 
his income in order to pay less income tax?”, (ii) A person gives the 
government incorrect information about himself to get government 
beneits that he is not entitled to?” Majorities in both the USA and 
Norway in 1991 agreed that both of these were “wrong” or “seriously 
wrong”, although the wrongness of beneit fraud was felt to be 
slightly higher. Halla & Schneider similarly compare “claiming state 
3  Data on these measures collected as part of the 2016 BSA survey are discussed in the 
main body of this chapter.  
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beneits which you are not entitled to” to “cheating on tax”, and ind 
that people believe that both are wrong, but that beneit fraud is seen 
as less justiiable in 21 of 29 countries. However, it is dificult to know 
if this is due to different moral standards being applied to taxation 
versus social security, or simply that the question does not ask about 
equivalent situations.
There is therefore much we do not know about legal and illegal 
manipulation of the tax and beneits systems and, in particular, 
people’s perceptions of one versus the other. Data collected as part 
of the BSA 2016 therefore provide a unique lens on these issues by 
asking similar questions about taxation and beneits, providing some 
of the most robust empirical evidence available on the perceived 
morality and prevalence of manipulation of both of these systems. 
How wrong are tax avoidance and beneit 
manipulation?
The use of legal loopholes
We begin by examining perceptions of the extent to which tax 
avoidance and beneit manipulation are wrong. The 2016 BSA  
survey included two questions designed to measure people’s  
feelings about the morality of using legal ‘loopholes’ to reduce the 
amount of tax one pays (tax avoidance), versus using such  
loopholes to increase one’s beneit payments (beneit manipulation). 
We asked respondents: 
Suppose someone used a loophole in the system to reduce 
the amount of tax they pay, without breaking the law. What 
would your view of this be?
Suppose someone used a loophole in the system to increase 
their benefit payments, without breaking the law. What 
would your view of this be?
As shown in Table 1, a clear majority (61%) think that it is wrong 
(“usually” or “always”) for beneit claimants to use legal loopholes 
to increase their payments. A smaller proportion (just under half) 
think it is always or usually wrong for taxpayers to use loopholes to 
avoid tax. Conversely, 21% think it is “rarely” or “never” wrong to 
use loopholes to pay less tax, considerably more than the 14% who 
think this for increasing beneits. This suggests that fewer people are 
disapproving of taxpayers ‘gaming the system’ to withhold tax than 
of beneit claimants who engage in similar behaviour to increase the 
payments they receive.
Exploring these questions together on their original ive-point answer 
scales, we ind that a majority (56%) provide answers indicating a 
view that tax avoidance and beneit manipulation are equally wrong. 
Among those who feel they are not morally equivalent, almost three 
times as many people (30%) feel that beneit manipulation is more 
wrong than tax avoidance, as opposed to thinking that tax avoidance 
is more wrong than beneit manipulation (12%). 
21% think it is rarely 
or never wrong to use 
loopholes to pay less tax, 
considerably more than 
the 14% who think this 
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Table 1 Attitudes to the morality of exploiting legal loopholes and beneit fraud
Using loopholes to 
reduce tax
Using loopholes to 
increase beneits
False information to 
support beneit claim
How wrong % % %
Usually or always wrong 48 61 91
Sometimes wrong 30 23 7
Rarely or never wrong 21 14 1
Unweighted base 2942 2942 2942
Interpreting responses to these questions may not be entirely 
straightforward however. The word ‘loophole’ may have a normative 
connotation – suggesting a deliberate action which goes against 
the intention of the system. This may naturally lead people towards 
perceiving this activity as ‘wrong’, inlating the perceived wrongness 
of the action. However, it is dificult to imagine a general question on 
this type of activity which does not suffer from this problem.
Beyond the manipulation of legal loopholes, the 2016 survey  
also asked about the morality of knowingly giving false information  
to support a beneit claim – in other words, beneit fraud. We  
asked respondents: 
Suppose someone knowingly gave false information to 
support their benefit claim. What would your view about  
this be?
As shown in the inal column of Table 1, an overwhelming majority 
(91%) feel that this is always or usually wrong, with only 1% feeling 
that it is rarely or never wrong. These proportions are similar to those 
recorded in both the USA and Norway in 1991, suggesting that 
most people in most places – even if not quite everyone –  think that 
outright beneit fraud is wrong (Edlund, 1999).
Unfortunately, no questions were asked about the wrongness of tax 
evasion – but given the responses in this section, we would expect 
an overwhelming majority of people to also think that this is wrong. 
Cash-in-hand work 
Alongside general questions on the morality of exploiting loopholes, 
BSA 2016 also included speciic questions on illegally failing to 
declare cash-in-hand work to the tax and beneits ofice. We asked 
if the behaviour described in the following two scenarios is wrong 
or not wrong (people randomly received different versions of the 
questionnaire specifying either £500 or £3,000 as the cash amount):
An unemployed person on benefits takes a casual job and is 
paid in cash. He does not report it to the benefit office and is 
£500/£3,000 in pocket.
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A person in paid work takes on an extra weekend job and 
is paid in cash. He does not declare it for tax and so is 
£500/£3,000 in pocket.
Table 2 presents the breakdown of responses to these questions. 
In line with the results above, people are more likely to disapprove of 
a beneit claimant concealing cash-in-hand earnings from the  
beneit ofice than they are to disapprove of someone in paid 
employment failing to declare this for tax. This is equally true for both 
the smaller and larger cash amounts we ask about, although it is 
worth noting that, in both cases, people are more likely to think that 
failing to declare a larger amount is wrong, than failing to declare a 
smaller amount.
Table 2 Attitudes towards the morality of cash-in-hand work
Not declaring a £500 gain … Not declaring a £3000 gain …
… to beneits 
ofice
… for tax 
purposes
… to beneits 
ofice
… for tax 
purposes
How wrong to not 
declare cash-in-hand 
job …
% % % %
Wrong or seriously wrong 68 56 80 68
A bit wrong 23 31 13 22
Not wrong 4 7 2 5
Unweighted base 1591 1591 770 770 
Comparing responses to the questions on the morality of cash-
in-hand work across beneits and tax on the original four-point 
answer scales, we ind that a majority of people provide responses 
indicating that it is equally wrong to conceal cash-in-hand work 
from the beneits ofice or for tax purposes (59%/63% provide 
combinations of answers demonstrating this for the £500/£3,000 
scenarios respectively). Around a quarter of people in each scenario 
(26%/24%) provide responses suggesting that a beneit claimant 
concealing cash-in-hand earnings from the beneits ofice is worse 
than a taxpayer concealing such earnings from the HMRC. Less than 
10% appear to express the opposite viewpoint (8%/6%).
How would people themselves behave? 
While the 2016 survey did not collect any evidence on how 
people actually behave, we asked respondents, as part of the 
self-completion element of the survey, how they would anticipate 
behaving – which enables us to see how this compares with their 
moral judgement of others. After each of the questions on cash-in-
hand work presented above, we asked respondents:
And how likely do you think it is that you would do this, if you 
found yourself in this situation?






disapprove of someone in 
paid employment failing 
to declare this for tax
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As shown in Table 3, a substantial proportion (20%/24% for 
£3000/£500) say that they would be likely to conceal cash-in-hand 
earnings from the tax authorities, while slightly fewer (14%/20%) say 
they would hide such earnings from the ‘beneits ofice’. 
Table 3 Self-reported likelihood of failing to report cash-in-hand earnings
Not declaring a £500 gain 
… 










… for tax 
purposes
How likely to not declare 
cash-in-hand job
% % % %
Fairly or very likely 20 24 14 20
Not very or not at all likely 72 69 78 74
Can’t choose 8 8 8 6
Unweighted base 1591 1591 770 770 
Another aspect of behaviour we probed was whether respondents 
would report someone they knew to have claimed falsely, by asking 
the following question:  
Imagine that you found out that someone falsely claimed 
benefits amounting to [£500/£3,000]. You know this person 
but they are not a close friend or family member. How likely 
or unlikely is it that you would report them?
Only a minority of people say that they would report someone for 
falsely claiming beneits. As found in relation to the questions on 
cash-in-hand work, people make slightly different judgements when 
a greater amount of money is involved. Among those asked about 
the £500 false claim, 23% say that they would be very or fairly likely 
to report their acquaintance; when the igure speciied is £3,000, a 
somewhat greater proportion (33%) say they would report them. 
Given that 91% feel that falsely claiming beneits is wrong, this 
suggests that a considerable proportion of people who consider 
beneit fraud to be wrong would nevertheless be unwilling to report 
an acquaintance they knew to be committing it. Further inspection 
of the data conirms this. Sixty four per cent of people who think 
that beneit fraud is always or usually wrong say that they would be 
unlikely to report someone they knew to have claimed falsely. The 
same question is not asked about tax evasion, but it may well be the 
case that people are similarly unlikely to report people for illegally 
failing to pay tax, even though they think this is wrong.
Only a minority of people 
say that they would 
report someone for falsely 
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Perceived prevalence of tax avoidance 
and beneit manipulation
In addition to asking for their moral judgements on tax avoidance 
and beneit manipulation, we asked respondents how common they 
perceive these activities to be, using the following two questions:
Thinking about the whole of Britain, out of every 100 people 
who pay tax, how many do you think have used a loophole 
in the rules to reduce the amount of tax they pay, without 
breaking the law?
Thinking about the whole of Britain, out of every 100 people 
receiving benefits, how many do you think have used a 
loophole in the rules to increase their benefit payments, 
without breaking the law?
Contrary to attitudes to the morality of legal loopholes, as shown 
in Table 4 there is little difference in perceptions of the prevalence 
of the use of such loopholes in relation to tax and beneits. On 
average, people believe the proportion of beneit claimants who 
have exploited loopholes to increase their beneits is larger than 
the proportion of taxpayers who have done so to avoid tax, but this 
difference is quite small (37 out of every 100 claimants vs. 32 out 
of every 100 taxpayers). Nevertheless, on an individual level, more 
people provide answers indicating a belief that beneit manipulation 
is more common than tax avoidance (45%) than provide answers 
indicating the opposite belief - that tax avoidance is more common 
than beneit manipulation (23%).
Table 4 Perceived prevalence of tax avoidance and beneit manipulation













beneit claim in 
local area 
Average perception 
(out of every 100)
             32             37             34             24 
% perceiving…. % % % %
0-24 out of every 100 44 35 40 51
25-49 out of every 
100
20 19 21 13
50-74 out of every 
100
18 26 21 11
75-100 out of every 
100
9 11 10 5
Don’t know/refused 8 10 8 20
Unweighted base 2942 2942 2942 2942 
On average, people 
believe the proportion 
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done so to avoid tax, 
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We asked two further questions about the prevalence of illegal 
beneit fraud (going beyond the exploitation of legal loopholes), 
which – to our knowledge for the irst time in a survey – focused on 
perceived fraud at both the national and local levels:
Thinking about the whole of Britain, out of every 100 people 
receiving benefits, how many do you think have broken the 
law by knowingly giving false information to support their 
claim?
Now thinking about the local neighbourhood where you 
live, out of every 100 people receiving benefits, how many 
do you think have broken the law by knowingly giving false 
information to support their claim?
No equivalent question was asked about the perceived prevalence of 
illegal tax evasion (rather than legal tax avoidance).
Responses to these questions are presented in the inal two columns 
of Table 4. It is notable that, on average, people believe illegal beneit 
fraud to be almost as common as the legal exploitation of beneits 
loopholes. It is possible that this relects people’s true beliefs about 
the prevalence of these two different types of activity. However, it is 
also possible that, despite the question wording, people do not draw 
a strong conceptual distinction between legal manipulation and illegal 
fraud: as we noted in the introduction to this chapter, a previous 
Ipsos MORI survey found that substantial proportions of people 
described entirely legal scenarios as examples of ‘beneit fraud’. 
Another notable inding from Table 4 is that, on average, people 
perceive the national prevalence of beneit fraud to be higher than 
the prevalence in their local neighbourhood. Almost 20% feel unable 
to give a igure for the local prevalence of beneit fraud, compared 
with just 8% who feel unable to give an estimate for the national 
picture. Taken together, these indings may suggest that people 
are relying on different sources of information to estimate how 
common false beneit claims are at the national versus local levels. 
It seems likely that people’s perceptions of the national picture are 
more strongly inluenced by national media coverage; whereas their 
perceptions of the local situation may draw more strongly on direct 
experience. This may explain why people are less willing to give a 
igure for the local prevalence of fraud: they feel that, in the absence 
of direct knowledge, they should not hazard a guess. This is however 
speculative, and is something worth exploring in future research. 
DWP deine a case of beneit fraud as one in which the claimant 
does not meet the conditions for receiving the beneit (or the rate 
being paid), and can reasonably be expected to be aware that they 
have not provided accurate or complete information to support their 
claim.4 This deinition matches the BSA question wording – which 
speciically references providing false information – quite closely. In 
the 2015/2016 inancial year, DWP estimated that 1.1% of beneit 
4  This is differentiated from ‘claimant error’, where the “claimant has provided inaccurate 
or incomplete information…but there is no fraudulent intent on the claimant’s part”
On average, people 
CFMJFWFJMMFHBMCFOFæU
fraud to be almost 
as common as the 
legal exploitation of 
CFOFæUTMPPQIPMFT
NatCen Social Research
British Social Attitudes 34 | Tax avoidance and benefit manipulation 23
spending in Britain meets their deinition of fraud. Even accepting 
that the share of claims that are fraudulent is slightly higher than the 
share of expenditure (see above), the BSA respondents on average 
seem to vastly overestimate beneit fraud compared to any plausible 
igure .We must bear in mind that respondents may mean something 
different by ‘fraud’ than is speciied by the question (as we have 
already discussed), and that some fraud will be undetected even by 
DWP’s robust fraud-counting exercise. Nevertheless, as one of us 
has argued in a more extensive review of whether ‘beneit myths’ 
exist (Geiger, 2016), “while it is dificult to know the true level of 
beneit fraud exactly, the public overestimate fraud compared to any 
reasonable igure.” 
While HMRC do publish estimates on the amount of tax lost to 
avoidance and evasion, they do not publish statistics on the 
proportion of taxpayers who are engaged in tax avoidance, or 
on the proportion of tax returns which include the exploitation of 
legal loopholes. Without these data it is impossible to determine 
the accuracy of the public’s perceptions of the prevalence of tax 
avoidance. However, given the large proportion of British taxpayers 
who pay tax solely through VAT and PAYE, and therefore have a 
limited ability to exploit ‘loopholes’, it is plausible that respondents 
are also overestimating the prevalence of tax avoidance. 
Have perceptions changed over time? 
While many of these questions were asked for the irst time in 2016, 
the questions about the morality of failing to declare cash-in-hand 
work of a value of £500 and the respondent’s anticipated behaviour 
in relation to this, have been asked periodically as part of the BSA 
survey series. Figure 1, which compares responses over time, shows 
that, there have been noticeable luctuations over time, but few 
systematic trends over the past twenty years. The sole exception is 
in anticipated behaviour regarding declaring cash-in-hand earnings 
for tax purposes. In 1996, almost 40% said they would not declare 
such earnings; this igure has now fallen to just 24%. While we can 
speculate that the more recent dip relects increasingly negative 
coverage of tax avoidance in the mainstream media – such as the 
Panama Papers and celebrity tax avoidance scandals (Morgan and 
Riley-Smith, 2016) – it remains unclear why the fall was sharpest 
between 1996-2002. 
In 1996, almost 40% 
said they would not 
declare such earnings; 
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Figure 1 Views on the morality of cash-in-hand work, 1996-2016 
The data on which Figure 1 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
In contrast, attitudes towards the prevalence of beneit fraud and 
manipulation have changed substantially over the years. While the 
detailed questions on the prevalence of fraud and manipulation were 
asked for the irst time in 2016, to assess how perceptions have 
changed over time we can examine three broader questions which 
address this issue. Every year we ask respondents whether they 
agree or disagree with the following statements: 
Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another
Many people who get social security don’t really deserve  
any help
Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if 
they really wanted one
The proportions agreeing or strongly agreeing with each of these 
three statements is shown in Figure 2. Previous BSA reports have 
noted the greater perceived prevalence of fraud/undeservingness in 
the late 1990s, along with the effect of the 2008-2009 recession (for 
example, Baumberg, 2014). What is new, however, is the sharp drop 
in the perceived prevalence of beneit manipulation/undeservingness 
since 2014. The proportion agreeing that most people on the dole are 
iddling has dropped from 35% to 22% in just two years. Similarly, 
the proportion saying that most social security claimants don’t 
deserve help has dropped from 32% to 21% across the same period. 
The proportion agreeing 
that most people on the 
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dropped from 35% to 
22% in just two years
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Figure 2 Views on the prevalence of beneit manipulation, 1987-2016 
The data on which Figure 2 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
Noticeably these changes have not occurred because of any 
perceived change in the labour market, with similar proportions 
saying that most unemployed people could ind a job if they really 
wanted one across the three most recent years. While we will need 
to examine the results of the 2017 survey to see if these changes 
are sustained – the smaller drops in 2006 now look like a one-year 
aberration – this may indicate an important change in the way the 
public thinks about beneit claimants. 
Do attitudes vary across society?
We inally turn to examine whether different sections of society 
hold distinct views about the morality of manipulating the tax or 
beneits systems. We might anticipate that some groups are more 
likely than others to believe that hiding money from the tax ofice or 
beneits ofice is wrong. People with particular levels of income or 
wealth would have comparatively greater and fewer opportunities to 
manipulate the tax and beneits systems – and would also be likely 
to have greater or lesser contact with others in a position to do this. 
We might anticipate that particular sections of society are more likely 
to condone behaviour that ‘they’ themselves undertake – or which is 
undertaken by others known to or similar to them. On the other hand, 
views about the morality of tax avoidance and beneit manipulation 
might be inluenced by wider political and moral attitudes and 
values – particularly the extent to which the individual holds liberal 
or authoritarian views more generally. In this section, we examine 
whether our data lend support to these two different theories.   
We might anticipate 
that particular sections 
of society are more 
likely to condone 
behaviour that they 
themselves undertake  
or which is undertaken 
by others known to or 
similar to them
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Groups deined by income 
We divided people by their reported levels of household income to 
see if richer people apply different standards to tax and beneits 
manipulation than do poorer people. To identify more accurately the 
association between income and beliefs about fraud – excluding 
where possible associations with other factors – we here present 
the results of statistical models that examine household income 
differences after removing their associations with age and sex.5 
Table 5 Income and the morality of exploiting legal loopholes (after controlling for age  
and sex)+









Adjusted % agreeing that 
always/usually wrong to use 
legal loopholes …
… to reduce tax 53 49 49 42 0.019
… to increase beneits 58 63 61 59 0.010
Adjusted % providing answers 
indicating that more wrong to 
use legal loopholes …
 
… to increase beneits 26 32 32 32 0.001
… to reduce tax 16 13 11 9 n/a++ 
Unweighted base 508 596 515 644
Adjusted % likely or very likely 
to not declare cash-in-hand 
work …
… to beneits ofice, for £500 gain 18 17 16 24 0.101
… for tax purposes, for £500 gain 22 23 24 28 0.002
Unweighted base 305 336 284 382
+ The table is based on a multinomial regression model that controls for sex and age; the 





From the analysis presented in Table 5, we can see that there is 
a correlation between income and the likelihood that people will 
believe that using legal loopholes is wrong. In particular, people in the 
highest quartile of household incomes are the least likely to think that 
5  Tables 5 and 6 present the results of multinomial logistic regression models, controlling 
for age (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-74 and 75+) and (binary) sex, using the 
standard BSA weights. The tables show average predicted probabilities across the sample, after 
controlling for these variables. 
6 The exact pre-tax household income quartiles are: Lowest (less than £1,200 per month), 
2nd lowest (£1,200-£2,200/pcm), 2nd highest (£2,201-£3,700/pcm) and Highest (more than £3,700/
pcm); the models exclude the 15% of the sample (449 people) who refused to indicate their income.
There is a correlation 
between income and the 
likelihood that people will 
believe that using legal 
loopholes is wrong
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using legal tax loopholes is wrong (42%, compared with 53% among 
those in the lowest income quartile). The highest income group are 
also the least likely to have provided responses indicating that using 
legal loopholes to reduce tax is more wrong than using loopholes to 
increase beneits (9%, compared with 16% among the lowest income 
group). The views of the highest and lowest income groups in relation 
to using legal loopholes to reduce beneits are not signiicantly 
different (although there is signiicant variation by income across this 
measure as a whole). However, the lowest income group is the least 
likely to have provided responses suggesting that it is more wrong to 
use loopholes to increase beneit payments than to use  
loopholes to reduce tax (26%, compared with 32% among all other 
income groups).
These patterns may be explained by straightforward economic 
interests: those with the highest incomes are the most likely 
beneiciaries of the exploitation of tax loopholes, whereas the 
lowest income group are the most likely beneiciaries of beneit 
manipulation. However, economic interests do not explain why 
the richest group are also relatively unlikely to say that beneit 
manipulation is wrong. This may be a consequence of those on the 
highest incomes perceiving the regular income beneit claimants 
receive to be very low – potentially justifying the exploitation of legal 
loopholes to increase it. This is consistent with more detailed analysis 
of the results shown in Table 4, which shows that the richest group 
are the most likely to say that they would fail to declare £500 to the 
tax authorities (and are also slightly – if not quite signiicantly – more 
likely to say that they would conceal earnings from the beneits 
ofice). Alternatively, it may be the case that individuals with higher 
incomes are more liberal and therefore less likely to make or act on 
moral judgements – or this group may simply consider £500 to be too 
small a sum to be worth declaring. 
Table 6 presents income-related differences in the perceived 
prevalence of fraud and manipulation. It highlights much greater 
differences by income than those discussed previously. The highest 
income group consistently think that using loopholes is much less 
common than those with lower incomes, perceiving 26 out of 100 
taxpayers on average to be using legal loopholes (compared with 
39 out of 100 among the lowest income group), and 32 out of 100 
beneit claimants to be using legal loopholes (compared with 41 out 
of 100 among the lowest income group). 
The highest income group 
consistently think that 
using loopholes is much 
less common than those 
with lower incomes
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Table 6 Income and the perceived prevalence of exploiting legal loopholes (after controlling 












Out of every 100 taxpayers/ 
claimants, adjusted average 
perceived number that have …
… exploited loophole to reduce tax 39 32 31 26 0.000
…exploited loophole to increase 
beneits
41 39 38 32 0.000
… given false information in beneit 
claim
40 38 34 26 0.000
… given false information in beneit 
claim in local area
29 26 25 18 0.000
Adjusted % providing answer 
indicating that loopholes are 
more commonly exploited …
 
… to increase beneits 38 48 48 47 0.058
… to reduce tax 27 22 23 24 n/a++ 
Unweighted base (exc. dont knows) 408-475 490-562 426-483 567-613
+ The table is based on a multinomial regression model that controls for sex and age; the 





It is possible that this variation partly relects variations in the levels 
of education of the different income groups – both in terms of 
accuracy (as we noted above, it is likely that most people provide 
considerable over-estimates of the use of legal loopholes) and 
numeracy (Ansolabehere et al., 2013). Nevertheless, Table 6 also 
shows that there are some income-related differences in whether 
legal loopholes are seen to be more commonly exploited for tax or 
beneits, with 38% of the lowest income group providing responses 
indicating that legal beneit loopholes are more commonly used  
than legal tax loopholes, compared with 47%-48% of the other 
income groups.
The perceived prevalence of illegal beneit fraud similarly varies by 
income. The highest income group think that beneit fraud is lowest 
both nationally and in their own area (26 out of 100 and 18 out of 100 
respectively), much lower than the perceived level among those in the 
lowest income group (40 out of 100 and 29 out of 100 respectively).
Groups deined by political ideology  
The BSA 34th Report as a whole examines whether we have 
witnessed a decline in liberal attitudes in recent years. Contributing 
The highest income group 
UIJOLUIBUCFOFæUGSBVE
is lowest both nationally 
and in their own area
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to this assessment, in this section we examine whether people 
whose views can broadly be classiied as liberal or authoritarian think 
differently about tax and beneit manipulation. To do this, we have 
split the population into four groups based on the standard BSA 
scales for left-right and libertarian-authoritarian attitudes  
(see Technical details): these groups have been labelled as ‘left-wing 
authoritarians’, ‘left-wing liberals’, ‘right-wing authoritarians’, and 
‘right-wing liberals’. We have divided the sample in half on  
each scale, in order to create four roughly equally-sized groups of  
the population.
The results presented in Table 7 show that political ideology is very 
important when it comes to the perceived morality of exploiting legal 
loopholes. For perceptions of tax-related morality, what matters most 
is whether people are left-wing or right-wing – 39%-42% of those 
who are right-wing think that it is wrong to use loopholes to reduce 
tax (irrespective of whether they hold liberal or authoritarian views), 
compared with 51%-58% of those who are left-wing. In contrast, 
what matters most for beneits-related morality is whether people 
hold liberal or authoritarian views – 55% of liberals think that it is 
wrong to use loopholes to increase beneits, compared with 64%-
66% of authoritarians. 
While political ideology strongly relates to moral judgements, it 
appears less important for self-reported behaviour. Liberals are 
slightly more likely than authoritarians to say that they would fail 
to declare casual earnings to the beneits ofice, but there are no 
signiicant differences around declaring earnings for tax purposes.
While political ideology 
strongly relates to moral 
judgements, it appears 
less important for self-
reported behaviour
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Adjusted % saying 
that always/usually 
wrong to use legal 
loopholes …
… to reduce tax 51 39 58 42 0.000
… to increase 
beneits
55 55 64 66 0.000
Adjusted % 
providing answer 
indicating that more 
wrong to use legal 
loopholes …
 
… to increase 
beneits 
21 30 30 40 0.000
… to reduce tax 17 8 14 8 n/a++
Unweighted base 569 585 649 543
Adjusted % likely 
or very likely to not 
declare cash-in-
hand work …
… to beneits ofice, 
for £500 gain
26 21 16 15 0.059
… for tax purposes, 
for £500 gain
27 25 21 23 0.473
Unweighted base 386 421 437 362
+ The table is based on a multinomial regression model that controls for sex and age; the 
WLYJLU[HNLZPU[OL[HISLHYL[OLH]LYHNLTHYNPUHSLMMLJ[ZHJYVZZNYV\WZKLÄULKI`WVSP[PJHSPKLVSVN`




Finally, Table 8 presents data to allow us to ascertain if there are 
ideological differences underpinning the perceived prevalence of 
beneit fraud and the use of tax/beneit loopholes. Authoritarians 
believe the prevalence of all these behaviours is greater than liberals 
do. Those holding liberal views tend to be more highly educated than 
authoritarians, so this may relect similar education-related effects 
to those noted in relation to different income groups in the previous 
section. However, it is interesting to see that authoritarians are also 
more likely to provide answers indicating that the exploitation of 
beneits loopholes is more common than the exploitation of tax 
loopholes (50-51% of authoritarians express such a view, compared 
with 38%-43% of liberals).
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Table 8 Ideology and the perceived prevalence of exploiting legal loopholes (after controlling 












Out of every 
100 taxpayers/
claimants, perceived 
number that have …
… exploited loophole 
to reduce tax
26 28 38 34 0.000
… exploited loophole 
to increase 
beneits
28 30 47 42 0.000
… given false 
information in 
beneit claim
24 25 44 39 0.000
… given false 
information in 
beneit claim in 
local area
18 16 33 26 0.000





… to increase 
beneits
38 43 50 51 0.001
… to reduce tax 30 25 22 19 n/a++
Unweighted base (exc. 
dont knows)
466-534 465-538 530-626 444-510
+ The table is based on a multinomial regression model that controls for sex and age; the 
WLYJLU[HNLZPU[OL[HISLHYL[OLH]LYHNLTHYNPUHSLMMLJ[ZHJYVZZNYV\WZKLÄULKI`WVSP[PJHSPKLVSVN`
after taking these into account.




Tax avoidance/evasion and beneit manipulation/fraud have been the 
subject of a great deal of recent political debate and policy reform, 
yet almost no studies have looked at how the public perceives these 
practices simultaneously. Using new questions asked on the 2016 
BSA survey, we show that tax avoidance and beneit manipulation 
do not seem to be morally equivalent in people’s minds; while 
both practices are perceived to be wrong by around half or more, 
beneit recipients appear to be judged more harshly for what might 
be considered a similar ‘offence’. Previous qualitative research has 
suggested that this may be because tax avoiders are perceived to be 
retaining money they have earned (Bamield and Horton, 2009), but it 
is also plausible that this double standard partly arises because of a 
5BYBWPJEBODFBOECFOFæU
manipulation do not seem 
to be morally equivalent 
in peoples minds
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generally more negative attitude towards beneit claimants (and poor 
people) as a group. 
Several other interesting indings emerge from these data. The 
public almost universally believes that lying to the ‘beneits ofice’ 
is wrong – but only a smaller majority regard concealing cash-in-
hand work from the ‘beneits ofice’ (which technically constitutes 
beneit fraud) as wrong, and relatively few would report someone 
they know to be claiming fraudulently. This nuance is consistent with 
how people make ethical decisions: people will agree to abstract, 
normatively acceptable principles, but when such principles are 
placed in concrete contexts people are more likely to see morally 
acceptable reasons to deceive (Bartels et al., 2015). We also ind 
that the public believes that fraud is higher nationally than it is in 
their local area. There appears to be a disconnect between the 
local, concrete experience of beneit fraud and the national rhetoric, 
perhaps because the preponderance of media coverage may have 
served to reinforce the sense that there is a large group of people 
somewhere in the country (even if they may not be apparent in in 
one’s own neighbourhood) who are fraudulently claiming (Lundstrom, 
2013; Tunley, 2011). 
Our most surprising inding is the sharp change in how common 
beneit fraud/manipulation is perceived to be. While 35% agreed that 
most dole claimants are ‘iddling’ in one way or another in 2014, this 
has fallen to 22% in 2016 – the lowest level recorded in 30 years. If 
this fall is sustained in future surveys, this suggests there has been 
a major shift in the perception of beneit claimants. There has also 
been a decline since the mid-1990s in the proportion of people who 
say they would be likely to conceal casual earnings to avoid tax 
(from 40% to 24%), although this predates much of the increasingly 
negative media coverage of tax avoidance schemes. However, 
despite this decline, more people would still consider concealing 
earnings from the HMRC than would consider doing so from the 
beneits ofice (though this difference is now small).
Finally, we found that different social groups perceive tax and beneit 
manipulation differently. Perhaps relecting economic interests, richer 
people are less likely to think that tax avoidance is wrong, and more 
likely to say that they personally would not declare cash-in-hand 
earnings for tax. Yet this is not just about economics: the richest 
share the relative unwillingness of the poorest to say that beneit 
manipulation is wrong, and are also the group most likely to say that 
they would conceal casual earnings from the beneits ofice. The 
role of ideology is also complex: what matters most for tax-related 
morality is whether people are left-wing or right-wing, but what 
matters most for ILULÄ[Z-related morality is whether people hold 
liberal or authoritarian views.
Overall, our results show that around half or more of the public 
is opposed to both illegal and legal manipulation of the tax and 
beneits system. However, beyond this, their feelings on the issue 
There appears to be a 
disconnect between the 
local, concrete experience 
PGCFOFæUGSBVEBOEUIF
national rhetoric
Our most surprising 
æOEJOHJTUIFTIBSQ






richer people are less 
likely to think that tax 
avoidance is wrong, and 
more likely to say that 
they personally would 
not declare cash-in-
hand earnings for tax
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are not straightforward. Despite overwhelmingly rejecting beneit 
fraud, most would not report someone they knew to be engaging 
in it, and substantial minorities are forgiving of the speciic example 
of concealing casual earnings. Similarly, while economic interests 
may shape attitudes to tax avoidance and beneit fraud, here too we 
ind that beliefs about fraud are not always entirely consistent with 
self-interested motives. Once you move beyond the obvious truisms 
(‘fraud is bad’), attitudes toward fraud and using legal loopholes 
resist easy interpretation.
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Appendix
The data for Figure 1 are shown below.
Table A.1 Views on the morality of cash-in-hand work, 1996-2016
1996 1999 2002 2006 2008 2010 2016
% wrong or seriously wrong 
not to declare £500 cash-in-
hand work …
… to beneits ofice 72 74 85 75 84 79 68
… for tax purposes 50 53 57 51 n/a  n/a  56
% fairly or very likely 
themselves to not declare 
£500 cash-in-hand work …
… to beneits ofice 24 24 18 22 17 18 20
… for tax purposes 40 34 29 29 n/a  n/a  24
Unweighted base 1038 2450 2900 2822 3000 2791 1618 
n/a = not answered
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The data for Figure 2 are shown below.
Table A.2 Views on the prevalence of beneit manipulation, 1987-2016
1987 1989 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996
% agreeing that …
Most people on the dole are iddling 32 31 28 31 34 33 35
Many people don't deserve any help 31 28 26 24 26 30 28
Most unemployed could ind a job 41 52 38 27 32 38 39
Unweighted base 1281 2604 2481 2567 2929 3135 3085 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
% agreeing that …
Most people on the dole are iddling 39 36 40 35 38 39 41
Many people don't deserve any help 32 27 31 32 36 38 39
Most unemployed could ind a job 54 56 60 63 65 66 69
Unweighted base 2531 2450 2980 2795 2900 873 2609 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
% agreeing that …
Most people on the dole are iddling 39 32 39 36 34 35 37
Many people don't deserve any help 40 29 36 37 34 35 35
Most unemployed could ind a job 69 67 67 68 55 54 56
Unweighted base 2699 2822 2672 3000 967 2791 2845 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
% agreeing that …
Most people on the dole are iddling 37 33 35 29 22
Many people don't deserve any help 35 33 32 28 21
Most unemployed could ind a job 54 54 59 60 56
Unweighted base 2855 2832 2376 2781 2400 
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Public attitudes to the government’s role in national security are comparatively iliberal. The 
public favours stronger state powers to tackle terrorism, with just over half in support of 
detaining people indeinitely without trial if a terrorist attack is suspected. Currently the law 
allows detainment without charge for a maximum of 14 days.
What should the government be allowed to do at the time of a suspected terrorist attack?
What should the government be allowed to do?
NatCen Social Research
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Civil liberties
The law, individual rights and the government’s role 
in national security
NatCen Social Research
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Public attitudes to civil liberties remain  
comparatively illiberal
Less than half of the public express a liberal view in relation to almost all of the issues 
asked about. However, attitudes have not changed in a consistent way over the past two 
decades. 
• Disagreement with the view that the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence for some 
crimes has doubled since 1986 – from 19% to 37% now. 45% agree with this view.  
• 41% think that detaining people for as long as the government wants without putting them 
on trial in times of terrorist threat should not be allowed, an increase of 10 percentage points 
since 2006 (31%). Around half (53%) think that this should be allowed.
The public is supportive of government activities in the 
area of national security
While the balance of public opinion supports government interventions despite the fact 
that these might limit individual freedoms, different sections of society express diverse 
views on this matter.
• 80% think the government deinitely or probably should have the right to keep people under 
video surveillance in public areas, while 50% think they should have the right to monitor 
emails and other information exchanged on the internet.
• People who are older, are less well-educated, are positive about the government’s success 
in dealing with threats to national security and who are concerned about immigration are all 
more likely to support government activities in relation to national security.  
Overview
Public attitudes to civil rights are comparatively illiberal and generally chime with the current 
direction of public policy – especially in relation to the government’s role in national security. 
However, the public is relatively divided on a number of issues, especially those relating 
to freedom of conscience and the rights of extremists, and attitudes have not moved in a 
consistent direction over the past two decades. And while the public is generally supportive 
of government activities in the area of national security, levels of support vary across 
different sections of society.
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A number of social, 
legal and political 
developments have 
changed the landscape 
against which attitudes 
to civil liberties need to 
be understood
Introduction
A consideration of the public’s attitudes to civil liberties is very 
timely. This topic was last examined as part of the British Social 
Attitudes (BSA) survey series more than a decade ago, based on 
data collected in 2005 (Johnson and Gearty, 2007). In the interim, 
a number of social, legal and political developments have changed 
the landscape against which attitudes to civil liberties need to be 
understood. In the main, these developments have resulted in public 
policy moving in an ‘illiberal’ direction, with the government tending 
to acquire greater authority and powers, at the expense of individual 
freedoms – in order to prevent and counter emerging forms of 
terrorism and criminality. Moreover, at the time of writing, the terrorist 
attacks that took place in Manchester and London between March 
and June 2017 forced campaigning for the 2017 General Election 
to shift its focus towards issues of national security, prompting 
discussion and assessment of past and future policy approaches in 
this area. 
For the purpose of this chapter (and accepting that this is itself 
contentious) we adopt a wide and inclusive deinition of civil liberties 
– encapsulating both positive ‘rights to’ and negative ‘freedoms from’ 
– that correlates broadly with more modern conceptions of human 
rights, guaranteed to individual citizens by law. Both implicate the 
state but in different ways. A ‘right to’ involves a correlative duty 
to provide – such as the right to a fair trial – and to protect from 
harms caused by others, including non-state private parties, as 
would be involved in the full and proper realisation of the right not 
to be tortured. On the other hand, the freedoms that citizens have 
to assemble, to protest and to express themselves imposes ‘simply’ 
a duty of forbearance: citizens should be entitled to do so without 
interference or surveillance from the government. Many, indeed most, 
have both negative and positive limbs – the right to liberty imposes a 
duty on the state not to detain citizens arbitrarily but also to provide 
an effective mechanism for those who are arrested to challenge 
the legality of their detention. Similarly, the right to privacy means 
not only that the state should not subject citizens to unwarranted 
surveillance (freedom from) but should also ensure that citizens 
have the right to take effective enforcement against Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) in respect of data they hold on their websites.  
In the irst part of this chapter, we examine attitudes to civil liberties 
from three distinct stand-points – from the perspectives of the law, 
the rights of the individual and the role of government in relation to 
national security (which arguably has the potential to conlict with 
individual rights and freedoms). We examine whether the current 
direction of law and policy-making is relected in the public’s 
attitudes and preferences and, where time series data is available, 
we consider whether the public’s attitudes have followed the same 
direction as law and policy-making in recent times (by becoming 
comparatively illiberal), or are now more at odds with the positions of 
politicians, policy and law-makers than they were in the past.
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Given current debates around the government’s role in national 
security, the second part of the chapter seeks to further our 
understanding of attitudes in this area. In particular we examine 
how consistently the public supports government intervention in 
relation to national security and whether individuals tend to support 
government intervention per se or whether support depends on 
the nature of the interventions being considered (and their potential 
impacts on the individual). We also examine the attitudes and 
characteristics which are linked with and help to explain preferences 
for the role of government in this area. In doing so, we seek to 
ascertain how far the current roles and powers of the government in 
relation to national security chime with public preferences and the 
extent to which we are united or divided in our views on this topic – 
our hypothesis being that what we ind out in relation to these two 
issues may shed light on likely public responses to future policy 
development and legislation in this area.   
The changing social, legal and policy 
context 
To inform our examination of the data, we irst consider the changing 
social, legal and policy context against which attitudes to civil 
liberties need to be interpreted. This context is best understood 
against the backdrop of several signiicant changes that have 
occurred over the past two decades, most notably: 
• the advent of international terrorism, in contrast to (in the UK 
context) terrorism linked to Irish republicanism, nationalism and 
Unionism;
• rapid technological expansion – in the form of the internet, 
social media, smart phones –availing citizens of speedier 
communications and access to information but allowing 
governments greater powers to monitor their activities;
• the passing of the Human Rights Act (HRA) in 1998 in the 
irst year of the Labour Government, as part of its package of 
constitutional reform, bringing into domestic law for the irst 
time the package of human rights contained in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); 
• EU enlargement in 2004 extending rights of free movement to 
the citizens of several central and eastern European countries 
opening up borders, including the UK’s, to the prospect of 
immigration on a much larger scale; and
• the global economic crash of 2008, and bank bail-out, leading 
across the western world to recovery programmes usually typiied 
as ‘austerity’ – an often drastic cutting of public sector spending. 
These developments have often been in tension, yet have sometimes 
reinforced or complemented each other, in terms of their impacts 
on individuals, societies and governments. In general, they have 
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given citizens greater freedom – of movement, expression and 
communication, while placing countries such as the UK at greater 
risk of terrorist attack, while arguably reducing their capacity to 
respond to or prevent it. As a result, they have given rise to measures 
which might be regarded as limiting or violating civil liberties – in 
order to protect life and to counter criminality more generally.
The growth of (generally) Islamic terrorism since 2001 has in turn 
led to calls for increasing the capacity of the police and MI5/MI6 
to engage in surveillance – of Facebook accounts and websites 
visited – as well as fuelling concerns over immigration, irrespective 
of whether terrorist attacks (actual or thwarted) are committed by 
home-grown and home-groomed UK citizens. The HRA over its 
near 20-year lifetime has seen the notion of ‘human rights’ move to 
centre-stage in domestic policy debates for the irst time yet has 
been unable to stem the tide of increasingly authoritarian legislation 
passed by governments of all parties – often in the guise of needing 
to deal with the terrorist threat. This legislation includes the ban 
on demonstrations around Westminster – in place between 2005-
2011 – as well as a series of Acts designed to enhance the power 
of the security services and the police to have access to and retain 
communications data, dating from 2000 with the most recent in 2016. 
Human rights legislation has also, in general, not prevented a range 
of counter-terrorism measures being implemented, commencing in 
2001 with detention without charge of foreign terrorist suspects and 
leading to increased policing powers of stop, search, and detention 
as well as considerable changes to the UK’s historic attachment to 
‘open justice’. While the ready and cheap availability of social media 
sites, such as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp, have enhanced the 
ability ordinary citizens have to organise and participate politically 
and indeed to counter what has been termed the mainstream 
media (MSM), this development has also availed the state with 
greater capacity to monitor its citizens and their everyday activities. 
Another key shift of the past decade or so has been in the regulatory 
opportunities afforded to private companies – such as Google and 
Facebook – and indeed the commercialisation of private, personal 
information and data. This shift from public to private has been 
hastened by the current economic climate – the withdrawal of the 
state from historic public sector provision, in areas such as criminal 
justice and welfare, in the name of eficiency and cost-saving. Again, 
while the HRA has ushered in more secure protection for rights such 
as freedom of expression, the need (or perceived need) to deal with 
terrorism, particularly indoctrination, has led to curbs on free speech 
in the guise of criminalising the encouragement of terrorism, by for 
example glorifying it, and to restrictions on foreign travel even to the 
extent of removing individuals’ passports. 
The three main UK parties have remained fairly consistent in their 
attitude to the HRA since its inception. Both Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats fought the 2010 and 2015 General Elections committed to 
retaining it and to remaining members of the ECHR.  
The Conservatives have a longer pedigree, ighting both elections 
on a pledge to repeal the HRA and replace it with a British Bill of 
Rights, albeit without a concurrent commitment to leave the ECHR, 
though this has been loated on several occasions over the past 
decade. The Conservative approach can be traced back to August 
2004 when (then) shadow Home Secretary David Davis announced 
a review, calling the HRA a “seriously malfunctioning Act” which 
had “spawned too many spurious rights…fuelled a compensation 
culture out of all sense and proportion and all too often it seems to 
give criminals more rights than the victims of crime.” (Hall, 2004). In 
2011, with David Cameron (when he was leader of the opposition) 
having listed the HRA third in his 10 pledges (Pascoe-Watson, 2009) 
and after their 2010 General Election victory, the Conservative-led 
coalition established a commission on a Bill of Rights to investigate 
possibilities. Only the presence of the Liberal Democrats in the 
coalition prevented full-blown repeal. The commission reached 
deadlock and reported in 2012 without any clear recommendations. It 
was not just the Conservatives, either in opposition or in government, 
who voiced concern though generally this was expressed in response 
to speciic judgments rather than suggesting repeal of the whole 
human rights framework1.
While it would not be wholly accurate to portray legal developments 
over the past 10 years or so as being all one-way illiberal trafic, a 
fair assessment would conclude that this was the general trend. 
In fact, with one or two rare exceptions, where that path has 
deviated it has generally been informed by the judicial arm. It is rare 
indeed for parliament, whether with a Labour majority, coalition or 
Conservative majority, unilaterally to have acted to liberalise the 
law. Exceptions would be, in the area of public order – the removal 
of the absolute ban on demonstrations around Westminster (in 
2011) – and repeal of the Identity Cards Act 2006 in 2010, both by 
the coalition government. By contrast, the judiciary has been active 
domestically – empowered and perhaps emboldened by the HRA 
– in seeking to protect human rights and preserve an appropriate 
balance between state power and civil liberties2. On the other hand, 
instances of legislation that greatly enhance the opportunities for 
the state to encroach on individual freedom are numerous. Taking 
as our focus policing powers in relation to counter-terrorism and 
surveillance, we might note the increase in the power to stop and 
search without requiring reasonable suspicion (though tightened 
up following a ruling of the ECHR), powers to detain and question 
1  Speciic examples include John Reid and Tony Blair after the so-called Afghan hijackers 
case and David Blunkett after a ruling in relation to the ining of lorry drivers who unwittingly brought 
in stowaways: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/dec/06/humanrights.immigration
2  Notable examples would include: the decision in the Belmarsh case ((HUK6[OLYZ]
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56) – holding that it breached the ECHR 
to detain without charge only foreign terrorist suspects; the successful challenge by Tom Watson to 
the data retention scheme on grounds that it was in breach of EU Law (speciically the guarantee 
of privacy), and the challenge to the fact that placement on the sex offender register had no right 
of appeal (R (on the application of F and Thompson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2010] UKSC 17). The irst and third led to parliament stepping in and passing legislation directly to 
rectify the matter. The second was referred back to the UK courts, where it had begun, by the EU 
Court, the CJEU.
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at ports and airports, increased powers of proscription, expansion 
of the number of terrorism-related offences including speaking 
at terrorist meetings, and the replacement of indeinite detention 
without charge with control orders (limiting terrorist suspects’ rights 
of association, communication and liberty to move freely) . In terms 
of surveillance, the last couple of years have seen two major Acts. 
The most recent, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, supplants the 
earlier Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. The 2016 
Act, known to some as the ‘Snooper’s Charter’, brings together 
all of the powers already available to obtain communications and 
data about communications and introduces a ‘double-lock’ for 
interception warrants. However, it also allows for obtaining and 
retaining communications data, such as internet connection records, 
for law enforcement to identify, for example, which websites or 
search terms a device has connected to, and makes provision for 
bulk interception, bulk acquisition, bulk equipment interference and 
bulk personal dataset warrants.
Generally speaking then, policy and law over the past decade – 
particularly when instigated by parliament and broadly supported by 
the main political parties – has tended to move in an illiberal direction, 
with the government acquiring greater authority and powers, at the 
expense of individual freedoms. We now turn to assess how far this 
policy position and direction chimes with current public attitudes and 
recent trends in attitudinal change.  
Attitudes to civil liberties  
Attitudes to the law
The BSA survey includes a range of questions which tap into 
respondents’ attitudes to civil liberties in relation to the role of the 
law. Two long-standing questions measure the extent to which 
people prioritize freedom of conscience over adherence to the law. 
First of all, we ask respondents:   
In general, would you say that people should obey the law 
without exception, or are there exceptional occasions on 
which people should follow their consciences even if it means 
breaking the law?
We also include a question on the survey each year, as part of our 
long-standing libertarian-authoritarian scale (further details on which 
can be found in the Technical details), which asks respondents 
whether they agree or disagree that:  
The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law  
is wrong  
Currently, less than half of the public express a ‘liberal’ position in 
relation to these statements. Slightly less than half (47%) express the 
view that there are exceptional occasions on which people should 
follow their conscience (even if this means breaking the law) – while 
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an almost identical proportion (46%) express the alternative view 
– that people should obey the law without exception. Meanwhile, 
only around 1 in 4 (24%) disagree that the law should always be 
obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong – while around 4 in 10 (38%) 
agree with this view (35% neither agree nor disagree). The lower 
proportion expressing a liberal view in relation to the second question 
may relect the availability of the less committal (“neither agree 
nor disagree”) answer option. Regardless, these data provide little 
evidence that the public currently prioritizes freedom of conscience 
over adherence to the law.  
The BSA survey includes two further questions on attitudes to the 
law, which can be interpreted as relecting attitudes to civil liberties, 
in terms of individual rights to freedom and rights to life respectively. 
We regularly ask respondents: 
All systems of justice make mistakes, but which do you think is 
worse ...to convict an innocent person or to let a guilty person 
go free?  
Meanwhile, as part of our libertarian-authoritarian scale, we ask 
respondents each year whether they agree or disagree with the 
following statement: 
For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate 
sentence 
Once again, there is little evidence of a public consensus on these 
issues. Just over half (55%) agree with the view that it is worse to 
convict an innocent person than to let a guilty person go free (a 
classic liberal standpoint) – while 1 in 4 (23%) adopt the opposite 
viewpoint (that, of the two options, it is worse to let a guilty person 
go free). Again, we encounter a considerable degree of ambivalence 
or uncertainty – with 2 in 10 (19%) indicating that they were unable 
to choose a response. Meanwhile, when it comes to views on the 
death penalty, slightly less than 4 in 10 (37%) disagree that for some 
crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence, while a 
slightly larger proportion (45%) agree with this viewpoint (16% neither 
agree nor disagree). 
Clearly then, from the perspective of the application of the law, 
the public is relatively divided in its attitudes to civil liberties, with 
evidence of a considerable degree of ambivalence. In none of the 
four scenarios asked about do a substantial majority of the public 
favour the more ‘liberal’ standpoint. This might imply that there is 
little evidence that public views are at odds with the illiberal direction 
in which policy and law in the UK in relation to civil liberties appears 
to be moving. We can explore this assumption further by examining 
whether responses to these questions have moved in a similar 
direction to the broad thrust of government policy (outlined in the 
previous section) over the past two decades.      
Figure 1 depicts support for the ‘liberal’ position in relation to each of 
the questions discussed above and how this has changed over the 
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lifetime of the survey (in each case, the ‘non-liberal’ view has moved 
in a roughly opposing direction). A number of trends are immediately 
apparent. On the two questions which measure support for freedom 
of conscience as opposed to adherence to the law, support for the 
liberal position has declined since the early 1990s. Support for the 
view that there are exceptional occasions in which people should 
follow their own conscience, even if this means breaking the law, rose 
between the early 1980s and the mid 1990s, but has now declined 
to a level not signiicantly different to when the question was irst 
asked (43% in 1986, 47% now). Similarly, disagreement with the view 
that the law should be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong has 
declined from a high point of 37% in 1991 to 24% now – somewhat 
lower than when the question was irst asked in 1986. These trends 
lend weight to the theory that the broad direction of British policy 
and law in relation to civil liberties relects, rather than conlicts with, 
changes in public attitudes. 
Figure 1 Proportions expressing liberal attitudes to the law, 1985-2016
The data on which Figure 1 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
When it comes to our measures of support for individual rights (to 
freedom and to life), a different pattern is evident – with greater 
evidence of a recent increase in support for the liberal position. 
Agreement with the view that it is worse to convict an innocent 
person than to let a guilty person go free declined up until 2006 – 
from 67% in 1985 to 51%, although there is some evidence that 
this trend has reversed in the last decade (support has risen by 4 
percentage points to 55% - though, given the small number of data 
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points available, it is not possible to pin-point the exact timing of this 
change). However, it is in attitudes to the death penalty that we see 
the most consistent and dramatic shift towards a liberal position. 
Disagreement with the view that the death penalty is the most 
appropriate sentence for some crimes has risen by 9 percentage 
points since 2006 and has almost doubled since the question was 
irst asked in 1986 – having risen by 18 percentage points overall – 
from 19% to 37%. Over the same period, levels of agreement with 
the view that the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence 
for some crimes changed even more dramatically, declining from 
74% in 1996 to 45% now. Given the fact that the death penalty was 
abolished for murder in Britain in 1969 (but was technically still in 
force until 1999, when it was formally abolished by the signing of 
the Sixth Protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights), 
this trend indicates that, while public attitudes have to some extent 
moved into line with public policy, almost half still adopt a position 
which is less liberal.    
Generally speaking then, attitudes to civil liberties, as they relate 
to the law, do not appear to have moved in a consistent direction 
in recent times. Yet, overall, they do not appear to be dramatically 
at odds with the recent general direction of government policy. 
While the public is clearly divided on these issues, in no case does 
a sizable majority support the more liberal position. And, generally 
speaking, attitudes have shifted over the last two decades in an 
illiberal direction or, in the case of the death penalty, still relect a 
position, albeit to a lesser degree, which is less liberal than current 
policy and law.  
The rights of individuals 
We next consider a number of questions which measure attitudes 
to civil liberties from the perspective of individual freedoms and 
rights – in terms of freedom of expression and the rights to assembly 
and to protest. The BSA survey has asked two sets of questions 
which encapsulate attitudes to these rights and freedoms at regular 
intervals since 1985 – the irst in relation to people or organisations 
in general and the second with regard to people whose views are 
considered extreme. Speciically, we ask respondents: 
There are many ways people or organisations can protest 
against a government action they strongly oppose. Please 
show which you think should be allowed and which should not 
be allowed …
Organising public meetings to protest against the government
Organising protest marches and demonstrations
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asked in 1986
There are some people whose views are considered extreme 
by the majority. Consider people who want to overthrow the 
government by revolution. Do you think such people should be 
allowed to…
… hold public meetings to express their views?
… publish books expressing their views?
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the public is more supportive of 
the rights of “people and organisations” to express their views, 
compared with people whose views are considered extreme. The 
vast majority, around 9 in 10, think that “people or organisations” 
should be allowed to organize public meetings to protest against the 
government, while almost 7 in 10 think they should be allowed to 
organise protest marches and demonstrations. Only small minorities 
disagree that people or organisations should be allowed to undertake 
these activities (9% and 20% respectively).   
Table 1 Attitudes to the right of people and organisations to protest against the 
government, 1985–2016 
1985 1986 1990 1994 1996 2005 2006 2016
% saying “deinitely” or 
“probably” should be allowed
Organising public meetings to 
protest against he government 
85 83 88 84 85 84 86 87
Organising protest marches and 
demonstrations
66 58 70 68 68 73 77 73
Unweighted base 1530 1321 1197 970 989 860 930 1563
When it comes to the rights of those whose views are considered 
extreme to express their views, the public is more divided. Around 
half in each case think that such individuals should be allowed to 
hold public meetings to express their views (while 46% think this 
should probably or deinitely not be allowed) or should be allowed 
to publish books to the same ends (38% express the opposing 
view). Clearly, the public draws a distinction between the freedoms 
and rights they think that people or organisations in general, and 
extremists in particular, should be allowed. In this sense, it is arguable 
that the tightening of public policy in relation to the latter group 
chimes with public attitudes by better relecting this distinction.
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Table 2 Attitudes to the rights of people whose views are considered extreme, 1985–2016
1985 1990 1996 2005 2006 2016
% saying people who want to 
overthrow the government by 
revolution  should “deinitely” or 
“probably” be allowed to …
… hold public meetings to express their 
views 
52 49 47 42 46 50
… publish books expressing their views 64 58 58 47 50 53
Unweighted base 1530 1197 989 860 860 1563
Support for the right of people and organisations to protest against 
the government by organising public meetings has remained 
relatively stable since it was irst measured in the mid 1980s, with 
between 8 in 10 and 9 in 10 people expressing support at any given 
point in time. Support for the organisation of protest marches and 
demonstrations has been rather more volatile, but has remained 
comparatively high over the past decade, with slightly more than 7 in 
10 endorsing these activities. Different trends are evident in relation 
to the rights of extremists however. The level of support for the right 
of extremists to hold public meetings is not signiicantly different to 
that recorded in 1985; about half express support for this activity, 
although support has dipped and risen in the intervening decades. 
On the other hand, while support for the rights of extremists to 
publish books is considerably lower than when irst measured in 
1985 (53% compared with 64%) is has actually risen slightly, but 
signiicantly, in the past decade. In this area then, it is arguable 
that the adoption of a more ‘illiberal’ position by the government 
over the past two decades does not relect (and has not prompted) 
comparable shifts in public opinion.   
The role of government in national security 
We inally consider two sets of questions which measure attitudes 
to civil liberties from the perspective of the role of the government 
in relation to national security. The irst set of three questions, 
introduced in 2006, seeks to measure public preferences for the 
government’s role in a time of terrorist attack. We ask respondents: 
Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was 
about to happen.  Do you think the authorities should have the 
right to…
… detain people for as long as they want without putting them 
on trial?
… tap people’s telephone conversations?
… stop and search people in the street at random?  
In each instance, the proposed government action can be viewed 
as being in direct conlict, to different degrees, with individual rights 
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and freedoms – for instance, the right for the authorities to tap 
people’s telephone conversations can be seen as conlicting with an 
individual’s right to privacy. 
As shown in Table 3, in each case at least a majority of the public 
supports the government having the right to undertake the speciied 
activity in a time of a suspected terrorist attack. Around half (53%) 
think that the government should have the right to detain people 
for as long as they want, without putting them on trial, while 7 in 
10 (70%) think the government should be able to stop and search 
people in the street at random. Meanwhile, almost 8 in 10 (77%) 
think that the government should have the right to tap people’s 
telephone conversations. In each case, only a minority express what 
can be interpreted as the ‘liberal’ view – that prioritizes individual civil 
liberties over the right of the government to intervene. Opposition to 
government intervention is most widespread in relation to detaining 
people indeinitely without putting them on trial, with 41% opposing 
this – while only around 2 in 10 oppose allowing each of the other 
activities asked about. Given that the questions broadly relect the 
nature of the activities the government is currently permitted to 
undertake in times of a suspected terrorist attack and, in the case 
both of detention and stop and search3 specify even greater powers 
than currently exist, these data suggest that public preferences for 
the government’s role, at least in a time of terrorist attack, broadly 
relect the current policy position.
Table 3 Attitudes to the rights of government in times of terrorist attack, 2006 and 2016
2006 2016
Detain people for as long as they want without putting them 
on trial
% %
Government should have right 64 53
Government should not have right 31 41
Tap people’s telephone conversations % %
Government should have right 73 77
Government should not have right 20 16
Stop and search people in the street at random % %
Government should have right 73 70
Government should not have right 21 24
Unweighted base 930 1563
However, a comparison of these levels of support with those 
recorded in 2006 does not suggest that attitudes have moved 
unanimously in an illiberal direction, in line with government policy. 
Indeed, opposition to detaining people indeinitely has risen by 10 
3  Detention has, since 2011, been limited to 14 days without charge, while stop and search 
since 2012 has required a senior oficer reasonably to suspect that an act of terrorism will take 
place before authorising the blanket power to stop and search. 
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percentage points since 2006 – suggesting that public opinion has 
moved in the opposite direction to policy and legal change around 
detention (and indeed may relect a reaction to increased government 
powers in this area). On the other hand, however, opposition to 
tapping telephone conversations has fallen slightly but signiicantly 
by 4 percentage points, while opposition to stop and search has 
not changed signiicantly over the same period – despite the more 
extensive and wide-ranging use of these two practices detailed 
previously. 
In the BSA 2016 survey, we introduced a further set of questions to 
measure support for the government’s role in national security. We 
asked respondents:
Now some questions about civil liberties and public security.
Do you think that the British government should or should not 
have the right to do the following:
Keep people under video surveillance in public areas? 
Monitor emails and any other information exchanged on the 
internet? 
Collect information about anyone living in Britain without their 
knowledge? 
Collect information about anyone living in other countries 
without their knowledge?
As shown in Table 4, levels of support for the different activities 
asked about vary markedly. While 8 in 10 (80%) people think that 
the government should have the right to keep people under video 
surveillance in public areas, only 5 in 10 (50%) think they should 
have the right to monitor emails and other information exchanged on 
the internet – perhaps because, in contrast to the irst activity asked 
about, this is viewed as a ‘private’ rather than a ‘public’ sphere. 
Meanwhile, when it comes to collecting information about individuals 
without their knowledge, 6 in 10 (60%) think the government should 
have the right to do this in relation to people living in Britain, although 
the level of support is somewhat lower when this activity is proposed 
in relation to those living abroad (around 5 in 10 (50%) support this). 
Interestingly, less than half in each instance oppose the government 
having these rights – a similar pattern to that found in relation to 
government rights in a time of imminent terrorist attack discussed 
previously. Taken together, these data suggest considerable public 
support for government monitoring and surveillance of individual 
activities, both in peacetime and in time of terrorist attack.  
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Monitor emails and any other information 
exchanged on the internet 
% 50 43 1531
Collect information about anyone living in 
Britain without their knowledge 
% 60 33 1531
Collect information about anyone living in 
other countries without their knowledge 
% 49 42 1531
Overall then, we ind little evidence that the current nature and 
direction of government policy is at odds with the views and 
preferences of a majority of the public. Nevertheless, it is important 
to recognize the substantial nuances in public attitudes; while in the 
area of the law the public is fairly evenly divided, with around half 
expressing an illiberal position in relation to civil liberties, there is 
markedly greater support for civil liberties when examined in relation 
to individual rights (although this support becomes more muted 
when those rights are applied to extremists). Meanwhile, when it 
comes to the role of government, there is considerable support for an 
‘authoritarian’ position in relation to national security – with majorities 
of the public supporting the range of activities the government is 
currently permitted to undertake in this area, which can be regarded 
as being in conlict with civil liberties. However, with the exception 
of attitudes to the death penalty and attitudes to detaining people 
indeinitely, there is little evidence of substantial attitudinal change 
over the past two decades. Attitudes to the death penalty continue 
to remain more illiberal than the current legal position, although they 
appear to be gradually moving in line with public policy. Meanwhile, 
opposition to the government’s right to detain suspects indeinitely in 
times of terrorist attack has increased, which may be in response to 
the extension of government powers in this area.  
Given current debates around the government’s role in national 
security, we next examine attitudes on this topic in more detail – 
examining in particular the extent to which individual support for 
government action in relation to national security is consistent or 
nuanced and the attitudes and characteristics that link with and may 
help explain public preferences in this area.   
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National security: understanding public 
preferences
How consistent is support for government action? 
As noted above, around half or more of the public (and often 
substantially higher proportions) think that each of the seven actions 
the government might undertake in relation to national security, when 
a terrorist attack is suspected or in peacetime, should be allowed. 
Do the majority of individuals tend to support government action 
in this area per se, or is support more nuanced, depending on the 
types of actions being considered and their potential impact on civil 
liberties? An examination of the correlations between each pair of 
items suggests that the former assumption is correct. Speciically, we 
ind high positive correlations between support for the government 
tapping telephones and undertaking stop and search in a time of 
terrorist attack, and between support for the government collecting 
information about anyone living in Britain, and anyone living abroad, 
without their knowledge4. Overall, we ind a moderate or high degree 
of correlation between nine of the 21 pairs of items examined. This 
suggests that it is worth considering how broader attitudes and 
values may be underpinning and inluencing speciic preferences in 
this area.  
We undertook factor analysis to identify the presence of any ‘latent’ 
attitudes – that is, broader attitudes or value systems which might 
explain some degree of the variation on the seven measures of 
attitudes to the government’s role in relation to national security. A 
model, depicted in Figure 2, emerged containing two factors which 
explain 66% of the variance in attitudes on the seven measures. 
The irst of these ‘factors’, which explains 51% of this variance, 
can be interpreted as representing general support for government 
intervention in the area of national security. This factor might relect 
an ‘illiberal’ stance in relation to civil liberties per se or more general 
support for government intervention or ‘big’ government.
4  For the purpose of this analysis, a very high correlation was deined as 0.8-1, a high 
correlation as 0.6-0.8, a moderate correlation as 0.4-0.6, a low correlation as 0.2-0.4 and a very low 
correlation as 0-0.2 (or, in each case, the negative equivalents). 
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Figure 2 Factors underpinning preferences for the role of government in the area of  
national security 
The data on which Figure 2 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
While the second factor explains far less of the variance (16%) in 
attitudes in this area, it nevertheless offers an interpretation of a 
further cross-cutting factor that may be inluencing preferences 
in relation to the seven government activities examined. This 
second factor links with support for the three government activities 
asked about in relation to a time of terrorist attack - but links with 
opposition to allowing government to undertake the remaining four 
activities, where the speciic circumstances in which they would be 
permitted were not speciied. This suggests that views in this area to 
some extent relect a reaction to the circumstances of government 
action, with a perception that actions are more acceptable or justiied 
in times of suspected terrorist attack. 
Broadly speaking then, this analysis lends support to the idea 
that views about the activities government should be allowed to 
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undertake in the area of national security are, to a large extent, 
underpinned by broader attitudes, values and considerations. This 
suggests that public preferences for government actions in relation to 
national security might tend to move in a consistent direction in the 
future – although the data on attitudes to detention presented above 
indicates that this may not always be the case and that reactions to 
policy change may have a greater impact.  
Given there is considerable evidence that individuals tend to support 
or oppose government action in relation to national security per se, 
and that this support or opposition is underpinned by more general 
attitudes and considerations, we inally consider which sections of 
society tend to support and oppose government action in this area. 
Who supports and opposes government action? 
For each respondent we created a ‘role of government’ score (out 
of seven) with a high score relecting the belief that a comparatively 
large number of government actions should deinitely or probably be 
allowed and a low score indicating approval for a smaller number of 
government actions.  
We envisaged that levels of support for government action in the 
area of national security might vary by a range of demographic 
characteristics and broader attitudes and values. Previous research 
has indicated that attitudes to civil liberties are linked to age and 
levels of education, with people who are younger and more highly 
educated being more likely to express a ‘liberal’ view (in other words, 
opposing the government’s right to undertake various activities) 
(Johnson and Gearty, 2007). This was indeed the case; when we 
analysed our ‘role of government’ score by these demographic 
characteristics; the average number of government actions 
supported rose signiicantly with age, with those aged 18-245 and 25-
34 expressing support for 3.6 and 4.2 government actions compared 
with 5.1 and 4.8 for those aged 65-74 and 75+. Similarly, people 
with a degree supported 4.3 interventions on average, compared 
with 4.8 among those with no qualiications. Interestingly, we did not 
ind any signiicant variation by sex. We also envisaged that location 
might make a difference, as those living in London might perceive 
themselves to be at greater risk of a security or terrorist threat and 
thus be more supportive of government intervention in this area. 
However, this was not the case; the level of support for government 
actions expressed by those living in London was not signiicantly 
different to that reported by those living in other regions.  
Logically, it seems plausible that attitudes to government intervention 
in the area of national security might relate to a range of broader 
value systems and to attitudes in associated areas. We have already 
seen that a factor analysis of these questions reveals a latent attitude 
or value system, explaining more than half of the variation in attitudes 
in this area. It therefore comes as no surprise that an analysis by our 
5  Caution needs to be applied to this inding, as the number of respondents aged 18-24 is 
<100.   
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libertarian-authoritarian scale reveals that those who generally hold 
a ‘libertarian’ outlook are less supportive of government intervention, 
with the opposite being true for those who tend to hold an 
‘authoritarian’ outlook. While the former group supports government 
intervention in 3.0 scenarios on average, the latter favours an average 
of 5.1 government activities. This suggests that the latent attitude 
identiied by our factor analysis may in fact relect a traditional 
libertarian-authoritarian value system.   
There is a substantial literature demonstrating that attitudes to civil 
liberties are strongly associated with political outlook, although the 
most recent analysis of BSA data on this issue (Johnson and Gearty, 
2007) indicated that this relationship had become less marked. 
Nevertheless, we ind that those classiied as having a ‘left-wing’ 
outlook on our left-right scale (see Technical appendix for further 
details) support 4.4 of the government actions asked about, while 
the equivalent average igure for those with a ‘right-wing’ outlook is 
5.3.  It has been argued that attitudes to civil liberties of supporters 
of different political parties have tended to converge as the stances 
of ‘their’ parties have become more alike, with the Labour Party in 
particular coming to advocate a less libertarian position throughout 
the late 1990s and early 2000s). Indeed, as demonstrated in our 
overview of recent policy and legislation, the positions of the main 
political parties have not been substantively different in the past 
decade, which might lead us to anticipate that the views of ‘their’ 
supporters in relation to national security are now fairly similar. 
Nevertheless, we ind that the average level of support among 
Labour supporters for government actions in the area of national 
security is still markedly lower than that expressed by Conservative 
supporters – 4.0 compared with 5.3 (with the views of those with no 
party afiliation, at an average of 4.4, falling in between them). This 
may, in part, be explained by the fact that people whose party is in 
power tend to be more supportive of the activities the government of 
the day undertakes (Butler and Stokes, 1974). 
In addition to these broader attitudes, it seemed likely that attitudes 
to government intervention in the area of national security might link 
with and be inluenced by attitudes to a range of related issues. In the 
irst place, those with more favourable attitudes to the government 
might be more supportive of them undertaking the range of actions 
asked about. This indeed turns out to be the case. We regularly ask 
respondents how much they “trust British governments of any party 
to place the needs of the nation above the interests of their own 
political party”. Those who were more trusting of government tended 
to be more supportive of government action in the area of national 
security. People who trust government “just about always” or “most 
of the time” supported government intervention in an average of 
4.8 scenarios, compared with 4.1 for those who said they trust 
government “almost never”. 
The 2016 survey also asked respondents how successful they 
thought the government in Britain is nowadays on a range of matters 
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including “dealing with threats to Britain’s security”. Generally, we 
found the public’s assessment to be positive, with 72% rating the 
government as “very” or “quite successful”, and just 9% regarding 
them as “very” or “quite unsuccessful”. It was envisaged that 
attitudes on this matter could link with support for government 
intervention in the area of national security in a number of ways. 
First, it might be that those who view the government as inherently 
successful at dealing with threats to national security are more 
supportive of government intervention in this area – because they see 
it as having the potential to achieve effective results. Alternatively, it 
might be that those who perceive the government as unsuccessful in 
this area do so because they do not feel it has all the powers needed 
to be successful (and thus support a greater number of powers). 
On balance, the evidence suggests our irst theory is more likely to 
be true; people who think the government is “very successful” at 
dealing with threats to national security support an average of 5.2 
actions, compared with 3.6 for those who view the government as 
“neither successful or unsuccessful” and 4.3 for those (albeit a small 
proportion) who perceive the government to be “quite” or “very 
unsuccessful”. Therefore, on both these measures, those who hold a 
more positive view of the government tend to be more supportive of 
its role in the area of national security. 
Finally, we envisaged that an individual’s support for government 
intervention in the area of national security might be mediated by 
more general priorities and concerns. The 2016 survey included a 
question asking respondents to identify, from a list, the areas they 
are “concerned or worried about at the moment”. Two of the options 
listed theoretically have the potential to intersect with attitudes to the 
government’s role in relation to national security. It seemed plausible 
that people who are concerned about “immigration” or “crime in your 
local area” might be more supportive of government intervention in 
the area of national security – as a mechanism for addressing these 
concerns. Indeed, when BSA data on civil liberties was last analyzed, 
concern about terrorism was found to have a considerable role to 
play in promoting support for government intervention (Johnson 
and Gearty, 2007). In both instances, this still appears to be the 
case. People who identify immigration as a current concern support 
government intervention in an average of 5.2 cases (compared 
with 4.3 for those who are not concerned about immigration). Less 
markedly, those who are concerned about crime in their local area 
support government action in the area of national security in 4.9 
instances (compared with 4.5 for those who are not concerned about 
this issue).  
Clearly then, support for government action in the area of national 
security links with, and may be inluenced by, a wide range of 
characteristics, and broader and related attitudes. However, we know 
that many of these characteristics and attitudes relate to each other; 
for instance, younger age groups tend to be more highly educated 
(due to the recent expansion in higher education), while those who 
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express a ‘libertarian’ outlook also tend to be left-wing. To identify 
the characteristics which are signiicantly associated with attitudes 
to the government’s role in the area of national security, once the 
relationships between them have been controlled for, we ran a linear 
regression model with the dependent variable being the number 
of government actions (out of seven) which the respondent thinks 
should be allowed. The results of this analysis are presented in the 
appendix to this chapter.  
Of the seven measures included in the model (where a signiicant 
relationship with our ‘role of government’ score was identiied in 
the analysis reported above), four were found to be signiicantly 
associated with support for government activities in the area of 
national security – age, level of education, views on the success of 
the British government in dealing with threats to national security, 
and current concern about immigration. The average ‘role of 
government’ scores of groups deined by these characteristics are 
depicted in Figure 3. The extent to which the individual holds right 
or left-wing views and their level of trust in government were less 
important in explaining attitudes to this topic, although both factors 
remain signiicantly associated with the ‘role of government’ score, 
even when their links with other measures had been controlled for. 
Concern about crime in the local area on the other hand did not 
remain signiicantly associated with levels of support for government 
intervention.  
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Figure 3 ‘Role of government’ score, by age, highest educational qualiication and  
related attitudes  
Age group Highest educational 
qualiication
View of government 
success at dealing 




The data on which Figure 3 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
Clearly, a wide range of characteristics link with support for 
government activities in relation to national security and, in most 
instances, this remains the case when the relationships between 
them have been controlled for. Unsurprisingly, we identiied very 
similar results when we ran regression analysis on respondent scores 
on the irst of our two latent attitudes or value systems, identiied 
by the factor analysis reported above, as shown in Table 5 below. 
However, our second factor – which we deine as representing 
support for government intervention only in times of terrorist attack, 
was only signiicantly associated with trust in government, once 
the relationships between all seven measures had been controlled 
for. Those who trusted government only some or none of the 
time achieved signiicantly more negative scores on this factor – 
suggesting that trust in government is key in driving support for 
government intervention in times of terrorist attack, as opposed to in 
peacetime. 
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intervention only in 
times of terrorist 
threat 
Highest educational qualiication ++
Age group ++
Left-wing vs. right wing 
Trust in government ++ +
Perceived success of government in dealing 
with threats to national security 
++
Concern about crime
Concern about immigration ++
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What do these indings mean for the future development of public 
preferences for the government’s role in relation to national security? 
In the irst instance they suggest that, to some degree, levels of 
support for different types of government intervention are likely to 
move in unison, given they are largely underpinned by a broader 
value system which could potentially be interpreted as relecting 
libertarian-authoritarian values. However, this conclusion should 
not be over-stated; the existence of a second underlying factor, 
distinguishing between activities in times of terrorist attack and 
peace-time indicates that the public does differentiate between the 
circumstances in which interventions are undertaken, while the recent 
decline in support for the right of the government to detain suspects 
indeinitely suggests that public views may also react to policy 
changes in relation to speciic types of interventions. Meanwhile, it 
is not necessarily clear how future changes in the prevalence of the 
demographic characteristics and attitudes associated with support 
for government intervention may impact on the balance of public 
opinion in this area. While the trend towards an ageing society would 
suggest an increase in support for government activities (as the 
proportions of the populations in older age groups, which tend to be 
more supportive, are set to increase), the tendency towards a more 
educated society would imply the opposite pattern. What is clear, 
however, is that changes in levels of trust in government, in general 
and in relation to national security speciically, are likely to impact 
on levels of support for its actions in this area. In other words, the 
more successful the government is perceived to be, the more likely 
the public is to endorse activities in relation to national security that 
potentially conlict with civil liberties. 
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Conclusions 
Overall, the public’s attitudes to civil liberties can be characterized 
as being comparatively illiberal. Although attitudes clearly vary in 
relation to the context being considered (albeit the application of the 
law, individual rights of assembly, protest and expression or the role 
of government in relation to national security), on almost all measures 
less than half of people support what could be termed the ‘liberal’ 
position. Indeed, a majority of the public tend to support a view 
which relects, or is even less liberal than, current public policy and 
law. In this sense, while there is little evidence of a consistent pattern 
of attitudinal change over the past two decades, we cannot conclude 
that the ‘illiberal’ direction in which British policy and law has recently 
travelled is at odds with the preferences of the public – although 
there is some evidence that the public has responded negatively 
to the introduction of more authoritarian policies in relation to the 
detention of terrorist suspects speciically.  
In particular, we see considerable public support for many of the 
activities the government might undertake in the name of national 
security in times of terrorist attack and peacetime (all of which 
have the potential to limit individual rights and freedoms in some 
way). Preferences for the role of government in this area are clearly 
underpinned by a broader value system – which is likely to relect 
libertarian-authoritarian values; however, they also appear to be 
mediated by age, level of education, attitudes to government 
and broader concerns, primarily immigration. This multi-faceted 
relationship makes it dificult to predict precisely how public 
preferences in relation to national security might change in the 
coming years – particularly given the fast-moving policy, legal and 
technological environment which may continue to alter the context in 
which attitudes in this area need to be understood. 
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Appendix 
The data for Figure 1 are shown below. 
Table A.1 Proportions expressing liberal attitudes to the law, 1985-2016
1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996
% saying there are 
exceptional occasions 
on which people 
should follow their 
consciences even if it 
means breaking the 
law 
n/a 43 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 55
% saying it is worse to 
convict an innocent 
person than to let a 
guilty person go free 
67 58 n/a n/a 62 n/a n/a n/a 58 56
Unweighted base 1530 1321 ° ° 1197 ° °  ° 989
% disagreeing "for some 
crimes, the death 
penalty is the most 
appropriate sentence"
n/a 19 17 18 22 29 19 22 22 21
% disagreeing “the 
law should always 
be obeyed, even if 
a particular law is 
wrong” 
n/a 32 30 29 29 37 29 30 28 33
Unweighted base   1321 1281 2604 2430 1257 1306 2929 3135 3085
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
% saying there are 
exceptional occasions 
on which people 
should follow their 
consciences even if it 
means breaking the 
law 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 54 n/a
% saying it is worse to 
convict an innocent 
person than to let a 
guilty person go free 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 52 51 n/a
Unweighted base 860 930
% disagreeing "for some 
crimes, the death 
penalty is the most 
appropriate sentence"
25 27 27 32 28 27 30 28 28 29
% disagreeing “the 
law should always 
be obeyed, even if 
a particular law is 
wrong” 
n/a n/a 29 26 28 27 26 27 27 24
Unweighted base 2531  2450  2980 2795 2900 3621 2609 3559 3748 3578
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Table A.1 Proportions expressing liberal attitudes to the law, 1985-2016 (continued)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
% saying there are 
exceptional occasions 
on which people 
should follow their 
consciences even if it 
means breaking the 
law 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 47
% saying it is worse to 
convict an innocent 
person than to let a 
guilty person go free 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 55
Unweighted base 1563
% disagreeing "for some 
crimes, the death 
penalty is the most 
appropriate sentence"
25 30 29 27 29 29 35 35 37
% disagreeing “the 
law should always 
be obeyed, even if 
a particular law is 
wrong” 
26 24 24 22 26 22 25 23 24
Unweighted base 3990 2942 2791 2845 2855 2832 2376 3670 2400
n/a = not answered
The data for Figure 2 are shown below. 
Table A.2 Factors underpinning preferences for the role of government in the area of 
national security
Component matrix Component 
Variable 1 2
Video surveillance in public areas .620 -.467
Monitor emails / other info exchanged on the Internet .705 -.384
Collect info on anyone living in Britain .785 -.262
Collect info on anyone living in other countries .759 -.210
Detain people for as long as want without trial .604 .538
Tap people's phone conversations .750 .370
Stop and search in the street at random .734 .440
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The data for Figure 3 are shown below. 





should have right 
to undertake
Unweighted base
Age group 18-24 3.6 78
  25-34 4.2 195
  35-44 4.3 230
  45-54 4.7 255
  55-64 5.1 263
  65-74 5.1 278





Higher education below 
degree/A level
4.6 417
  O level or equivalent/CSE 4.7 408
  No qualiication 4.8 250
View of government 
success at dealing 
with threats to national 
security
Very successful 5.2 268
  Quite successful 4.7 832
 
Neither successful or 
unsuccessful
3.6 196
  Quite / very unsuccessful 4.3 138
Concern about 
immigration 
Not concerned 4.3 976
  Concerned 5.2 504
In Table A.4 we present an OLS regression where the dependent 
variable is the ‘role of government’ score in relation to national 
security described in the chapter.  A positive coeficient indicates a 
higher score while a negative coeficient indicates a lower score. For 
categorical variables, the reference category is shown in brackets 
after the category heading
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Highest educational qualiication (degree)
Higher education below degree/A level *.110 .193 .011
O level or equivalent/CSE **.142 .202 .002
No qualiication .075 .253 .092
Age group (18–24) 
25-34 .070 .299 .171
35-44 **. 148 .286 .008
45-54 **.195 .288 .000
55-64 **.200 .293 .000
76-74 **.181 .308 .001
75+ .094 .354 .054
Left-right scale (left-wing)
Neither *.097 .156 .010
Right-wing *.085 .246 .027
View of government success in dealing 
with threats to national security (very 
successful) 
Quite successful **-.194 .186 .000
Neither successful or unsuccessful **-.266 .257 .000
Quite / very unsuccessful **-.180 .285 .000
Trust in government (just about always / 
most of the time) 
Only some of the time -.039 .188 .402
Almost never *-.117 .220 .014




Concern about Immigration (concerned)
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There are signs of a reaction against the iscal discipline of recent years, 48% now say the 
government should increase taxes and spend more, a higher proportion than at any point 
during the last 10 years.
Start of global 
inancial crisis 2007
Coalition announces large-scale 
public spending cuts 2010
Treasury extends austerity 
period until at least 2018 2014
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Role of Government 
What do we want Government to do?  
Support for ‘tax more, spend more’ at highest level in a decade
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Pensioners 
Improving the standard of living of pensioners has become less of a priority. 
• 52% now think that the government “deinitely” has a responsibility for providing a decent 
standard of living for the old, down from 69% in 1996.
• 55% are now in favour of spending more government money on pensions, compared with 
76% in 1996. 
The unemployed 
There is less support for government meeting the needs of the unemployed. 
• Only 48% now think the government has a responsibility to ind a job for everyone who wants 
one, down from 65% in 1996. 
• Support for more government spending on unemployment beneits has fallen from 33% in 
1996 to just 16% now.
Government spending 
There are signs of a reaction against the iscal discipline of recent years.
• Only 29% now support cuts in government spending as a way of helping the economy, 
whereas 43% did so in 1996.
• As many as 48% now say the government should increase taxes and spend more, a higher 
proportion than for over a decade.
Overview 
This chapter looks at trends in attitudes towards the proper role and responsibilities of 
government during the last 20 years. It looks in particular at the extent to which these trends 
appear to represent a reaction to recent developments in the pattern of public spending and 
to changes in external circumstances. Both seem to have played a role in changing views, 
as evidenced both by trends in attitudes towards the responsibility that government has for 
the welfare of pensioners and the unemployed in particular, and towards the merits of cutting 
public expenditure in general.
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People may be more 
inclined to want 
government to be active 
when there is believed 
to be a problem and less 
inclined to want it to take 
action when they feel 
that the status quo is 
satisfactory
Introduction
One of the perennial issues of political debate is what role and 
activities government should undertake and what should be left to 
others to do, be they private companies, charitable institutions or, 
indeed, individuals themselves. At one end of the spectrum are those 
who think government should play a minimal role, providing law 
and order and national security, but otherwise leaving decisions and 
activities predominantly in the hands of the market and individuals. 
At the other end are those who think that government should not only 
provide public services and a system of welfare beneits, but also run 
key industries itself. An inclination towards the former perspective is 
often regarded as being a ‘right-wing’ view, while expressing views 
more akin to the latter outlook is typically regarded as being on  
the ‘left’.
However, there is no necessary reason why the role of government 
should be regarded as a question of ideological preference. It is 
quite possible that citizens take a more pragmatic, even reactive 
attitude towards what government should do. When they feel there 
is a problem that needs solving they look to government to ix it. But 
equally, when they reckon there is not any particular dificulty that 
needs addressing, they may be happy for government to step back.
This insight has previously led to the suggestion that citizens’ 
attitudes react rather like a ‘thermostat’ when it comes to the role and 
activity of government (Wlezien, 1995; Seroka and Wlezien, 2005; 
2010). If government starts spending more money on something, 
and as a result the quality and/or quantity of a service improves, 
voters gradually come to the view that no further action needs to 
be taken. If on the other hand, government cuts back on spending 
and as a result the service comes to be seen as less satisfactory, 
then there are calls for government to spend more. However, we 
might anticipate that people’s perceptions of the role of government 
depend not only on how much it is currently spending but also 
on external circumstances. People may be more inclined to want 
government to be active when there is believed to be a problem 
and less inclined to want it to take action when they feel that the 
status quo is satisfactory. Thus, for example, people may want the 
government to be active in dealing with unemployment when many 
people are out of job, but are less concerned for it to do something 
when joblessness is low (Blekesaune and Quadango, 2003; 
Blekesaune, 2007). Similarly, they may want the government to be 
more active in regulating business if there has been recent evidence 
of corporate misbehaviour than if there has not. 
In this chapter, we look at trends in attitudes towards the role of 
government during the last 20 years. We assess how far attitudes 
seem to relect a stable, long-term orientation towards what 
government should and should not do, and how far they appear 
to vary in the light of changing circumstances. Our data come 
principally from questions that were asked as part of a module on 
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the role of ‘government’ that were included on the 2016 British Social 
Attitudes (BSA) survey as part of the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP) (about which more details can be found in the 
Technical details). These questions were also ielded as part of the 
same programme in 1996 and 2006, while in some instances they 
have also been asked in other years too. In addition, we refer to the 
indings of some additional questions on government spending and 
activity that have appeared regularly in BSA surveys.
Much, of course, has happened during the last 20 years. After an 
initial period of iscal constraint, the Labour government that came 
to power in 1997 presided over a considerable expansion of public 
spending. That, and a lot more, came to a halt in 2008 thanks 
to the worst inancial crash since the 1930s and a subsequent 
depression that blew a large hole in the country’s iscal inances. 
Although economic growth has since picked up once more – while 
wage restraint helped ensure that the depression did not result in a 
sustained increase in unemployment – a period of public spending 
restraint has still left the country spending more than it raises in 
taxes. In short, if public attitudes towards the role and activity of 
government are inluenced by changes of circumstances, there is 
every reason why attitudes might have changed during the last  
20 years.
What should Government do?
Table 1 shows for a range of possible activities and objectives how 
many people during the last 20 years have said that they should 
“deinitely” or “probably” be the responsibility of government. (To 
make the table easier to follow the igures for those saying they 
deinitely or probably should not be the responsibility of government 
are not shown.) At irst glance, what perhaps is most striking is just 
how wide-ranging the responsibilities of government are thought to 
be. Only in the case of one of the items in the table, the provision of 
a job for everyone, do less than half think it should either deinitely or 
probably be the responsibility of government – and even in that case 
the igure is only just under half (48%). Most of us appear to think 
that the government has at least some responsibility for everything 
from the provision of health care to ensuring that the unemployed 
have enough to live on.
Most of us appear 
to think that the 
government has at least 
some responsibility for 
everything from the 
provision of health care 
to ensuring that the 
unemployed have enough 
to live on
Table 1 Perceptions of the responsibilities of government, 1996-2016
Should it be the government’s responsibility to … 1996 2002 2006 2012 2016
… provide health care for the sick % % % % %
   Deinitely 81 84 68 82 67
   Probably 16 12 27 16 29
… provide a decent standard of living for the old % % % % %
   Deinitely 69 79 58 74 52
   Probably 26 17 36 22 41
… provide industry with the help it needs to grow % % % % %
   Deinitely 38 n/a 27 58 31
   Probably 50 n/a 54 33 52
… reduce income differences between the rich 
and the poor
% % % % %
   Deinitely 32 n/a 25 41 31
   Probably 30 n/a 38 28 34
… provide decent housing for those who can’t 
afford it
% % % % %
   Deinitely 34 n/a 24 38 29
   Probably 50 n/a 57 44 50
… keep prices under control % % % % %
  Deinitely 40 53 31 54 29
  Probably 41 38 49 35 53
… provide a decent standard of living 
for the unemployed
% % % % %
   Deinitely 26 n/a 10 21 14
   Probably 46 n/a 40 38 42
… provide a job for everyone who wants one % % % % %
   Deinitely 26 33 16 27 14
   Probably 39 39 36 36 34
Unweighted base 989 1911 930 956 1563
n/a = not asked
That said, only in one case, the provision of health care, is there a 
widespread belief that this should “deinitely” be the responsibility 
of government. In this instance two-thirds (67%) currently take that 
view. Otherwise only the provision of a decent standard of living for 
the old is also regarded by more than half of citizens as deinitely the 
responsibility of government – and then only just (52%). In all other 
instances, it is always the case that more people say that an activity 
or objective should “probably” be the responsibility of government 
than say it “deinitely” should. It seems that there is something of 
an ‘it depends’ character to many people’s perceptions of what 
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government should do, not least, perhaps, because in many of these 
areas people feel that government is but one of several actors with a 
role to play.
As we would anticipate, those who say they support the Labour 
party are generally more likely to say that something should be 
a government responsibility than are those who support the 
Conservatives. However, the gap varies. It hardly exists at all in 
respect of the provision of a health service or providing help for 
industry. While 70% of Labour supporters think providing a health 
service should deinitely be a government responsibility, so also 
do 65% of Conservative identiiers. Similarly, while 34% of Labour 
supporters say that government should provide industry with 
the help that it needs to grow, so also do 30% of Conservatives. 
Where, in contrast, the two sets of party supporters do particularly 
disagree is in respect of activities and objectives that imply 
government action in support of greater equality. Thus, for example, 
while 45% of Labour supporters think it should deinitely be the 
government’s responsibility to reduce income differences between 
rich and poor, and another 37% believe it probably should be, the 
equivalent igures amongst Conservative supporters are only 14% 
and 29% respectively. Much the same picture pertains in respect 
of the government providing a decent standard of living for the 
unemployed.
Yet these partisan differences do not mean that the balance of 
opinion amongst voters as a whole has not altered over time. The 
most marked change has been in respect of providing a job for 
anyone who wants one. Twenty years ago, around three-quarters 
(76%) believed it was either deinitely or probably the responsibility 
of government; now, as we have already noted, a little under half 
(48%) take that view. The proportion has dropped both amongst 
Conservative and amongst Labour supporters, albeit more especially 
amongst the latter (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Chap. 8). This drop 
is just what we might expect to have happened given recent trends 
in unemployment (Ofice for National Statistics, 2017a). In the 
third quarter of 1996 unemployment stood at 8.1%, having been 
at a peak of 10.3% just three years earlier. By 2006 it was as low 
at 5.5% and had been at around 5% or so for the last ive years. 
Equally, after (briely) being almost as high in 2012 (7.9%) as it had 
been in 1996, unemployment was even lower, 4.8%, by the third 
quarter of 2016. In short, unemployment itself has, for the most 
part, been lower in recent years and, as a result, voters may well be 
more likely to feel that anyone who wants a job should be able to 
secure one, and should not have to rely on the government to ind 
employment. Indeed, as noted in the chapter on ‘Tax avoidance and 
beneit manipulation’, whereas in 1996 39% agreed that “around 
here, most unemployed people could ind a job if they really wanted 
one”, by 2006 that igure had risen to 67%, and is still as high as 
56% now. This may also help explain why the proportion who think 
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the government has a responsibility to provide a decent standard of 
living for the unemployed has also fallen somewhat during the last 20 
years.
Otherwise, however, there is relatively little change over time in the 
combined totals of those who say that something is either deinitely 
or probably the government’s responsibility. For example, in 1996 
62% said that the government should reduce income differences 
between rich and poor, and 20 years later the igure is, at 65%, still 
much the same. Relative stability is also in evidence in response to 
another question about income inequality that is asked regularly on 
BSA. This asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with the 
proposition that “the government should redistribute income from the 
better-off to those who are less well-off”. Now, 42% say they agree 
with this proposition while 28% disagree, igures that are virtually 
identical to those that pertained in 1996 (44% and 28% respectively). 
True, the proportion who agreed was lower (and the proportion who 
disagreed higher) during much of the period in between (just as the 
proportion saying reducing income differences was deinitely the 
government’s responsibility was relatively low in 2006) but, as yet at 
least, there is no sign that support for redistribution is returning to the 
level that was in evidence on this measure before the late 1990s (on 
which see also Curtice, 2010). But then this, perhaps, is just what we 
might expect given that after rising sharply in the 1980s, there has 
not been any consistent long-term trend in income inequality during 
the last 20 years (McGuiness, 2017).
Figure 1 View of whether the government should redistribute income from the better-off to 
those who are less well-off, 1986-2016
The data on which Figure 1 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
However, in many instances there have been changes in the balance 
between those saying that an objective is “deinitely” a government 
responsibility and those saying that it “probably” is. Indeed, a similar 
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pattern can be observed across many of the items in Table 1. In most 
cases, there was a decline between 1996 and 2006 in the proportion 
who said that something was “deinitely” the government’s 
responsibility. The proportion then rose again in 2012, only for the 
most part to return once again to what it was in 2006. It may be that 
the relatively benign economic circumstances that had long been 
in place by 2006 served to reduce the strength of the demand that 
the government should be taking responsibility for people’s welfare 
and that, after the hiatus of the inancial crash, that mood has now 
returned once more.
That said, there is one other item where the pattern of change 
over time is of particular note. The proportion who think that the 
government should deinitely be responsible for providing a decent 
standard of living for older people is, at 52%, rather lower than it 
was in 2006 (58%). At the same time, the overall drop since 1996 
in the proportion who assign the government deinite responsibility 
for this objective, is second only to the equivalent drop in respect of 
providing a job for everyone. This is a subject to which we will return 
later in this chapter.
Managing the economy
One of the key arguments about the role of government is what it 
should do in order to manage the economy. Some will argue that 
it should primarily focus on providing a benign macroeconomic 
environment and then allow the private sector to get on with 
delivering economic growth. Others will feel that government has a 
more active role to play, not only providing some of the infrastructure 
that might help increase economic growth, but also providing 
inancial help for speciic industries and projects. In Table 2 we show 
how attitudes towards some of the things that the government might 
do for the economy have evolved during the last 20 years. The items 
were introduced as follows:
Here are some things the government might do for the 
economy. Please show which actions you are in favour of and 
which you are against 
In the top half of the table we show attitudes towards some of the 
ways in which government might intervene directly in the economy, 
not least as a way of boosting employment, while in the bottom half 
we look at some of the ways in which government might be expected 
to step back in order to promote the economy.
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Table 2 View of government actions for the economy, 1996-2016
1996 2006 2016
Support for industry to develop new products and 
technology
% % %
  In favour 86 81 83
  Against 1 2 1
Government inancing of projects to create new jobs % % %
   In favour 84 72 83
   Against 3 6 3
Support for declining industries to protect jobs % % %
   In favour 62 57 56
   Against 13 16 14
Reduce the working week to create more jobs % % %
   In favour 37 28 25
   Against 30 32 36
Less government regulation of business % % %
   In favour 40 40 34
   Against 14 10 19
Cuts in government spending % % %
    In favour 43 35 29
    Against 26 29 39
Unweighted base 989 930 1563
For the most part, attitudes towards the ways in which the 
government might actively intervene in the economy have been 
relatively stable. In the case of each of the items in the top half of 
the table, the proportion who favour the action now is much the 
same as it was 20 years ago. There is, it seems, almost universal 
and consistent support for government action that might promote 
new products and new jobs, that is, what might be regarded as the 
engines of economic growth. There is, though, rather less support 
for ‘propping up’ declining industries, and indeed this is one activity 
where support does seem to have declined somewhat (from 66% to 
57%) during the last 10 years. Meanwhile, there is remarkably little 
enthusiasm for the idea of reducing the length of the working week
But if attitudes towards various forms of government intervention 
in the economy have been relatively stable, those towards ways in 
which government might step back have changed. There is rather 
less support now for reducing government regulation of business 
than there was 10 years ago. Now only 34% feel that way compared 
with 40% 10 years ago. This drop could conceivably have been 
occasioned by the experience of the inancial crash, which might 
in part be thought to have been a consequence of inadequate 
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regulation of the banking sector (Crotty, 2009), together with 
continuing arguments about the level and oversight of executive 
pay (House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
Committee, 2017).  
However, the biggest change has occurred in respect of attitudes 
towards cuts in government spending. Now only 29% feel that this 
would be beneicial to the economy, compared with 35% 10 years 
ago, and as many as 43% in 1996. Even more strikingly, perhaps, 
more people now say that they are opposed to such a policy than 
say they are in favour. This is not simply a partisan reaction to the 
iscal constraint introduced by Conservative-led administrations. 
Although Labour supporters (23%) are less likely to be in favour of 
cutting expenditure than their Conservative counterparts (36%), 
there has been as much as an 11 point decline in support since 
1996 amongst Conservatives, a drop that is almost as big as the 14 
points drop over the same time period amongst Labour supporters. 
This trend comes, of course, at the end of a six-year period in which 
government has been trying to reduce the iscal deicit by reducing 
(or, more accurately, stemming the overall increase in) government 
expenditure (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2015a).  Public spending as 
a proportion of GDP fell from just under 48% in 2009-10 to 41% in 
2016-17. Perhaps voters are beginning to react against the curb on 
public spending during this period?
Further evidence that this may be the case comes from the 
responses to a question that has been asked every year by BSA 
since the irst survey in 1983. It reads as follows:
Suppose the government had to choose between the three 
options on this card. Which do you think it should choose?
Reduce taxes and spend less on health, education and  
social benefits
Keep taxes and spending on these services at the same level 
as now
Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and  
social benefits
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Table 3 Attitudes to taxation and spending on health, education and social beneits,  
1983–2016
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
View on level of taxation and 
spending
% % % % % % % % %
Increase taxes/spend more 32 n/a n/a 46 50 n/a 50 54 65
Keep taxes/spend same 54 n/a n/a 44 42 n/a 46 37 29
Reduce taxes/spend less 9 n/a n/a 5 3 n/a 3 3 3
Unweighted base 1761 n/a n/a 3100 2847 n/a 3029 2797 2918
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
View on level of taxation and 
spending
% % % % % % % % %
Increase taxes/spend more n/a 63 58 61 59 62 63 58 50
Keep taxes/spend same n/a 29 33 31 34 31 32 35 40
Reduce taxes/spend less n/a 4 4 5 4 3 3 4 5
Unweighted base n/a 2945 3469 3633 3620 1355 3146 3143 2292
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
View on level of taxation and 
spending
% % % % % % % % %
Increase taxes/spend more 59 63 51 49 46 46 42 39 34
Keep taxes/spend same 34 31 38 42 43 44 47 50 55
Reduce taxes/spend less 3 3 6 6 7 6 7 8 8
Unweighted base 3287 3435 3272 2146 2166 3240 3094 2229 1139
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
View on level of taxation and 
spending
% % % % % % %
Increase taxes/spend more 32 36 34 36 37 45 48
Keep taxes/spend same 56 54 53 54 52 47 44
Reduce taxes/spend less 8 6 6 6 7 4 4
Unweighted base 3297 3311 3248 3244 2878 3266 2942
n/a = not asked
As Table 3 shows, following a marked increase in public spending 
during much of the irst decade of the twenty-irst century, support 
for increased spending in response to this question fell away 
markedly from 63% in 2002 to just 32% in 2010. Now, having 
remained at little more than one third for a number of years, support 
has risen once again to 48%, higher than at any time since 2004. 
It would seem that voters are now beginning to react against the 
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‘austerity’ of recent years, just as we might expect them to do if they 
were behaving like a thermostat, though we should also note that 
support for more spending on this measure is still, as yet, to reach 
the 60% or so level that was commonplace for much of the 1990s.
Public spending
This, however, still leaves the question of what precisely government 
should spend money on. In Table 4 we show how people have 
responded when asked the following question:  
Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please 
show whether you would like to see more or less government 
spending in each area. Remember that if you say “much 
more”, it might require a tax increase to pay for it
In each case respondents were presented with a set of ive possible 
answers ranging from “spend much more” to “spend much less”. 
In the table, we show the proportion who say that the government 
should spend either “much more” or just “more” combined.
The table reveals that some forms of spending are persistently more 
popular than others. Just as in Table 1 we saw that providing health 
care for the sick was more likely to be regarded as a government 
responsibility than any other activity, so spending on health has 
always been the most popular option for increasing spending. On the 
other hand, only a distinct minority has ever favoured spending more 
on culture and the arts, albeit that that minority appears to be slightly 
bigger now than 20 years ago.
Table 4 View of government spending levels in different policy areas, 1996-2016
% in favour of more government spending 1996 2006 2016
Health 90 78 83
Education 82 69 71
Police and Law Enforcement 70 58 57
Old Age Pensions 76 69 55
Environment 41 53 41
The Military and Defence 17 28 39
Unemployment Beneits 33 13 16
Culture and the Arts 6 10 13
Unweighted base 989 930 1563
That said, there have been some marked long-term changes in the 
popularity of increased spending for some particular items. First 
of all, in line with the decline in the proportion who think that the 
government has a responsibility for ensuring that unemployed people 
have a decent standard of living, support for increased spending on 
unemployment beneits is, at 16%, only around half the level it was 
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20 years ago. This inding is also consistent with the evidence of a 
further question about beneits for the unemployed that has been 
carried regularly on BSA. In 1996 as many as 48% said that beneits 
for unemployed people were “too low and cause hardship”, but this 
igure had fallen to 23% in 1996 and was still only 24% in 2015. So 
here, it seems, is evidence further to that in Table 1 that the lower 
levels of unemployment in recent years has resulted in less demand 
to spend money on those who do ind themselves without have a job.
Second, there has been a marked decline in support for extra 
government spending on old age pensions. Only 55% now think that 
more should be spent on funding pensions, compared with 69% 10 
years ago, a drop that is evident irrespective of the party someone 
supports. This would appear to echo what we noted in Table 1 in 
relation to the drop in the proportion who felt that the government 
had a responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for older 
people. It is also relected in the fact that, in response to a different 
question on the survey (see the Key Findings), only 60% now say 
that retirement pensions are among their two top priorities for more 
government spending, less than have done so in any BSA survey 
since the series began in 1983.
Thanks to the introduction of a ‘triple lock’ whereby the state old age 
pension has been increased each year by whichever was the highest 
of wage inlation, price inlation or 2.5%, pensioners have largely 
been protected from the government’s attempts to reduce spending 
on welfare. Together with increased access amongst older people 
to private pensions, this policy has helped ensure that the standard 
of living of pensioners has grown more rapidly in recent years than it 
has amongst younger people (Ofice for National Statistics, 2017b).
It would appear this relative success in increasing the standard 
of living of older people has been recognised by many voters. In 
response to another question in the survey, as many as 41% now 
think that the government is successful at “providing a decent 
standard of living for the old”, well up on the 30% who were of that 
view in 2012, let alone the 27% who felt that way in 2006. And it is 
this recognition that seems to have helped persuade some voters 
that spending on old age pensions is now less of a priority than 
it was. Amongst those who think that the government has been 
successful in providing a decent standard of living for older people, 
just 41% are in favour of more spending on pensions, whereas 
amongst those who think the government has been unsuccessful 
the igure is still as high as 76%. Interestingly, the decline in support 
for more spending on pensions is by no means conined to younger 
people of working age. Even amongst those aged 65 and over, 
support for more spending has fallen from 85% in 1996 to 53% now.
Third, although starting from a low level of just 17% in 1996, there 
has also been a substantial increase, to 39%, in the proportion who 
would like more spending on the military and defence. This is despite 
the fact that the proportion who think that the government has been 
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successful at “dealing with threats to Britain’s security” has increased 
from 40% in 1996 to 55% in 2006 and 72% now. However, in this 
case it seems that a perception of success does not necessarily 
persuade voters to think that more money does not need to be 
spent. In our most recent survey, for example, those who thought 
that government was “very successful” at dealing with threats to 
security were actually more likely (43% were in favour) of spending 
more on the military and defence than were those who thought that 
government had neither been successful nor unsuccessful. This 
suggests that for some voters at least, past success in dealing with 
security threats is evidence that money spent on defence is money 
well spent (see also the chapter on ‘Civil Liberties’). Meanwhile, we 
should bear in mind that the proportion of national income spent on 
defence by Britain has been in long-term decline, a trend that has 
continued during the last 20 years despite the cost of the country’s 
military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan (Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, 2015b). So, once again, voters could be reacting to the 
recent trajectory in public spending.
Conclusion
Voters still, it seems have relatively high expectations of government. 
Most think it has some role at least both in managing and growing 
the economy and in providing universal public services such as 
health, education and pensions. Meanwhile, within that broad 
envelope, voters’ priorities for what the government should do have 
changed little. The health service has consistently been the public’s 
number one priority, while, conversely, meeting the needs of the 
unemployed has consistently been regarded as less important. At 
the same time, Labour supporters have always been somewhat more 
inclined than their Conservative counterparts to back a more active 
state.
Yet this does not mean that attitudes have not changed. Our analysis 
has uncovered three important trends during the last 20 years. First, 
voters have become less keen on the government becoming involved 
in meeting the needs of the unemployed. Second, there is now felt 
to be less urgency about spending more on pensions and on the 
inancial needs of older people. Third, and in a sense despite these 
two trends, support for curbing public expenditure in general has 
fallen.
 None of these trends appear to be result of partisan responses, 
conined to either Conservative or Labour supporters, but rather 
appear to have occurred across the political spectrum. Rather, all 
three seem to provide evidence of the public reacting to changing 
circumstances, including the recent trajectory in public spending. 
Unemployment has been relatively low during the last two decades 
and there is a relatively widespread feeling nowadays that anyone 
who wants a job should be able to ind one. It is thus not surprising 
that voters should think that devoting scarce public resources to 
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tacking unemployment and its consequences has become a less 
pressing priority. Meanwhile, although their incomes are still lower 
than those in employment, the incomes of pensioners have grown 
more rapidly in recent years. Voters themselves appear to think that 
government has been relatively successful at meeting the inancial 
needs of pensioners and it seems that some have now come to the 
view that spending more money on older people has become less of 
a priority too.
But while unemployment has been relatively low and many 
pensioners have seen a growth in their incomes, the last seven 
years have been ones of relative famine so far as public expenditure 
is concerned. It appears that gradually the public are beginning to 
react against that experience, as relected in declining support for 
cutting expenditure as a way of helping the economy and some 
increase in support for spending on public services. True, the call for 
more spending is still well below what it was by the late 1990s, but it 
looks as though the tide may at least have begun to low back in that 
direction.
For many a politician, what the government should or should not do 
is a question of belief, a largely unchanging ideological preference 
for either a government that does a little less or one that does rather 
more. However, it seems that many voters take a more pragmatic 
view. When a problem arises they often look to government to ix 
it. Once that problem is solved they look to government to shift its 
attention elsewhere. It means that a politician who looks for plaudits 
for what they have achieved is always at risk of being disappointed 
– for voters’ focus is always on today’s dificulty, not yesterday’s 
achievement.
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Appendix
The data for Figure 1 are shown below.
Table A.1 View of redistribution, 1986-2016
1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996
The government should 
redistribute income from the 
better off to those who are 
less well off
% % % % % % % % %
Agree 43 45 51 51 49 48 51 47 44
Disagree 30 33 29 30 29 33 25 29 28
Unweighted base 1321 2493 2604 2430 2702 1306 2929 3135 3085
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
The government should 
redistribute income from the 
better off to those who are 
less well off
% % % % % % % % %
Agree 39 36 39 38 39 42 32 32 34
Disagree 31 35 36 33 34 32 38 39 38
Unweighted base 3085 2450 2980 2795 2900 3621 2609 3559 3748
2007 2008 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
The government should 
redistribute income from the 
better off to those who are 
less well off
% % % % % % % % %
Agree 32 38 32 38 37 36 37 41 42
Disagree 37 35 37 35 34 35 34 30 29
Unweighted base 3578 3990 3578 3990 2942 2791 2845 2855 2832
2014 2015 2016
The government should 
redistribute income from the 
better off to those who are 
less well off
% % %
Agree 39 44 42
Disagree 33 26 28
Unweighted base 2376 3670 2400
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Moral issues
Sex, gender identity and euthanasia
Attitudes to sex before marriage, same-sex relationships, abortion and pornography have all 
become more liberal. While people who identify as religious, older people and those without 
a formal education are less liberal, there are signs this is changing.
Acceptance of same-sex relationships has increased quickly in the 
last four years, especially among Christians
Civil Partnership 
Act 2004
Age of consent for same-sex 
partners lowered to 18 1994 Marriage (Same-sex 
Couples) Act 2013
Age of consent for same-sex 
partners lowered to 16 2001
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The growth in social liberalism continues
The liberalisation in attitudes to pre-marital sex, same-sex relationships, abortion and 
pornography continue. For the irst two of these, this trend has accelerated in recent years. 
• A signiicant majority of people (75%) say that sex before marriage is “not at all wrong”, an 
increase of 11 percentage points since 2012, and 5 percentage points since 2015.
• Attitudes towards same-sex relationships have become signiicantly more liberal with 64% of 
people saying that they are “not wrong at all”, up from 59% in 2015, and 47% in 2012.
• 93% of people think that if a woman’s health is seriously endangered, an abortion should be 
allowed. Record-highs of people say an abortion should be allowed if a woman decides on her 
own she does not want the child (70%) or if a couple cannot afford any more children (65%). 
• 41% of people feel some ilms are too violent or pornographic to be watched even by adults, 
down from 59% of people in 1996. 
Some views contradict policy and practice
Broad support for a form of euthanasia continues and contrasts with its total legal 
prohibition. Meanwhile, low self-reported levels of prejudice to transgender people contrast 
with when people are asked about speciic situations.  
• 77% of people feel a person with a painful incurable disease should be able to legally request 
that a doctor end their life. This support has been stable for over 30 years. 
• The vast majority of people (82%) describe themselves as “not prejudiced at all” to 
transgender people. However, less than half of people say suitably qualiied transgender 
people should deinitely be employed as police oficers or primary school teachers (43% and 
41% respectively).  
Divides by age, religion and education
While social liberalism seems to be growing, there are notable divides by certain 
demographics.
• People who have a religion are less likely to hold liberal views than those with no religion on all 
of the topics we examine in this chapter. 
• Similarly, older people are less likely to hold socially liberal views than younger people for all of 
the topics except transgender issues. 
• People without formal educational qualiications are more likely to be socially conservative 
than those with qualiications in their views on same-sex relationships, abortion and 
transgender issues. 
Overview
This chapter explores attitudes to a range of personal and political issues and inds that 
the growth in social liberalism seen in recent decades continues. Attitudes to sex before 
marriage, same-sex relationships, abortion and pornography have all become more liberal, 
while attitudes to euthanasia remain largely unchanged. For the irst time using the British 
Social Attitude (BSA) survey’s method, attitudes to transgender people are also examined. 
Underneath this liberalising trend however, we ind some important demographic dividing lines. 
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Introduction
In this chapter we examine whether there is a further onward trend 
of ‘social liberalism’, typically the belief that there is a personal realm 
in which the only role of the state is as a guarantor of freedoms, 
counter-posed against ‘social conservatism’, which suggests that 
societal or state-sanctioned moral judgement is what keeps society 
cohesive and strong. 
This year’s BSA questions allow us to examine this question across a 
range of questions covering personal or private autonomy, including 
sex before marriage, same-sex relationships, the use of pornography, 
transgender rights and attitudes to abortion and euthanasia. While 
this is not an exhaustive list and spans different types of issues, it 
does nonetheless provide us with an indication of whether there 
has been continued growth in social liberalism. Further, this chapter 
also examines whether there is a pattern in which demographic 
characteristics typically predict answers to questions on these 
issues. 
Previous analysis of BSA data over the last 30 years has found 
evidence of increasing acceptance of people having children before 
marriage, premarital sex, abortion and same-sex relationships. The 
latter, in particular, has seen a dramatic fall in intolerant attitudes from 
the late 1980s through to the 2010s.
By contrast, attitudes to euthanasia have been more mixed. Clery 
et al’s (2007) chapter found a more complex picture of trends in 
views on euthanasia; while a large majority of people support doctor-
assisted dying where the patient is painfully and terminally ill, in 
2005 there had been a decrease in support for assisted dying where 
someone was not going to die from their illness. 
This chapter will seek to update the indings from these previous 
BSA chapters, and also include some indings from questions not 
before presented in a BSA report. Firstly, views of pornography 
and adult content in ilms, and secondly, new questions on views 
towards transgender people, their use of public bathrooms and their 
employment in two public-facing jobs.  
Sex and relationships
It is well documented that recent decades have seen great changes 
in the way British people approach marriage and family. Oficial 
statistics show a dramatic decline in marriage rates since the early 
1970s, while the average age of marrying for the irst time has 
increased from 26 for women and 29 for men in 1974, to 35 for 
women and 37 for men in 2014 (for opposite-sex couples) (Ofice 
for National Statistics, 2017a). This has been accompanied by an 
increase in cohabiting couples, either instead of marriage or for long 
periods before marriage.
Perhaps the most signiicant change to marriage in Britain in the 
more recent past was the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act in 2013. 
Britain is now one of 22 countries (at the time of writing) that legally 
recognise same-sex marriages, and in 2014 there were around 5000 
same-sex marriages in England and Wales. This forms part of a 
signiicant shift in societal and legal status for LGB people over the 
last 50 years. 
We know from previous BSA surveys that the public has become 
increasingly accepting of same-sex relationships as well as sex 
outside of marriage. Park and Rhead previously speculated that 
this would likely steadily continue as each older, more conservative 
generation is replaced by a younger, more liberal one (Park and 
Rhead, 2013). Here we examine whether this has been the case in 
years since. 
In this section we focus on changing attitudes to both sex before 
marriage, and same-sex relationships, using two questions that have 
been asked on the BSA survey since its inception in 1983:
If a man and woman have sexual relations before marriage, 
what would your general opinion be?
What about sexual relations between two adults of the same 
sex?
[Always wrong, Mostly wrong, Sometimes wrong, Rarely 
wrong, Not wrong at all]
As shown in Figure 1, we see no evidence of a slowing down of this 
liberalisation of views towards premarital sex and same-sex relations 
– in fact data from the past 5 years appear to show acceleration 
towards more liberal attitudes. Attitudes to premarital sex were fairly 
stable between 2007 and 2012, however there has been a marked 
increase in acceptance of sex before marriage since 2012; 75% now 
say that sex before marriage is “not at all wrong”, an increase of 11 
percentage points since 2012, and 5 percentage points since 2015. 
Now just 8% think premarital sex is “always” or “mostly” wrong. 
There has also been a signiicant increase in liberal attitudes towards 
same-sex relationships since the introduction of same-sex marriages 
in 2014; the proportion saying that same-sex relationships are ‘“not 
wrong at all’” is now a clear majority at 64%, up from 59% in 2015, 
and 47% in 2012. Looking further back to when the question was 
irst asked in the 1980s an even starker picture emerges. In 1983 only 
17% were completely accepting of same-sex relationships. Attitudes 
hardened further during the late 1980s at the height of the AIDS 
crisis; in 1987 just 11% said same-sex relationships were “not wrong 
at all”. At that time three-quarters (74%) of British people thought 
same-sex relationships were “always” or “mostly” wrong, a view that 
has fallen to 19% today. 
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Figure 1 Views on premarital sex and same-sex relationships, 1983-2016
The data on which Figure 1 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
Comparing the change over time in attitudes towards premarital 
sex and same-sex relationships we see that while the British 
public is generally more accepting of premarital sex than same-sex 
relationships (75% and 64% respectively), this gap has narrowed 
substantially from 26 percentage points in 2005 to 11 percentage 
points in 2016.
Premarital sex: generational differences or lifecycle 
change?
To further explore this attitudinal shift, we examine the differences 
between various societal groups and how these have changed over 
time. One particularly pertinent characteristic here is age; it may 
come as no surprise that past BSA reports have found older people 
to be less liberal in their views of sex and relationships than younger 
people, and our analysis conirms this pattern. In 2016 84% of 27 to 
36 year olds say premarital sex is “not wrong at all”, compared with 
59% of people aged 67 to 76. 
This age difference might be due to a ‘generational effect’ (or 
‘cohort effect’); that is that each new generation develops views in 
their formative years, and retains similar attitudes throughout their 
life. Therefore as older generations formed their opinions in a more 
socially and politically conservative period in time, their views are 
likely to be more conservative than younger generations. If this is 
the case then as older generations grow older and are eventually 
replaced by younger, more liberal ones, the attitudes of society as a 
whole will become more liberal. 
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While the British public 
is generally more 
accepting of premarital 
sex than same-sex 
relationships (75% 
and 64% respectively), 
this gap has narrowed 
substantially
A second possible explanation for this age difference is a ‘lifecycle 
effect’ (sometimes known as an ‘ageing effect’); the concept that 
people become more conservative in their views as they become 
older. 
As well as generational and lifecycle effects, looking at change 
over time might reveal a ‘period effect’; which means all cohorts 
are changing their views in the same direction over time, due to 
changes in the societal climate. Often, the three drivers of change are 
interrelated.
One way to unpick these different possible effects is to follow 
how each generation change their views over time using cohort 
analysis. As the BSA survey uses a fresh sample each year we are 
not following the same individuals over time, however, the long-term 
nature of the project does allow us to examine how people born in 
the same era change their views over time. In this chapter we have 
chosen to group people by the decade they are born in, rather than 
larger conceptual groups (for example the groups of Pre-war, Baby 
boomers, and Generations X and Y used in Ipsos, 2012), because 
this allows us a more detailed view of generational attitudes and how 
they change over time. 
In Figure 2 we present attitudes to sex before marriage over time 
by age cohort, with lighter purple lines representing younger age 
cohorts, and darker lines older ones. In general there is a clear 
generational divide, with younger cohorts tending to be more 
liberal than older ones. And this is true across time; in general each 
generation retains similar views over time, relected by the fact that 
each line is relatively stable and so suggests there is not a strong 
lifecycle effect on this measure. For example, if we look at those 
born in the 1940s, in 1983 53% said that premarital sex is “not 
wrong at all”, and although the view of this cohort moved around 
slightly over the years, in 2016 we ind a similar 59% of this group 
held this view. This pattern suggests that the change we have seen 
overall of an increased liberalism towards premarital sex is related 
to a generational effect; as older generations are being replaced by 
younger, more liberal ones, the views of society as a whole have 
become more accepting of premarital sex. 
Two further points can be made about the data in Figure 2. 
Firstly, while in 1983 there was a wide range of views across the 
generations, from 17% of the oldest generation being accepting to 
66% of the youngest group, in 2016 all but the oldest cohort are 
clustered together in a group with relatively homogenous views 
spanning from 77% to 84%. So while historically there were clear 
divisions between age cohorts in their views of premarital sex, most 
of the cohorts now sit together with little difference between their 
views.
The second point is that although looking at the long-term trend there 
has been little change over time within cohorts, between 2012 and 
2016 there was a substantial increase in acceptance of premarital 
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There is a clear 
generational divide, 
with younger cohorts 
tending to be more 
liberal than older ones 
on premarital sex
sex among all age cohorts. This suggests that while the liberalisation 
of attitudes towards premarital sex has been driven by generational 
effects in the past, in the most recent 5 years other factors are also at 
play, leading to a society-wide shift. 
Figure 2 Proportion saying premarital sex is “not wrong at all”, by generation cohort,  
1983-2016
The data on which Figure 2 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
So if the increased acceptance of sex outside wedlock is not being 
only driven by age, are there particular societal groups that have 
changed their views over the past 5 years?
Religious groups are more conservative in their views on premarital 
sex than people without a religion. However, there has been an 
increased acceptance of sex before marriage over the past 5 years 
among all religious groups and the gap in attitudes between the 
religious and non-religious appears to be narrowing (Table 1). Note 
that small sample sizes mean caution should be used when looking 
at igures for the Roman Catholic group in 2012 and 2016, and the 
Non-Christian group. 
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There has been an 
increased acceptance of 
sex before marriage over 
the past 5 years among 
all religious groups
Table 1 Views on premarital sex, 1985-2016, by religion1
% saying premarital sex 
“not wrong at all”






37 43 58 54 73 +19
Roman Catholic 38 39 62 64 76 +12
Other Christian 28 36 47 45 62 +17
Non-Christian ‡ ‡ 36 21 33 +11
No religion 59 68 79 82 87 +6
The bases for this table can be found in the appendix to this chapter 
 = percentage not shown as base is under 50
There also appear to be differences by education level; those without 
any formal qualiications (62%) are least likely to be accepting of 
premarital sex, while those with higher education and A-levels (82%) 
and GCSEs or equivalent (80%) are most likely to be accepting of 
this. However, regression analysis found that once the relationship 
between level of education and other variables is controlled for2, 
level of education is not signiicantly associated with attitudes 
to premarital sex. Nevertheless it is notable that people with 
qualiications are more likely than those with no qualiications to have 
become more liberal since 2012. 
Who is most and least likely to be accepting of  
same-sex relationships?
When we turn to views on same-sex relationships we again see a 
marked difference in views between  age cohorts, for example 73% 
of people born in the 1980s say that same-sex relationships are 
“not wrong at all”, compared with just 41% of people born in the 
1940s (Figure 3). Unlike the pattern of generational differences we 
saw with premarital sex, attitudes towards same-sex relationships 
have changed markedly within cohorts; people born in all cohorts 
from the 1940s onwards have become more accepting of same-sex 
relationships since the early 1990s. The fact that nearly all cohorts 
have become markedly more accepting of same-sex relationships 
suggests that the shift in views over time has been caused by wider 
societal changes, rather than a predominantly generational effect. 
This increased liberalisation of views therefore appears to mainly be a 
period effect – driven by a society-wide cultural shift. 
1 Figures showing change over time in this table are calculated from the exact data, rather 
than the rounded igures that appear in the table. As a result they will sometimes appear to be 
incorrect by +/-1%. This applies to all similar tables in this chapter.
2  Variables included in this binary logistic regression analysis (as well as other regression 
analyses in this chapter) were: highest level of education, age, sex, religion, party identiication and 
social class.  Education level is known to be associated with age, religion, party identiication and 
social class. Full results of the multivariate analyses can be found in the appendix to this chapter. 
NatCen Social Research
British Social Attitudes 34 | Moral issues 92
73% of people born in the 
1980s say that same-sex 
relationships are not 
wrong at all, compared 
with just 41% of people 
born in the 1940s
Figure 3 Proportion saying same-sex relationships are “not wrong at all”, by generation 
cohort, 1983-2016
The data on which Figure 3 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
Looking at attitudes by religion, education and party identiication we 
ind that that since 2012, all sub-groups have become more liberal 
in their views towards same-sex relationships. There has been a 
shift towards acceptance among every religious group in the past 5 
years, notably now well over half (55%) of Anglicans say same-sex 
relationships are “not wrong at all”, an increase of 24 percentage 
points since 2012 (Table 2). As with attitudes to pre-marital sex, 
we see a narrowing of the gap between the religious and the non-
religious, as religious groups, speciically Christian groups, are 
increasing their acceptance at a faster rate, (note that again, small 
sample sizes for the non-Christian and Catholic groups mean caution 
should be used).
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Well over half (55%) of 
Anglicans say same-sex 
relationships are not 
wrong at all
Table 2 Views on same-sex relationships, 1985-2016, by religion
% saying same-sex 
relationships are not 
wrong at all






9 14 31 31 55 +24
Roman Catholic 9 21 37 38 62 +24
Other Christian 9 13 25 37 53 +16
Non-Christian   19 19 30 +11
No religion 19 32 50 63 76 +13
The bases for this table can be found in the appendix to this chapter
 = percentage not shown as base is under 50
There is particularly low acceptance of same-sex relationships 
among those without any formal qualiications, 38% of this group 
say that same-sex relationships are “not wrong at all”, compared 
with 60% of people with GCSEs or equivalent, 75% of people with 
higher educational qualiications or A-levels, and 74% of people 
with a degree. This more conservative attitude among people with 
fewer qualiications holds up when we use regression analysis to 
control for variation in age and other characteristics, conirming that 
education level is signiicantly associated with attitudes to same-sex 
relationships. However, even those without any formal qualiications 
have become more liberal in the past 5 years; in 2012 only 27% of 
this group said that same-sex relationships were “not wrong at all”, 
meaning an increase of 12 percentage points.
One might expect public opinion on this issue to divide clearly 
down party lines; however this is not the case. While acceptance 
of same-sex relationships is slightly lower among Conservative 
supporters (60%) compared with Labour supporters (69%), the gap 
is not large and it has narrowed since 2012 (from 13 to 9 percentage 
points). There are now comfortable majorities accepting of same-sex 
relationships amongst the supporters of both the country’s largest 
parties. 
Summary
In 2013 Park and Rhead suggested that based on their indings 
to date it was likely that liberalisation of attitudes to sex and 
relationships would steadily continue before plateauing. This year’s 
indings in fact show that this growing liberalism has accelerated 
in recent years. This analysis shows that while changes continue 
to be driven by a generational effect of older, more conservative 
cohorts being replaced by younger ones with a more liberal outlook, 
there is a period effect at play too. With the exception of those 
without any formal qualiications, which merits further examination, 
there has been a society-wide liberalisation of views towards sex 
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show that this growing 
liberalism has accelerated 
in recent years
and relationships. It is possible that the interesting acceleration in 
liberalisation we have seen has occurred because we have reached a 
tipping point after which normalisation occurs. 
Transgender people 
Transgender people and their stories are becoming increasingly 
visible in society; with the emergence of various public igures in 
the last decade or more such as celebrity Caitlyn Jenner, actress 
Laverne Cox, Big Brother winner Nadia Almada and former soldier 
Chelsea Manning. This has come alongside high-proile ilms and TV 
programmes centred on transgender characters, such as the 2015 
ilm The Danish Girl starring Eddie Redmayne, Hayley Cropper on 
Coronation Street, and the irst of its kind, BBC2 sitcom Boy meets 
Girl in 2016. 
Nonetheless transgender people continue to face both personal 
prejudice and structural discrimination affecting many aspects 
of their lives. For example, the irst parliamentary inquiry into 
transphobia and discrimination in 2016 reported widespread societal 
and systemic transphobia, citing a multitude of issues such as 
the way the NHS deals with transgender patients (in particular by 
medicalising trans identity, i.e. considering it as a condition that 
needs to be treated), as well as how the criminal justice system deals 
with transphobic crimes (House of Commons Women and Equalities 
Committee, 2016). The Trans Mental Health study (McNeil et al, 2012) 
found that 81% of its respondents feared and avoided certain social 
or public situations, such as gyms, public toilets and shops, while 
38% had experienced sexual harassment and 37% physical threats 
or intimidation for being transgender. Some transgender people have 
also experienced attacks from the press, with primary school teacher 
Lucy Meadows taking her own life three months after transitioning 
to being a woman, after being hounded by media reporters (Brown, 
2013). While her suicide note made no mention of the press, the 
coroner of the case criticised the “sensational and salacious” 
coverage, in particular an article by Richard Littlejohn in the Daily Mail 
entitled “He’s not only in the wrong body … he’s in the wrong job”, 
which has since been removed from the newspaper’s website. 
Another battleground is the use of gendered public toilets. In the UK 
in order to make trans and non-binary people feel more comfortable 
a number of universities and other spaces have introduced gender-
neutral toilets. However in the US some states have passed bills 
requiring people to use public bathrooms according to the gender 
listed on their birth certiicate rather than their gender identity, 
meaning transgender women would have to use a men’s bathroom 
and vice-versa. 
In this section we use data collected on BSA 2016 which, for the 
irst time, measures public attitudes around transgender issues on 
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and discrimination in 
2016 reported widespread 
societal and systemic 
transphobia
We use data collected 
on BSA 2016 which, for 
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public attitudes around 
transgender issues on 
a general population 
random probability 
survey
a general population random probability survey. For this survey we 
used a deinition of transgender people that was developed in past 
research (Balarajan et al, 2011): 
[people who] have gone through all or part of a process 
(including thoughts or actions) to change the sex they 
were described as at birth to the gender they identify with, 
or intend to. This might include by changing their name, 
wearing different clothes, taking hormones or having gender 
reassignment surgery
Prejudice against people who are transgender
We irst turn to prejudice against people who are transgender. We 
asked people to self-report transgender prejudice (also known as 
transphobia) using the following question:
How would you describe yourself... 
... as very prejudiced against people who are transgender,
a little prejudiced,
or, not prejudiced at all?
Overwhelmingly, the public reports themselves as not prejudiced 
against transgender people. Over 8 in 10 (82%) describe themselves 
as “not prejudiced at all”, while 15% say they are “a little prejudiced”, 
and just 2% say they are “very prejudiced” (Table 3). Of course, 
this question does have the possibility of a social desirability bias 
affecting the responses. To get around this we also asked a second 
question placed on the self-completion element of the survey that 
approaches the topic of prejudice from a rather less subjective point 
of view: 
Do you think that prejudice against transgender people is 
always wrong, sometimes wrong, rarely wrong or never 
wrong?
Here we ind that only 53% condemn transphobia completely, saying 
that prejudice against people who are transgender is “always wrong”, 
however a further 19% say that prejudice against transgender people 
is “mostly wrong”, meaning a total of 72% have a largely negative 
view of prejudice against transgender people. A minority (15%) say 
that transphobia is “sometimes wrong”, while very few (4%) say it is 
“rarely” or “never” wrong. 
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Only 53% condemn 
transphobia completely, 
saying that prejudice 
against people who are 
transgender is always 
wrong
Table 3 Prejudice against people who are transgender
Would you describe yourself ... %
... as very prejudiced against people who are transgender 2
… a little prejudiced 15
… or not prejudiced at all 82
Unweighted base 974








We also asked respondents how they feel about people who are 
transgender being employed in public-facing roles, in the following 
two questions:
If they are suitably qualified, do you think that people who are 
transgender should be employed as … 
… police officers? 
… primary school teachers? 
Overall around 4 in 10 are completely accepting of transgender 
people being employed in public-facing jobs, with 43% saying that 
a qualiied transgender person “deinitely should” be employed as a 
police oficer and 41% saying they “deinitely should” be employed 
as primary school teachers (Table 4). Overall, acceptance (whether 
deinite or more tentative) is slightly higher for employment as a 
police oficer than as a primary school teacher, with 74% saying 
transgender people “deinitely” or  “probably” should be employed 
as police oficers, compared with 67% saying the same for primary 
school teachers. This difference suggests there may be some who 
are accepting of a transgender person being employed in a general 
public-facing job, but not for a job working closely with children. 
The extent to which this is the case, and how attitudes vary by other 
types of role, could be worth exploring in further research. 
There is still a substantial minority who do not approve of 
transgender people being employed in these jobs, including 15% 
who say transgender people “probably” or “deinitely” should not 
be employed as police oficers, and 21% saying they should not be 
employed as primary school teachers. 
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Table 4 View of transgender people in public-facing jobs
Should suitably qualiied transgender people be employed as …
… police oficers
… primary school 
teachers
% %
Deinitely should 43 41
Probably should 32 26
Probably should not 10 12
Deinitely should not 5 9
Unweighted base 974 974
Public toilets
To further examine people’s levels of prejudice in less theoretical 
terms, we explore how comfortable the general public is with a 
transgender person using toilets according to their own gender 
identity. We asked separate questions to men and women. To women 
we asked the following question:
Please think about a transgender woman - that is a man 
who has gone through all or part of a process to become a 
woman. How comfortable or uncomfortable would you be for a 
transgender woman to use female public toilets?
To men we asked the same question but concerning a transgender 
man, “that is a woman who has gone through all or part of a process 
to become a man”. 
For both sexes a majority say they are comfortable with a 
transgender person using a public toilet according to their gender 
identity (Table 5). Women tend to be more comfortable with this 
than men, with 72% of women saying they are “very” or “quite 
comfortable” with a transgender woman using a female toilet, 
compared with 64% of men saying they are comfortable with a 
transgender man using male toilets. Around 1 in 6 (14% of women, 
and 15% of men) say they are not comfortable with this. 
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Table 5 View of transgender people using public toilets
How comfortable would feel for a … 
… transgender woman 
to use a female toilet 
(asked of women only)
… transgender man to 
use a male toilet (asked 
of men only)
% %
Very comfortable 47 41
Quite comfortable 25 24
Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 14 19
Quite uncomfortable 9 9
Very uncomfortable 4 6
Unweighted base 561 413
Who is most and least likely to be accepting of 
people who are transgender?
Women are more likely than men to condemn prejudice against 
transgender people (58% of women say it is “always wrong” 
compared with 46% of men). Younger people are also more likely 
to say that prejudice against people who are transgender is “always 
wrong”; while 61% of 18-34 year olds say this, 40% of those aged 
65 or more do. However, this difference reduces when looking at 
the proportion of people saying transgender prejudice is “always 
or mostly wrong”, which was 76% among the youngest group and 
64% among the oldest. Further, on this measure regression analysis 
found that, once other characteristics are controlled for, age is not a 
signiicant factor in explaining transgender prejudice. 
Anti-transgender prejudice is also linked to religious belief; people 
without a religion (59%) are more likely to think prejudice against 
transgender people is always wrong than those with a religion (46%). 
Similarly, education is linked with views on transgender prejudice; 
people with degrees (64%) and higher education qualiications or 
A-levels (63%) are more likely than those with GCSEs or equivalent 
(43%) or no formal qualiications (35%) to say transgender prejudice 
is “always wrong”. 
Summary
Overall, these indings suggest the majority of the public have 
supportive attitudes towards transgender people and their interaction 
with public life. However, the low levels of people with overtly-
stated prejudice against transgender people contrasts with the 
high proportions of transgender people who report facing regular 
harassment and intimidation found in previous research.
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This gap is perhaps explained by the questions that reveal prejudice 
more indirectly. Only 4 in 10 people feel a suitably qualiied 
transgender person should deinitely be employed as a police oficer 
or primary school teacher. This stands in contrast to employment 
law and people’s earlier, more accepting views. This implies a gap, 
seen elsewhere, between people’s view of their prejudices and their 
revealed ones. This in turn might explain why many transgender 
people experience the country not to be as accepting as the irst 
answers imply.
As this is the irst time we have asked questions about transgender 
rights, we do not have any time series data to look at changes in 
attitudes over time. However we might speculate that in the context 
of increasingly liberal attitudes towards same-sex relationships, 
attitudes towards transgender people – another group that breaks 
out from traditional gender norms – are likely to become more liberal 
in future years. 
Pornography and adult content in ilms
The ubiquity of the internet has dramatically increased the availability 
of pornography. This section explores whether this greater 
prevalence has normalised adult content and liberalised our views to 
it, or instead led to more conservative attitudes in response. 
Attitudes to pornography and adult content in ilms touch on a 
huge number of issues. Traditional conservative perspectives often 
concern offending ‘public decency’ and whether adult content 
encourages sexual permissiveness. Feminist perspectives typically 
argue that pornography leads to an objectiication of women 
(Hernandez, 2011), fuels an exploitative industry and can inspire or 
legitimise violence against women. In more recent developments, the 
high proportions of children now seeing pornography on the internet, 
often via smart phones, has led to government policy discussions 
about whether pornography should be more tightly censored, and 
whether this is indeed now possible.3 Children’s advocates have 
lagged serious concerns about whether the pervasiveness of 
pornography among young people is leading to children exploiting 
other children, to growing sexual anxiety and body conidence 
issues, and unrealistic or warped expectations about sex and 
relationships (Parker, 2014). Most recently concerns about how 
children manage the increased availability of porn have renewed 
debates about the delivery of sex education in schools (Turner, 
2017). This is already a long but not exhaustive list of debates that 
pornography touches upon and it is not possible to do any of them 
justice in this section. BSA can nonetheless help us understand the 
degree to which cumulative changes to the technology, prevalence 
and societal responses surrounding porn have marked a shift in 
attitudes. 
3  BBC (2014), 6USPULWVYUVNYHWO`[VILISVJRLKI`KLMH\S[74HUUV\UJLZ BBC, London: 
available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23401076 
NatCen Social Research
British Social Attitudes 34 | Moral issues 100




employed as a police 
PGæDFSPSQSJNBSZ
school teacher
The public is fairly evenly divided on the question of whether “adults 
should be able to see whatever ilms they like” or if “some ilms are 
too violent or pornographic even for adults”. A similar proportion (just 
over two-ifths) choose each view, though 15% cannot choose or do 
not answer the question (Table 6).
Table 6 Views about pornography and adult content in ilms
Should adults be able to watch whatever they like? %
Adults should be able to see whatever ilms they like 45
Some ilms are too violent or pornographic even for adults 41
Can’t choose/not answered 15
How wrong is it for an adult to watch pornography at home 






7 (Always wrong) 13
Can’t choose/not answered 10
You shouldn’t try to stop teenage boys from watching pornography %
Agree strongly 6
Agree 24




To judge attitudes on the overall morality of pornography, people are 
asked the following question: 
On the scale below 1 means “not wrong at all”, 7 means 
“always wrong” and 2 to 6 means something in between. The 
following question is about pornography that shows people 
having sex – not just actors pretending to do so. 
How wrong do you personally think it is for an adult (18 or over) 
to watch pornography at home, or is it not wrong at all?
The single most common view is that an adult watching pornography 
is “not wrong at all” and just over half of respondents (51%) choose 
categories 1-3 (Table 6). By contrast, there is a minority of people 
(28%) who choose categories 5 to 7, indicating they are not at all 
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comfortable with letting adults watch pornography. Again about 1 in 
10 people are not able to answer this question.
Next, we asked people whether they agree or disagree that: 
You shouldn’t try to stop teenage boys from watching 
pornography that shows people having sex (not just actors 
pretending to do so); it is just a normal part of growing up.
More people disagree with this statement than agree with it (35% 
compared with 29%), highlighting there is not a strong body 
of support for a laissez-faire attitude towards teenage boys’ 
consumption of pornography (Table 6). However, a similar proportion 
opt not to choose either way, indicating people ind this a dificult 
question to answer and perhaps relecting the practical dificulty in 
now restricting teenagers’ access to pornography. 
Only one of the questions detailed above on attitudes towards 
pornography and adult content in ilms has featured in previous BSA 
surveys (see Table 7). However, this does show a clear and marked 
increase in the more relaxed attitude on this measure. It appears that 
in just a decade that a lot more people are willing to allow any ilm to 
be viewed. In 1996 the majority (59%) of people felt some ilms were 
too violent or pornographic, whereas that view was in a minority by 
2016 (41%), albeit a sizable one. 
Table 7 Views about adult content in ilms, 1996 and 2016
  1996 2016
% %
Adults should be able to see whatever ilms they like 32 45
Some ilms are too violent or pornographic even for adults 59 41
Can’t choose / not answered 9 15
Unweighted base 989 1619
Who is most and least likely to have liberal views on 
adult content in ilms?
There are some important divides in views towards pornography 
among the major demographic subgroups of the population. Similar 
patterns were found across all three measures of attitudes towards 
pornography. In particular, men are much more likely than women 
to view adult content in ilms as acceptable, for example saying 
adults should be able to watch whatever ilms they like (58% for men 
compared with 32% for women). The youngest group is also most 
likely to say adult content is acceptable and the oldest group most 
likely to say it is unacceptable (60% of those aged 18-34 compared 
with 20% of those aged 75+ respectively say adults should be able to 
watch whatever ilms they like). Those with no religion are also more 
likely to say it is acceptable than all religious groups, with 54% of 
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people with no religion saying adults should be able to what whatever 
ilms they like, compared with 31%-39% among the religious groups. 
Those with some educational qualiications (45%-49%) are more 
likely to be accepting than those with no qualiications (35%), 
however regression analysis found that once the relationships 
between level of education and other variables are controlled for, 
level of education is not signiicantly associated with attitudes to 
adult content. Instead, belonging to a younger age group, having no 
religion and being male remain signiicant in explaining views on adult 
content. 
Finally, we looked at whether differences between subgroups have 
changed over time. Men have become more accepting over the 
period compared with women (16 percentage point increase between 
1996 and 2016 compared with 9 percentage points for women). In 
terms of religion, the ‘other Christian’ (i.e. Christian but not Anglican 
or Catholic) and ‘no religion’ groups have seen the most increase. 
Finally, we found an educational divide, with the ‘no qualiications’ 
group seeing the smallest increase in acceptance since 1996 (5 
percentage points). While some of this is likely to be related to 
age, even those in the oldest age groups saw an increase of 10 
percentage points or more. This does therefore suggest that those 
with no qualiications have experienced the least liberalisation in their 
views in relation to pornography. 
Summary
Unlike some other indicators of moral attitudes, the population as 
a whole is evenly balanced in reaction to questions of pornography 
and adult content. In this sense, it is very much a ‘live’ moral issue 
for society and there is not yet a settled view of what is acceptable 
or not, especially between the sexes. In common with other issues, 
there is also a clear divide by age and religiosity. 
Having said that, there has been a clear shift in the last decade 
towards people being more ‘liberal’ or ‘relaxed’ about the showing 
and use of pornography, at least for adults. It remains to be seen 
whether this continues or whether pornography’s ubiquity creates 
any increased nervousness in the future, especially stemming from 
the impact on children.  
Abortion
Abortions have been allowed by law in Britain since 1967, when 
the Abortion Act made it possible for abortions to be performed 
for pregnancies under 28 weeks. This was updated in 1990 by the 
Human Embryology and Human Fertilisation Act, which reduced 
the time limit for abortions from 28 to 24 weeks, although later-term 
abortions are allowed in special circumstance where there is grave 
risk to the mother or there is severe foetal abnormality. 
NatCen Social Research
British Social Attitudes 34 | Moral issues 103
There has been a clear 
shift in the last decade 
towards people being 
more liberal or relaxed 
about the showing and 
use of pornography, at 
least for adults
Recent years have seen a decline in abortion rates since a peak in 
2007 of 17.9 abortions per 1,000 women in England and Wales of 
child-bearing age, down to 16 in 2015. At the same time there has 
been a shift in the age proile of women having abortions (Ofice for 
National Statistics, 2016), with fewer teenage abortions (the teenage 
pregnancy rate has been halved since 1998 (Ofice for National 
Statistics, 2017b)) and an increase in abortions among women aged 
30 plus. 
But have these changes been accompanied by a shift in public 
perceptions of abortion? BSA has included a number of questions 
on abortion since the survey’s inception in 1983 that help us explore 
this: 
Here are a number of circumstances in which a woman might 
consider an abortion. Please say whether or not you think the 
law should allow an abortion in each case.
The woman decides on her own she does not wish to have a 
child
The couple cannot afford any more children
The woman’s health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy
The British public is almost unanimous in their belief that if a woman’s 
health is seriously endangered, an abortion should be allowed by law. 
Over 9 in 10 (93%) say this, a igure that has changed very little in the 
last three decades (Figure 4). 
Fewer people say that abortion should be allowed if a woman 
decides on her own she does not want the child (70%) or if a 
couple cannot afford any more children (65%), however, for both 
questions a clear majority of people think these abortions should be 
allowed, and in both cases these are the highest-recorded levels of 
approval. Views on whether abortions for parents who can’t afford 
another child saw a decline in approval during the 1990s to a low of 
48% in 2007 before a steady increase in support to 65% in 2016. 
Acceptance of abortions where the woman does not want the child 
has slowly increased from a low of 29% in 1984 to 70% in 2016.
NatCen Social Research
British Social Attitudes 34 | Moral issues 104
The British public is 
almost unanimous 
in their belief that if 
a womans health is 
seriously endangered, 
an abortion should be 
allowed by law
Figure 4 Views towards abortion in different scenarios, 1983-2016 
The data on which Figure 4 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
Who is most and least likely to be accepting of 
abortion?
Older people are less likely to approve of abortions when a woman 
does not wish to have the child.  Fifty-three per cent of people aged 
77 to 86, and 61% of those aged 67 to 76 say they think abortion 
should be allowed in this situation, compared with 76% of the 
youngest age group aged 18 to 26. 
However, unlike the views about sex before marriage, or same-sex 
relationships we saw in previous sections, there is not a clear pattern 
of trends in views towards abortion over time by birth cohort. Figure 
5 shows the proportion saying that abortion should be allowed if the 
woman does not wish to have the child by generation cohort. The 
generational groups do not stay consistently in line, and do not cover 
a particularly large range of views. People born in the 1950s or later 
have a relatively narrow range of views from 68% to 76% saying 
abortion should be allowed in this situation. All cohorts have become 
more accepting of abortions in this situation over time, suggesting 
that the primary explanation for any change over time is not a cohort 
effect. 
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Figure 5 Proportion saying abortion should be allowed by law if the woman does not wish to 
have the child, by generation cohort, 1983-2016
The data on which Figure 5 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
Religious groups are less likely than people with no religion to say 
that a woman should be allowed by law to have an abortion if she 
does not wish to have the child. Nearly 4 out 5 (78%) of people with 
no religion say abortions should be allowed in this situation. One 
might expect Catholics to be most likely to disagree with abortions in 
this situation given the Vatican’s continued opposition. While this may 
be true historically, Catholics (61%) are now more likely than ‘other’ 
Christian groups (57%) to think these abortions should be allowed, 
and are not far behind Anglicans (67%). The increase in approval of 
this type of abortion by those of religion in general appears to have 
been driven in part by a change in views among Christian groups, in 
particular Catholics, among whom there has been a 22 percentage 
point increase in the view that abortions should be allowed if the 
woman does not wish to have the child (from 39% in 2012 to 61% in 
2016). However, we need to treat these within-Christianity trends with 
some caution as the sample sizes are small. 
Interestingly, among people with no formal qualiications, views 
on abortion when a woman does not want the child have changed 
very little since the mid-1980s. While overall approval of abortion 
in this situation has increased from 49% in 1985 to 70% in 2016, 
the increase was 49% in 1985 to 54% in 2016 among those with 
no qualiications. At the same time approval among those with 
qualiications has increased, resulting in a relatively large gap 
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between the most and least educated; in 2016 54% of those with no 
formal qualiications say abortion should be allowed if a woman does 
not want a child, compared with 77% of people with a degree. 
Men and women are equally as likely to be supportive of abortion; 
there are no differences between the sexes in their views for any of 
the scenarios we asked about. 
Summary
In general the British public is accepting of abortions, both when 
it is vital for the health of the mother, and for other reasons. The 
past decade has seen modest increases in liberal attitudes towards 
abortion, which appears to have been driven by the more educated, 
and people with religion, while religious divides are narrowing we see 
a deeper divide between those with qualiications and those without. 
Euthanasia
This inal section looks at moral attitudes to voluntary euthanasia; 
that is whether it should ever be legal to help someone to end their 
life. 
This has been subject of intense debate since the 1990s, which 
tends to peak when there are relevant private member’s bills or high 
proile legal cases. Arguments for and against euthanasia have been 
rehearsed in detail during three private member’s bills introduced by 
Lord Joffe (Clery et al., 2007) and cases where people have sought 
euthanasia abroad. In brief, advocates of legalisation tend to rely 
on a ‘human-right’ and ‘autonomy’ view. They also argue the law is 
inconsistent because there is already common use of what some 
people call ‘passive’ euthanasia, whereby treatment is denied in the 
expectation of death. 
Opponents of legalisation argue that all life is sacred, that there 
would be a ‘slippery slope’ if any form of euthanasia was allowed, 
that older people will feel pressure to seek assisted dying, and/or that 
a doctor’s job should never be to kill. 
In looking at public opinion on helping someone to die, we use a 
number of hypothetical scenarios to assess the extent to which 
attitudes depend on the conditions and circumstances under which 
it may be done. In doing so, we try to be clear on the terms used and 
the issues of debate.
• Voluntary decision-making. By this mean we mean helping 
an individual who wishes to die to do so. There is clearly 
debate about whether it is always possible to be clear whether 
someone’s wishes are genuine and considered. The term ‘non-
voluntary euthanasia’ means ending the life of an individual when 
the views of the individual cannot be elicited, and it is requested 
or authorised by a doctor or relative.
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• Euthanasia (otherwise known as ‘assisted dying’). By this we 
mean that someone else is administering a substance that 
enables a person to die. The crucial distinction here is with 
‘assisted suicide’, where someone takes their own life. There is 
a further sub-distinction between who that ‘someone else’ is, for 
example whether they are a medical practitioner or a relative.
• The nature of the person’s situation. There are a number of 
dimensions to someone’s condition/s that could inluence 
whether euthanasia is considered acceptable, particularly whether 
the disease is terminal and/or to what extent someone is suffering 
pain or severe cognitive problems.
Different countries and US states have different approaches and 
the form of euthanasia varies according to these issues. In the 
Netherlands, both voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide are 
legalised, albeit only when performed by a doctor. However, in 
Belgium, only voluntary euthanasia has been legalised, while in 
the US state of Oregon doctor assisted suicide is only allowed if 
someone is terminally ill. In Switzerland, assisted suicide is allowed 
but only by non-medical practitioners. 
We presented respondents with scenarios of patients with different 
descriptions and then asked if the law should allow someone (either 
a doctor or relative) to help them to end their lives should they wish. 
The four main scenarios are:
1. Voluntary euthanasia by a doctor for “a person with an 
incurable and painful disease who will die – for example, 
someone dying of cancer”
2. Voluntary euthanasia by a close relative for a person with an 
incurable and painful disease who will die
3. Voluntary euthanasia by a doctor for “a person with an 
incurable and painful illness, from which they will not die”
4. Voluntary euthanasia by a doctor for “a person who is not in 
much pain nor in danger of death, but becomes permanently 
and completely dependent on relatives for all their needs - for 
example someone who cannot feed, wash or go to the toilet 
by themselves”
For each question, we presented four response categories: 
Definitely should be allowed
Probably should be allowed
Probably should not be allowed
Definitely should not be allowed
Table 8 shows levels of public support for euthanasia by grouping 
those who say it should deinitely and probably should be allowed in 
the varying circumstances. In contrast with UK law, there is strong 
support (78%) for allowing voluntary euthanasia where it is carried 
out by a doctor for a person with an incurable disease. There is less 
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clear-cut support for the other scenarios, that is, where euthanasia 
is carried out by a close relative (39%), where the person is not 
suffering from a terminal disease (51%) or is completely dependent 
but not in pain or danger of death (50%). 
Table 8 Attitudes to voluntary euthanasia
% saying the law should deinitely or probably allow…
... a doctor to end life of someone with an incurable and painful illness from 
which they will die
78
… a close relative  to end life of someone with an incurable and painful illness 
from which they will die
39
… a doctor to end life of someone with an incurable and painful illness from 
which they will not die
51
… a doctor to end life of someone who is dependent on relatives for all of their 
needs, but not in pain or danger of death
50
Unweighted base 1928
Table 9 explores the strength of support, or not, for euthanasia being 
allowed in each case. When looking at those who say whether or not 
voluntary euthanasia should “deinitely” be allowed the support for 
the irst scenario is even clearer (50% say it should be “deinitely” 
allowed, compared with 16%-20% for the other scenarios). A 
similar breakdown shows the public is most opposed to voluntary 
euthanasia when it is done by a relative rather than a doctor (33% 
say it “deinitely should not be allowed”). 
Table 9 Attitudes to voluntary euthanasia
Scenarios for voluntary euthanasia





which they will 
die 






which they will 
die 





which they will 
not die 
By a doctor for 
someone who 
is dependent, 
but not in pain 
or danger of 
death 
Should the law 
allow voluntary 
euthanasia in this 
situation?
%   
Deinitely should 50 16 20 19
Probably should 29 23 30 31
Probably should not 8 26 22 21
Deinitely should not 12 33 25 26
Unweighted base 1928 1928 1928 1928
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Attitudes towards voluntary euthanasia over time
One general question on attitudes towards voluntary euthanasia has 
been asked on a number of occasions on previous BSA surveys: 
“Suppose a person has a painful incurable disease. Do you think 
that doctors should be allowed by law to end the patient’s life, if the 
patient requests it?” 
Just over three-quarters (77%) of people say “deinitely” or “probably 
should be allowed” in answer to this question, which is in line with 
overall responses to the irst scenario outlined above which also asks 
about a doctor ending someone’s life if they have a painful incurable 
disease.
Figure 6 shows that the overall trend has been relatively stable over 
time. It appeared as if there was a slow trend towards increasing 
support between 1983 and 1994, but that has now halted and the 
levels of support for voluntary euthanasia are the same in 2016 as in 
1983.
Figure 6 Proportion saying voluntary euthanasia should be allowed for a person who has a 
painful incurable disease, 1983-2016
The data on which Figure 6 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
The BSA surveys are now building up a time series on some of 
the scenarios of interest, so it is possible for us to look further at 
change for each of the four scenarios. Table 10 presents the levels of 
support for each scenario in 1995, 2005 and 2016 using the summary 
indicator of all those who think the form of euthanasia should be 
deinitely or probably allowed.
It shows that there has not been a clear change in attitudes over time 
and overall trends are broadly stable. Where there has been some 
minor change, for example on euthanasia by a relative it appears that 
there was greater change between 1995 and 2005 than there was 
during the last decade. 
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Table 10 Summary views about euthanasia over time: 1995, 2005 and 2016
% saying the law deinitely/probably should allow … 1995 2005 2016
… voluntary euthanasia by a doctor for a person with an incurable 
and painful disease who will die
80 82 78
… voluntary euthanasia by a relative for a person with an incurable 
and painful disease who will die
31 45 39
… voluntary euthanasia by a doctor for a person with an incurable 
and painful disease who will not die4
41 46 51
… voluntary euthanasia by a doctor for a person who is 
completely dependent on relatives for all their needs
51 44 50
Unweighted base 1234 2113 1928
Who is most and least likely to support voluntary 
euthanasia?
There are relatively few major differences in views towards euthanasia 
among the major demographic subgroups of the population. We 
noted however the main differences occur by religious afiliation; 
those with no religion being most likely to support euthanasia (for 
example, 89% of people without a religion say euthanasia by a 
doctor for someone with a terminal disease should be allowed, 
compared with 67% of people with a religion). However, views 
towards euthanasia where someone is completely dependent appear 
to behave somewhat differently to views towards other forms of 
euthanasia, as there is little difference among the major religious 
subgroups for this speciic scenario. 
In general there are also some differences by age; those in the oldest 
age groups (75+) tend to be less supportive of euthanasia than 
younger age groups. For example, 77% of the youngest age group 
say euthanasia by a doctor for someone who will die from a painful 
disease should be allowed, compared with 69% of the oldest age 
group. However it is the middle age groups who are most likely to 
approve of voluntary euthanasia in this situation, with 85% of 45-54 
year olds and 84% of 55-64 year olds saying this. The same is also 
true of euthanasia for a person who is completely dependent on 
their relatives, with 57% of 45-54 year olds being accepting of this 
compared with 49% of 18-34 year olds and 42% of people aged 75 
or older. 
There is no suggestion in these data that those with higher 
educational qualiications are more likely to support euthanasia. 
Equally, there are no marked differences by party identiication.
As there has been little change over time, we did not conduct any 
analysis of the generations and trends in their attitudes over time. 
4 In 1995 this question referred speciically to arthritis, so any change over time should be 
viewed with caution.
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Summary
In the collection of issues studied in this chapter, euthanasia 
is unique in having attitudes that are both relatively stable and 
not subject to major divides by age, education or sex. The most 
surprising aspect of this issue is, perhaps, how out of step UK law 
is with long-standing and signiicant majority public support for 
voluntary euthanasia by a doctor in cases where a person has an 
incurable and painful terminal disease. 
By contrast, that half (50%) of people support euthanasia being 
allowed in cases where someone is completely dependent on 
relatives for all their needs perhaps highlights why some anti-
euthanasia campaigners worry that a legal change could result in 
people ending their lives out of a sense of being a burden on others. 
Conclusions
We have seen that across a number of issues Britain seems to be 
becoming more socially liberal in its response to these questions 
of personal autonomy. Even in the past few years there have been 
marked increases in the acceptance of same-sex relationships and 
premarital sex; while longer-term there has been a liberalisation of 
views towards abortions and pornography. We have also found that 
a signiicant majority are supportive of transgender people, though 
this falls when people are asked questions of practical application. 
Attitudes to euthanasia have remained relatively stable, but support 
for the most limited form of euthanasia is strong. Taken together 
these indings do point to a wider societal spread of a socially liberal 
attitude. 
While the growth in social liberalism seems to be continuing there 
are notable divides in opinion. For example: we ind particularly low 
acceptance of same-sex relationships among those without any 
formal qualiications; there is a 26 percentage point gap between 
men and women’s views on whether adults should be allowed to 
watch whichever adult ilms they like; older age groups are less likely 
to support an option for allowing euthanasia than the youngest age 
groups in all scenarios presented, but in some instances support 
among the middle-aged is higher; and men and older people are less 
accepting of transgender people. 
We found that religion is closely associated with attitudes in every 
one of the issues covered in this chapter, even when the relationship 
between religious afiliation and other demographic variables has 
been controlled for; across the board religious people are more likely 
to be conservative than people without a religion. The same is the 
case for older people, who are generally less liberal on all topics 
except on attitudes to transgender people. People without formal 
qualiications are more conservative about same-sex relationships, 
abortion and transgender people. Sex, in turn, is associated with 
views on same-sex relationships, pornography and transgender 
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The most surprising 
aspect of this issue 
is, perhaps, how out 
of step UK law is with 
long-standing and 
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public support for 
voluntary euthanasia
Across a number of 
issues Britain seems 
to be becoming more 
socially liberal
people; with women being more liberal on same-sex relationships 
and transgender issues, while men are more likely to be liberal on 
pornography and adult content in ilm.
While these divides are notable it is important to add that in many 
cases they do appear to be narrowing. While across the board 
religious groups are more conservative in their views than the non-
religious, they have become increasingly liberal in their views towards 
premarital sex, same-sex relationships and abortion, and narrowed 
the gap between them and the non-religious. 
Looking at age we also see some narrowing. While much of the 
growing social liberalism has been caused by a generational effect, 
meaning that older, less liberal people are being replaced by younger 
cohorts with more liberal attitudes, there have also been changes 
within generations. This is most notable with same-sex relationships, 
where older generations have become more socially liberal in recent 
years.
In conclusion, it seems clear from these issues that ‘social liberalism’ 
is a growing feature of British society and will seemingly remain so as 
the older age cohorts are replaced by young ones. Some important 
divides exist, although they do appear to be narrowing. It will be 
interesting to test in future whether this growth in social liberalism 
also holds for other issues, such as race and the status of women. 
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While across the board 
religious groups are 
more conservative in 
their views than the 
non-religious, they have 
become increasingly 
liberal in their views
It seems clear from 
these issues that social 
liberalism is a growing 
feature of British society 
and will seemingly remain 
so as the older age 
cohorts are replaced by 
young ones
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Appendix
The data for Figure 1 are shown below. 
Table A.1 Views on premarital sex and same-sex relationships, 1983-2016
1983 1984 1985 1987 1989
% saying sex before marriage 
“not wrong at all”
42 42 43 42 44
% saying sex between two adults of the same 
sex “not wrong at all”
17 16 13 11 14
Unweighted base 1761 1675 1804 2847 3029
1990 1993 1995 1998 1999
% saying sex before marriage 
“not wrong at all”
45 54 51 58 52
% saying sex between two adults of the same 
sex “not wrong at all”
15 18 22 23 27
Unweighted base 2797 2945 3633 3146 3143 
2000 2003 2005 2006 2007
% saying sex before marriage 
“not wrong at all”
62 63 63 60 62
% saying sex between two adults of the same 
sex “not wrong at all”
34 37 37 38 39
Unweighted base 3426 4432 4268 4290 4124
2010 2012 2013 2015 2016
% saying sex before marriage 
“not wrong at all”
62 64 67 70 75
% saying sex between two adults of the same 
sex “not wrong at all”
45 47 57 59 64
Unweighted base 3297 3248 1097 3245 974
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The data for Figure 2 are shown below. 









All 42 1761 43 1804 45 1397
Cohort
1970s    
1960s 66 177 68 326 67 227
1950s 63 317 59 336 59 270
1940s 53 346 50 348 45 268
1930s 37 281 29 270 35 207
1920s 28 269 25 243 25 193









All 51 1172 62 3426 63 2102
Cohort
1980s     72 104 77 207
1970s 75 111 76 524 75 307
1960s 70 241 78 730 72 427
1950s 60 210 69 556 67 359
1940s 51 191 58 495 56 360
1930s 31 157 42 483 40 223









All 62 1081 64 1103 75 974
Cohort
1980s 74 144 75 139 84 141
1970s 76 190 71 192 79 186
1960s 68 201 70 179 78 167
1950s 72 145 68 175 77 153
1940s 45 189 53 206 59 151
1930s 39 122 38 113
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The bases for Tables 1 and 2 can be found below. 
Table A.3 Views on premarital sex, by religion, 1985-2016,
% saying premarital 
sex 'not wrong at all' 




653 367 631 269 166
Roman Catholic 197 111 196 85 87
Other Christian 296 184 408 183 186
Non-Christian 44 37 77 51 55
No religion 608 471 775 506 477
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The data for Figure 3 are shown below. 













1960s 18 177 17 326 20 227
1950s 27 317 21 336 19 270
1940s 25 346 17 348 18 268
1930s 17 281 7 270 12 207
1920s 17 269 5 243 7 193









All 22 1172 34 3426 37 2102
Cohort
1980s     49 104 51 207
1970s 43 111 46 524 46 307
1960s 27 241 46 730 44 427
1950s 34 210 37 556 39 359
1940s 17 191 30 495 27 360
1930s 14 157 20 483 18 223








All 45 1081 47 1103 64 974
Cohort
1980s 59 144 58 139 73 141
1970s 56 190 52 192 70 186
1960s 53 201 58 179 66 167
1950s 47 145 43 175 64 153
1940s 28 189 30 206 41 151
1930s 18 122 18 113
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The data for Figure 4 are shown below. 
Table A.5 Views on abortion in different scenarios, 1983-2016
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1994
% saying "yes" the law should 
allow an abortion when …
… the woman’s health is 
endangered
87 92 91 92 94 92 93 92
… the woman does not wish to 
have child
37 29 49 44 54 49 56 54
… the couple cannot afford any 
more children 
   47 n/a    58    51    58    57    62    61 
Unweighted base 1761 1675 1804 3100 2847 3029 2797 3469
1995 1998 2004 2005 2007 2008 2012 2016
% saying "yes" the law should 
allow an abortion when …
… the woman’s health is 
endangered
90 92 91 91 86 90 90 93
… the woman does not wish to 
have child
60 54 56 60 60 60 62 70
… the couple cannot afford any 
more children 
   59    56    53    51    48    52    64 65
Unweighted base 3633 3146 3199 4268 4124 4486 3248 1619
n/a = not asked
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The data for Figure 5 are shown below. 
Table A.6 Proportion saying abortion should be allowed by law if the woman does not wish 
to have the child, by generation cohort. 1983-2016









All 37 1650 49 1530 56 1197 60 1054
Cohort
1970s     65 108
1960s 45 166 56 276 58 197 68 229
1950s 46 309 53 292 63 241 59 181
1940s 40 329 51 297 56 237 60 175
1930s 34 261 40 234 53 176 53 136
1920s 32 255 49 212 53 164 55 153








All 60 2645 62 950 70 1619
Cohort
1990s 76 131
1980s 65 228 65 114 71 231
1970s 67 387 65 154 74 282
1960s 67 518 69 164 68 277
1950s 64 458 65 155 73 287
1940s 53 472 48 187 61 266
1930s 52 325 51 114
1920s 41 256
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The data for Figure 6 are shown below. 
Table A.7 Proportion saying voluntary euthanasia should be allowed for a person who has a 
painful incurable disease, 1983-2016
1983 1984 1989 1994 2005 2012 2016
Should doctors be allowed by 
law to end a patient’s life, if 
they request it % % % % % % %
Yes 77 75 79 82 80 81 77
No 22 24 20 15 18 16 21
Unweighted base 1650 1562 1307 984 1786 956 1619
Below are the results of ive regression analyses referred to in 
this chapter. The multivariate analysis technique used is logistic 
regression, about which more details can be found in the Technical 
Details. Variables included in the analyses were education, age, sex, 
religion, party identiication, and social class. Below we present 
results for education, age, sex and religion, as these variables were 
signiicantly associated with at least one of the ive dependent 
variables. 
In Table A.8 we present logistic regression analysis where the 
dependent variable is whether the respondent says pre-marital sex 
is “not wrong at all”. A positive coeficient indicates that the group is 
more likely than the reference group (shown in brackets) to say that 
pre-marital sex is not wrong.  
Table A.8 View of pre-marital sex, logistic regression 
Coeficient Standard error p value
Education (degree)     .065
Higher education / A level .426 .263 .105
O level / CSE **.740 .281 .008
No qualiications .392 .326 .230
Age (18-34)     .000
35-44 *-.698 .355 .049
45-54 **-1.406 .348 .000
55-64 **-1.415 .374 .000
65-74 **-2.037 .370 .000
75+ **-3.015 .412 .000
Sex (male) -.041 .193 .832
Religion (no religion)     .000
Church of England -.311 .280 .267
Roman Catholic -.641 .348 .065
Other Christian **-1.343 .239 .000
Non-Christian **-3.208 .390 .000
Constant **2.831 .373 .000
Unweighted base: 862
$ZPNUPÄJHU[H[ SL]LS$ZPNUPÄJHU[H[  SL]LS
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In Table A.9 we present logistic regression analysis where the 
dependent variable is whether the respondent says same-sex 
relationships are “not wrong at all”. A positive coeficient indicates 
that the group is more likely than the reference group (shown in 
brackets) to say that same-sex relationships are not wrong.  
Table A.9 View of same-sex relationships, logistic regression 
Coeficient Standard error p value
Education (degree)     .013
Higher education / A level -.111 .242 .648
O level / CSE *-.508 .247 .040
No qualiications **-.895 .303 .003
Age (18-34)     .000
35-44 **-.773 .287 .007
45-54 **-.876 .284 .002
55-64 **-1.231 .302 .000
65-74 **-1.654 .310 .000
75+ **-2.912 .394 .000
Sex (male) *.382 .173 .027
Religion (no religion)     .000
Church of England -.444 .251 .077
Roman Catholic *-.703 .304 .021
Other Christian **-.994 .218 .000
Non-Christian **-2.466 .366 .000
Constant **2.317 .315 .000
Unweighted base: 862
$ZPNUPÄJHU[H[ SL]LS$ZPNUPÄJHU[H[  SL]LS
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In Table A.10 we present logistic regression analysis where the 
dependent variable is whether the respondent says “adults should be 
allowed to see whatever ilms they like” (as opposed to saying “some 
ilms are too violent or pornographic even for adults”). A positive 
coeficient indicates that the group is more likely than the reference 
group (shown in brackets) to say that adults should be able to see 
whatever ilms they like.  
Table A.10 View of adult content in ilm, logistic regression 
Coeficient Standard error p value
Education (degree)     .348
Higher education / A level .198 .166 .235
O level / CSE .275 .182 .132
No qualiications .394 .237 .096
Age (18-34)     .000
35-44 *-.401 .187 .032
45-54 **-.751 .187 .000
55-64 **-.893 .197 .000
65-74 **-1.744 .230 .000
75+ **-2.027 .293 .000
Sex (male) **-1.084 .122 .000
Religion (no religion)     .001
Church of England *-.406 .182 .026
Roman Catholic -.468 .244 .055
Other Christian *-.469 .165 .005
Non-Christian **-.817 .277 .003
Constant 1.208 .201 .269
Unweighted base: 1453
 $ZPNUPÄJHU[H[ SL]LS$ZPNUPÄJHU[H[  SL]LS
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In Table A.11 we present logistic regression analysis where the 
dependent variable is whether the respondent says abortion should 
be allowed by law when a woman decides she doesn’t want the 
baby. A positive coeficient indicates that the group is more likely 
than the reference group (shown in brackets) to say that abortion 
should be allowed in this scenario.
Table A.11 View of abortion when a woman decides she doesn’t want the baby, logistic 
regression 
Coeficient Standard error p value
Education (degree)     .035
Higher education / A level -.260 .180 .149
O level / CSE *-.389 .193 .044
No qualiications **-.655 .226 .004
Age (18-34)     .012
35-44 .022 .219 .919
45-54 -.128 .217 .555
55-64 -.152 .216 .483
65-74 -.409 .226 .070
75+ **-.783 .250 .002
Sex (male) .192 .125 .125
Religion (no religion)     .000
Church of England -.325 .172 .058
Roman Catholic **-.799 .221 .000
Other Christian **-.900 .161 .000
Non-Christian **-1.607 .291 .000
Constant 1.731 .230 .294
Unweighted base: 1453
$ZPNUPÄJHU[H[ SL]LS$ZPNUPÄJHU[H[  SL]LS
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In Table A.12 we present logistic regression analysis where the 
dependent variable is whether the respondent says prejudice against 
transgender people is wrong. A positive coeficient indicates that the 
group is more likely than the reference group (shown in brackets) to 
say that transgender prejudice is always wrong.  
Table A.12 View of prejudice against transgender people, logistic regression 
Coeficient Standard error p value
Education (degree)     .000
Higher education / A level -.265 .235 .260
O level / CSE **-.905 .248 .000
No qualiications **-1.102 .326 .001
Age (18-34)     .085
35-44 -.482 .270 .074
45-54 -.368 .276 .182
55-64 -.548 .288 .057
65-74 -.517 .311 .096
75+ **-1.155 .384 .003
Sex (male) **.548 .173 .002
Religion (no religion)     .004
Church of England -.302 .248 .223
Roman Catholic -.314 .340 .355
Other Christian *-.487 .228 .033
Non-Christian **-1.334 .376 .000
Constant **1.166 .295 .000
Unweighted base: 706
$ZPNUPÄJHU[H[ SL]LS$ZPNUPÄJHU[H[  SL]LS
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In the years leading up to the Brexit vote we see a stark and growing divide in people’s views 
on the economic impact of immigration between the young degree-educated and older 
school-leavers. Across Europe young graduates are more likely than older school-leavers to 
say immigration is good for the economy, and this divide is biggest in the UK.
The UK is the most divided country in Europe on the economic impact of immigration
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Immigration
How attitudes in the UK compare with Europe
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Overview
Despite the debate about immigration becoming more prominent and contentious, this 
chapter inds that in the 12 years up to 2014 our attitudes on immigration’s impact on the 
country became largely more positive. However, underneath this change hides a social 
divide in attitudes which is among the starkest in Europe.
Attitudes more positive but more selective
From 2002-2014 the public has, on balance, become more positive about the beneits of 
immigration, but also more selective on who they wish to see migrate. 
• In 2002 the proportion believing immigration was bad for the economy outweighed those who 
thought it good by 16 percentage points. By 2014 this had changed, to the extent that the 
proportion with a positive view of its impact were 4 points ahead. 
• The public have become slightly more sceptical about the cultural beneits of immigration, but 
those with a positive view still just outweigh those with a negative one by 4 percentage points. 
• During this period the public have not noticeably become more or less keen on restrictions 
to migrant numbers. However, they are more selective. Signiicant majorities feel the ability to 
speak English (87%, up from 77%), a commitment to the British “way of life” (84%, up from 
78%) and possessing needed skills (81%, up from 71%) are important criteria for selecting 
migrants. 
UK attitudes more divided than in most European countries
UK attitudes to the economic impact of immigration have gone from being some of the most 
negative to being middling in the list of countries we examine. This overall trend however, 
masks a comparatively stark social divide in views.   
• People in the UK now have a mid-ranking view of how positive immigration is for the economy 
(The UK is 7th out of 18 European countries, compared with 16th in 2002). By contrast, UK 
attitudes to immigration’s cultural impact rank amongst the less positive countries in Europe 
(14th out of 18).  
• By contrasting views about immigration’s economic impacts among young degree-educated 
people with those of older school-leavers, we ind that the UK has the starkest social divide in 
views in Europe. The UK’s divide in attitudes about immigration’s cultural impact is also one of 
the deepest in the continent.
Introduction 
The public has not typically been enthusiastic about immigration, but 
they have often shown a degree of pragmatism about it. For as long 
as we have had public opinion data, the prevalent public attitudes 
on the issue have been acceptance that some migration is useful, 
coupled with demands for strict government controls on its scale, 
particularly whenever the numbers of migrants arriving has risen. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, Britain experienced signiicant migration from 
Commonwealth nations. Commonwealth citizens took advantage 
of rights to live and work in Britain and responded to the British 
Government’s calls to help ill labour shortages. This inlow triggered 
intense public hostility, making migration an explosive political issue. 
Immigration remained a controversial issue until a series of reforms 
by successive governments curtailed Commonwealth migration 
rights, a process completed by the British Nationality Act of 1981 
(Hansen, 2002; Ford et al., 2014). 
Over the past twenty years, a similar story has played out. Political 
reforms eased access to Britain, in particular to citizens from the 
new EU members in central and eastern Europe, to whom Britain 
(uniquely among western Europe’s large economies) granted 
immediate and full free movement rights on their accession to the EU 
in 2004. Growing numbers of migrants opted to exercise the option 
to move to Britain, attracted by (among other things) a growing 
economy, buoyant labour markets and educational opportunities 
(Somerville, 2007). The result has been the largest, most sustained 
and most diverse inlow of migration in British history. As in the 
1960s, the public has reacted to this with steadily mounting concern 
and demands for greater control of migration inlows (Ford et al., 
2014). Immigration has been rated by voters as one of the most 
important issues facing the country continuously for most of the past 
decade (Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014). Surging public concern about 
immigration was a central factor in both the rise of UKIP as a new 
political force (Ford and Goodwin, 2014) and in the majority vote for 
“Brexit” in the 2016 EU membership referendum (see the chapter 
on ‘The vote to leave the EU’, along with Ford and Goodwin, 2014; 
Clarke et al., 2017). 
Past British Social Attitudes (BSA) reports on immigration have 
highlighted how the British public have reacted to recent rises in 
immigration by increasing their demands for control of inlows, while 
becoming much more socially divided about the economic and 
cultural effects of immigration (Ford et al., 2012; Ford and Heath, 
2014). These earlier analyses also suggest that the public is highly 
responsive to differences between particular migrant groups; they are 
much more positive about the arrival of migrant students or skilled 
professionals than they are about family reunion migrants or unskilled 
labourers (Ford et al., 2012; Hainmuller and Hiscox, 2010). 
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Immigration has 
been rated by voters 
as one of the most 
important issues 
facing the country 
continuously for most 
of the past decade
With the Government signalling that Brexit will entail the end of the 
free movement rights for EU citizens to Britain, the Brexit process 
represents an opportunity for the most comprehensive debate 
of immigration policy in decades. This is therefore an opportune 
moment to examine how attitudes in the UK have changed over the 
past 15 years, and how they compare to those in other European 
Union countries. To do this we look at immigration views in two 
waves of the European Social Survey (ESS); wave 1 (2002-2003), 
ielded before the accession of new European members, and wave 
7 (2014-2015), ielded long afterwards. The ESS collects data from 
18 countries across Europe. Unlike BSA, it draws on a whole of UK 
sample and therefore includes Northern Ireland1. The use of the ESS 
means we will be considering data from 2014 and therefore before 
the UK’s EU referendum vote. While more recent data are available, 
and partly analysed in the chapter on ‘The vote to leave the EU’ in 
this year’s BSA report, the ESS data here allow us to make important 
comparisons across Europe and time. However, as high proile 
debates about immigration in the context of the EU referendum and 
the refugee crisis have occurred since this latest ESS wave was 
conducted, it is important the conclusions from the 2014 data are 
treated with caution.
In this chapter we address three questions. Firstly, we look at 
whether the increase in migration over the past 15 years has made 
the public more selective about the migrants they think Britain should 
accept, and more sceptical about the effects of migration on the 
country. Next we examine whether the UK has become more divided 
in its views about migration. Finally we look at how UK attitudes 
stand in contrast to those in other European countries, over time, 
at an aggregate level and in terms of how internally divided each 
country is in its views. 
A more sceptical public? 
The scale of migration to Britain over the past 15 years is 
unprecedented, but has this increased public demands for greater 
control of migrant inlows? Four questions from ESS give us some 
insight on this. Firstly, respondents were asked: 
To what extent do you think Britain should allow people of the 
same race or ethnic group as most of Britain’s people to come 
and live here?
The same structure was then used to ask respondents about people 
of a different race or ethnic group; people from poorer countries 
in Europe; and inally, about people from poorer countries outside 
Europe. These categories are broad, as are the response categories: 
“allow many to come and live here”, “allow some”, “allow few” and 
“allow none”. We therefore need to ensure conclusions drawn from 
these responses are treated with caution as “allow some migrants 
1  ESS collects data from the whole of the UK, including Northern Ireland which represents 
approximately 1% of the sample. For the questions on immigration, respondents living in Britain 
were asked about “people coming to live in Britain”. Respondents living in Northern Ireland were 
asked about “people coming to live in the UK”. 
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from different ethnic groups to come to Britain” could mean a range 
of things. 
While these are important limitations, the distribution of responses on 
these items give us a broad sense of public sentiment and whether it 
has shifted. There is no evidence of a large or general movement in 
views towards the restriction of migration over the past 15 years, but 
there are some small and potentially interesting changes in attitudes 
to particular groups (Table 1). Views of migrants from the same ethnic 
group as the majority remain stable, but the public has become more 
positive about accepting ethnic minority migrants: 57% feel that 
“many” or “some” should be allowed in the 2014 survey, up from 
50% in 2002. 





How many immigrants from same race/ethnic group as 
majority should Britain allow to come and live here? 
% % %
Allow many 12 14 +2
Allow some 52 50 -2
Allow few 27 26 -1
Allow none 8 9 +1
How many immigrants from different race/ethnic group 
to majority should Britain allow to come and live here? 
% % %
Allow many 8 11 +4
Allow some 42 46 +4
Allow few 34 29 -4
Allow none 15 12 -3
How many immigrants from poorer countries in Europe 
should Britain allow to come and live here?
% % %
Allow many 9 11 +2
Allow some 45 40 -4
Allow few 33 31 -2
Allow none 12 16 +4
How many immigrants from poorer countries outside 
Europe should Britain allow to come and live here?
  
Allow many 8 9 +1
Allow some 41 34 -6
Allow few 36 34 -1
Allow none 14 21 +7
Unweighted base 2052 2264
Source: UK respondents to the European Social Survey wave 1 (2002) and wave 7 (2014)
2 Figures showing change over time in this table are calculated from the exact data, rather 
than the rounded igures that appear in the table. As a result they will sometimes appear to be 
incorrect by +/-1%. This applies to all similar tables in this chapter.
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While the signiicant increase in migrants from central and eastern 
Europe has been a major focus of political and media debate, public 
sentiment about migrants from poorer European countries has barely 
changed. The percentage saying “none” should be allowed has 
risen slightly (from 12% to 16%). The public has become slightly 
more restrictive regarding immigration from poorer countries outside 
Europe, with the percentage saying no migration should be allowed 
rising 7 percentage points to 21%, and the proportion favouring 
“some” migration dropping by the same amount, from 41% to 34%. 
While there are some modest changes in views of particular groups, 
the overall picture here is remarkably stable given the scale of the 
migration Britain experienced in the period between these two 
surveys. 
BSA 2013 indings broadly corroborate these trends and found this 
resulted in most people wanting a reduction in immigration (Ford and 
Heath, 2014). In 1995 63% of people wanted immigration reduced “a 
little” or “a lot”, with 39% wanting the larger of the two reductions. 
By 2013 these proportions stood at 77% and 56% respectively, but 
these igures were largely unchanged since 2008. While the time 
periods covered by BSA are different, the results are consistent with 
ESS inding attitudes having been broadly stable between 2002 and 
2014. Interestingly, together the studies suggest the big negative 
changes in attitudes to immigration occurred between 1995 and 2002 
when immigration levels were much lower.
Judged by ESS measures, there has been no general intensiication 
in public demand for migration control. But how about views of 
the economic and social impact of migration? Has the increase in 
migration raised public concerns about disruptive effects? Table 2 
takes a look at the following four questions asking about the impact 
of migration:
Would you say it is generally bad or good for Britain’s economy 
that people come to live here from other countries? [11-point 
scale where 0 is Bad for the economy, 10 is Good for the 
economy]
Would you say that people who come to live here generally 
take jobs away from workers in Britain, or generally help to 
create new jobs? [11-point scale where 0 is Take away jobs, 10 
is Create new jobs]
Are Britain’s crime problems made worse or better by people 
coming to live here from other countries? [11-point scale 
where 0 is Crime problems made worse, 10 is Crime problems 
made better]
Would you say that Britain’s cultural life is generally 
undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from 
other countries? [11-point scale where 0 is Cultural life 
undermined, 10 is Cultural life enriched]
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The public has 
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Again, we ind little evidence that the signiicant recent increases 
in immigration have resulted in a major negative change in public 
sentiment. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case in some areas. 
The public has become more positive about the economic impact 
of immigration, with the proportion judging immigration to be good 
for the British economy rising 14 points from 27% to 40%, and 
the percentage saying immigration creates jobs rising 10 points 
from 22% to 32%. These rises are from a low base, so even after a 
signiicant positive swing immigration enthusiasts barely outnumber 
sceptics on overall economic impact, and in 2014 slightly more 
people still see immigration as threatening to jobs than see it as an 
engine of job creation. 





Is immigration good or bad for the British economy % % %
Good 27 40 +14
Neither good nor bad 28 22 -6
Bad 43 36 -7
Net good - bad -16 +4 +20
Do immigrants take jobs away in Britain or create new jobs % % %
Create new jobs 22 32 +10
Neither 35 30 -6
Take jobs away 41 36 -5
Net create jobs - take jobs away -19 -4 +15
Crime problems made better or worse by immigrants
Made better 8 13 +5
Neither 30 33 +3
Made worse 60 50 -9
Net crime better- crime worse -52 -37 +14
Cultural life enriched or undermined by immigrants
Enriched 44 43 -1
Neither 22 17 -5
Undermined 32 38 +6
Net enriched - undermined +12 +4 -8
Unweighted base 2052 2264
Source: UK respondents to the European Social Survey wave 1 (2002) and wave 7 (2014)
3 For each of the questions presented in Table 2, the 11-point scales have been grouped 
into 3 categories where ratings  0 to 4 are coded as positive (e.g. “Good”, or “Create new jobs)”, 5 
as neutral (e.g. “Neither”), and 6 to 10 as negative (e.g. “Bad” or “Take jobs away”).
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The public has become 
more positive about 
the economic impact of 
immigration
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the public did not react to a 
decade of high immigration and economic crisis by becoming 
more anti-migration by these measures. This may suggest, in 
line with earlier work, that migration attitudes are pragmatic and 
responsive to context. Britain’s labour market performed relatively 
well both before and after the inancial crisis, with high levels of job 
creation and employment rates close to record highs. It seems that 
mass migration amid such benign economic conditions may have 
encouraged greater acceptance of the positive economic effects of 
immigration on the labour market and the economy in general. 
There is a similar positive change in attitudes about immigration and 
crime, although here a very negative overall view remains in 2014, 
with roughly half of the public continuing to see immigration as a 
potential threat to crime levels (down from over 60% in 2002). There 
is, however, a negative change in views about the cultural impact of 
immigration, the item which attracted the most positive responses in 
2002. The proportion who think migration undermines British culture 
rose 6 points from 32% to 38%. A buoyant economy may assuage 
economic concerns about immigration; it is less likely to alleviate 
worries about the impact mass migration has on British identity and 
culture. Yet even here, the negative change in attitudes is relatively 
modest given the scale of change. The largest inlow of migrants in 
British history has not produced a general negative change in the 
public mood about migration’s effects. 
It is worth recalling that these questions were asked well before 
the prominent discussions of immigration surrounding the EU 
referendum, which may have changed views. 
A more selective public? 
In both ESS waves, respondents were presented with a list of 
characteristics and asked which they believed were important 
qualiications in choosing which migrants to accept:
Please tell me how important you think each of these things 
should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and 
living outside Britain should be able to come and live here
Table 3 shows the proportion of respondents who rate various 
qualiications as being important4 for selecting migrants. 
Here we do ind evidence of a signiicant change in sentiment: the 
public has become more selective. They are very clear about what 
matters most as criteria for selection: skills and being committed 
to the British way of life. Achieved qualiications - things such as 
speaking English, work skills and education which can be acquired 
with time and effort - already mattered a great deal to people in 
2002, with large majorities rating them as important factors to use 
in selecting migrants. The emphasis placed on all of these criteria is 
even higher in 2014.
4  "Important" is deined as scores of above 5 on a scale from 0 “extremely unimportant” to 
10 “extremely important. 
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Migrants being “committed to the way of life in Britain” has also 
grown in importance and remains a top-two criterion for the public. 
Of the criteria in this question this is arguably the most subjective 
and the ESS leaves it open to personal interpretation. Earlier BSA 
research on identity found people struggled to deine what values, 
behaviours or customs are typically British (Heath et al., 2007). The 
answers offered ranged from “politeness” and “fair play”, to “history”, 
“roast dinners” and “drinking tea”. It is therefore likely that people 
are interpreting “committed to the way of life in Britain” in a wide 
variety of ways. For some it may concern observation of the law, for 
others customs, and for some it will be upholding certain values. 
This warrants further examination in subsequent research in this area 
given its importance to the public.
Table 3 Proportion of respondents thinking particular qualiications are important for 





% saying that to be able to come and live here it is 
important for someone from outside Britain to …
… be committed to the way of life in Britain 78 84 +6
… be able to speak English 77 87 +10
… have work skills that  Britain needs 71 81 +10
… have good educational qualiications 63 74 +11
… come from a Christian background 19 16 -3
… be white 11 7 -5
% saying it’s important to have good educational 
qualiications AND speak English AND have work skills 
that Britain needs
49 65 +16
Unweighted Base 2052 2264
Source: UK respondents to the European Social Survey wave 1 (2002) and wave 7 (2014)
Overall it is clear that there is a growing selectiveness from the public 
about immigration. This is even more evident if we combine the 
qualiication-related criteria. Two-thirds (65%) of people in 2014 note 
that educational qualiications, work skills and English language skills 
are all important requirements when selecting migrants - up from 
half (49%) of people in 2002. While people are more aware of the 
positive economic effects of migration, it seems they might also be 
more sensitive to the skills and abilities which they see as maximising 
those positive effects. 
While the public places a strong and rising emphasis on the achieved 
qualiications or behaviour of migrants, the same is not true for 
aspects of migrants’ identities that are dificult or impossible to 
change. Fewer than 1 in 5 regarded a Christian religious background 
as an important qualiication for migrants in 2002 and 2014. The 
NatCen Social Research
British Social Attitudes 34 | Immigration 135
Fewer than 1 in 5 regard 
a Christian religious 
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percentage of the public who see white ethnicity as important is even 
lower, and declining even faster (from 11% in 2002 to 7% in 2014). 
Deepening social divides?
ESS evidence suggests that the UK has not, in the aggregate, 
become more negative about immigration. In fact, across some 
measures attitudes to immigration’s impact have become more 
positive between 2002 and 2014. Yet this aggregate result might 
mask deepening social divisions over the issue. Recent work 
analysing both BSA data (Ford et al., 2012; Ford and Heath, 2014) 
and ESS data (Heath and Richards, 2016) have revealed strong social 
divisions in attitudes to immigration by age, education, social class, 
and migrant heritage.
Tables 4 and 5 look at the social divides in attitudes to migration 
from different groups, and in attitudes to the economic and social 
impacts of migration, in 2014. Here we take the top and bottom 
groups from each characteristic or attitudinal measure (full question 
wording for the attitudinal measures can be found in the appendix 
to this chapter). The tables conirm what previous evidence has 
shown: the public is deeply divided over immigration. On nearly every 
measure we ind gaps of 9 to 30 percentage points in views between 
the social groups which are most positive about migration and those 
which are most negative. Majorities of 18-29 year olds support 
allowing “many” or “some” migrants from each group asked about, 
while majority support from the 70+ group for “many” or “some” 
migrants only extends to those of the same ethnic group. 
The majority of the “higher service” classes believe we should allow 
“many” or “some” migrants from every migrant group tested, and 
see migration as enriching British culture and beneitting the British 
economy. In contrast, unskilled workers are much less likely to want 
more or some migration from poorer countries, and less than a third 
see economic or cultural beneits from migration. The education 
divides are particularly deep, with majorities of degree-holders 
backing the more pro-migration options on every item presented 
here, often by notable margins. In contrast, only one pro-migration 
option (migration from the same ethnic group) receives majority 
support from those with GCSEs or less (for ease referred to as 
“school leavers” from here on). There is also a large heritage divide in 
the UK; with the fast-growing proportion of UK residents born abroad 
being a great deal more enthusiastic about migration than those who 
were born in the UK to two UK-born parents. 
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% saying should allow “many” or “some” 
migrants from group into Britain
Age:18-29 69 66 60 51
Age: 70 plus 58 42 38 27
Age gap 11 24 22 24
Class: higher service 
(professionals and managers)
76 67 61 54
Class: unskilled workers 56 51 45 36
Class gap 20 16 16 17
Education: Degree 78 74 70 62
Education: GCSE or less 56 47 40 33
Education gap 21 27 30 29
Heritage: Born abroad 75 73 66 53
Heritage: UK born, UK-born parents 60 53 47 40
Heritage gap 14 21 19 13
Social trust: most people can be trusted 71 65 60 51
Social trust: you can't be too careful 53 47 39 32
Social trust gap 18 18 21 19
Satisfaction with economy: satisied 73 66 60 48
Satisfaction with economy: not satisied 54 49 43 38
Satisfaction with economy gap 18 16 17 10
Source: UK respondents to the European Social Survey wave 7 (2014)
Bases for this table can be found in the appendix to this chapter 
The class variables are drawn from the 5-Class OESCH class schema (Oesch, D., 2006a; 2006b)
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Age: 18-29 48 48 31 45
Age: 70 plus 31 29 29 60
Age gap 17 18 2 15
Class: higher service 
(professionals and managers)
61 57 45 43
Class: unskilled workers 32 27 24 52
Class gap 29 30 20 10
Education: Degree 68 62 52 37
Education: GCSE or less 30 29 25 57
Education gap 39 34 26 19
Heritage: Born abroad 62 61 55 37
Heritage: UK born, UK-born parents 36 34 27 54
Heritage gap 26 26 29 17
Social trust: most people can be trusted 52 50 40 45
Social trust: you can't be too careful 30 27 23 60
Social trust gap 22 23 17 15
Satisfaction with economy: satisied 54 53 44 47
Satisfaction with economy: not satisied 34 30 24 56
Satisfaction with economy gap 20 22 19 10
Source: UK respondents to the European Social Survey wave 7 (2014)
Bases for this table can be found in the appendix to this chapter  
The class variables are drawn from the 5-Class OESCH class schema (Oesch, D., 2006a; 2006b)
Finally, we compare the attitudes of people with different levels of 
social trust and economic satisfaction. These are both commonly 
cited as possible drivers of opposition to immigration (Hainmuller 
and Hopkins, 2014; Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014; Herreros and 
Criado, 2009) - economically insecure people may worry more about 
competition from migrants, while those who are low in social trust 
may regard “outsiders” with more suspicion, and be less inclined 
to believe political or expert arguments in favour of migration. In 
accordance with these theories, we ind more negative attitudes 
to migration are more prevalent among economically dissatisied 
and distrustful groups. The bottom of Table 4 shows that those 
expressing satisfaction with the economy are far more likely to 
support entry of “many” or “some” migrants to Britain compared 
with those expressing dissatisfaction with the economy. Economic 
perceptions show an even stronger relationship with views about 
the cultural and economic impact of migration. More than half of 
those satisied with the state of the economy are positive about the 
NatCen Social Research
British Social Attitudes 34 | Immigration 138
cultural and economic impact of migration compared with a third 
or less of those who are dissatisied with the economy. The around 
20-percentage point (17-22 point) divides in views on the cultural 
and economic impact of migration that we see by levels of trust and 
economic satisfaction are also apparent to a similar degree in views 
on immigration’s impact on job creation. With immigration’s impact 
on crime, this divide narrows slightly to 10-15 percentage points.  
The majority of those expressing trust towards others also support 
entry of “more” or “some” migrants into Britain, while support among 
those who are distrustful is lower, with only two ifths supporting 
entry of “more” or “some” migrants from poorer countries outside 
Europe. More than half of those who express trust in others felt 
migration enriches British culture and beneits the economy, 
compared with less than a third of those who express distrust 
towards others. 
When we compare the depth of social divides in 2002 and 2014, 
we ind that the biggest change has occurred in divides over the 
economic impact of immigration - where overall attitudes have 
become more positive. Figure 1 illustrates this, showing the depth of 
divides in views about the economic impact of migration by various 
factors in 2002 (light bars) and 2014 (dark bars). While the public is 
more positive overall about the economic effects of migration, this 
aggregate change masks deepening division on all but one of our 
measures. The growth in this divide is largely the result of young 
graduates becoming more positive about the economic impact 
of immigration, whereas older less qualiied people’s views have 
remained the same.
The UK is more divided than it was in 2002 by age, class, education, 
social trust and personal economic satisfaction, while the divides 
by migrant heritage remain as large as they were before. This poses 
problems for policymakers. While, on aggregate, people have a 
balanced view about the positive or negative economic effect of 
immigration, most people don’t actually hold such a middling view. 
In practice, people are either positive about immigration’s economic 
effects - in which case they opt for allowing “more” or “some” 
migrants in - or negative about the economic impact of migration - in 
which case they are more likely to opt for “few” or “none”. While a 
compromise policy may best match the overall average, when views 
are polarised like this - and growing more so over time - centrist 
positions may backire, angering both sides in the political debate. 
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economic satisfaction
Figure 1 Differences (in percentage points) between social groups in their view that 
immigration is good for the economy, 2002 and 2014
Source: UK respondents to the European Social Survey wave 1 (2002) and wave 7 (2014) 
The data on which Figure 1 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
The persistent and often deepening social divides in views about 
migration may also help to explain why the issue has become more 
politically contentious (Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014), despite no 
negative adjustment in overall public attitudes. The social groups 
who are untroubled by immigration usually do not see the issue as 
important, and tend to focus on other issues when voting, whereas, 
for immigration-sceptics the issue seems to have become ever more 
central to their electoral decisions (see the chapter on ‘The vote to 
leave the EU’). While overall views have not changed dramatically 
between 2002 and 2014, opponents to immigration became more 
politically mobilised and more focused on the issue, creating the 
impression of a population-wide backlash against immigration. 
Is the UK different? 
The prominent and divisive role played by immigration in the debate 
about the UK’s membership of the European Union has led some 
to speculate that the public is unusually negative about the effects 
of immigration, and unusually hostile towards immigrants. In Table 
6 below we compare UK attitudes about the economic and social 
impact of immigration to those in all the other European countries 
surveyed in both 2002 and 2014. In 2002, the UK was indeed 
unusually negative about economic effects of immigration, with 
sceptics outnumbering optimists by a larger margin than in any 
other western European country surveyed. UK pessimism about the 
economic effects of immigration at this point was more similar to that 
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in post-Communist Europe where migration was (and remains) very 
low, than views in the migrant-receiving nations of western Europe.
Things are different in 2014. The UK saw the largest positive change 
in views of the economic impact of immigration between 2002 and 
2014, moving attitudes overall from unusually negative to mid-
ranking among the countries we analyse. Both of the other countries 
to experience large positive changes - Germany and Poland - also 
had relatively strong economies and labour markets between the two 
survey years. By 2014, after a decade of unprecedented migration 
inlows, the UK was not unusually positive or negative about the 
economic effects of immigration compared with other EU countries. 
By contrast, other large migrant-receiving western European EU 
members such as Austria, Netherlands, Belgium and France, saw 
their attitudes about the economic effects of immigration become 
more negative.
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Table 6 European views about cultural and economic impact of immigration, by country, 




Net view about economic impact of 
immigration (% positive – % negative)
Switzerland +32 +42 +10
Germany +7 +23 +16
Sweden +20 +23 +3
Norway +16 +22 +6
Ireland +3 +8 +5
Finland +15 +7 -8
UK -16 +4 +20
Poland -13 +2 +15
Spain +17 +2 -15
Austria +22 -2 -24
Portugal -2 -2 -
Netherlands +2 -5 -6
Denmark -7 -7 -
Belgium -11 -16 -4
France +6 -17 -23
Slovenia -20 -27 -8
Czechia -16 -43 -27
Hungary -25 -42 -17
Net view about cultural impact of 
immigration (% positive – % negative)
Sweden +67 +64 -3
Finland +77 +59 -18
Netherlands +44 +40 -3
Poland +39 +37 -3
Germany +38 +35 -2
Switzerland +42 +34 -8
Spain +31 +31 +1
Belgium +31 +27 -4
Norway +29 +23 -5
Denmark +24 +19 -4
Ireland +18 +19 -
Portugal +13 +16 +3
France +9 +6 -3
UK +12 +4 -8
Slovenia +7 +3 -4
Austria +26 -2 -28
Hungary +5 -6 -11
Czechia -8 -34 -25
Source: respondents to the European Social Survey wave 1 (2002) and wave 7 (2014)
Bases for this table can be found in the appendix to this chapter
Countries are ordered by 2014 result
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In contrast to their views on the economic impact, people in the 
UK are on aggregate, less positive about the cultural impact of 
immigration than most of their European neighbours. While the UK’s 
aggregate view of the cultural impact has become more negative 
between 2002 and 2014, we witness a similar trend in most other 
countries resulting in the UK remaining at the bottom end of the 
table.
The two other wealthy European countries with similarly pessimistic 
views on the cultural impacts of immigration - France and Austria - 
both have very large and electorally successful anti-migrant radical 
right-wing parties. Radical right-wing candidates made the run-off 
round for Presidential elections in both countries over the past year, 
suggesting that the rising concerns about the cultural effects of 
immigration the EES had detected in 2014 can be a potent electoral 
force. 
Table 7 summarises the wide range of different views about the 
economic and cultural impacts of immigration found across the 
continent (though note the baseline level of positivity about cultural 
impacts is higher). Germany, Sweden and Switzerland are positive 
about the economic effects and very positive about the cultural 
effects of immigration, while Norwegians on balance see economic 
beneits but are comparatively less positive about the cultural 
impact. A cluster of four countries - Finland, Poland, Spain and 
the Netherlands - see immigration as very enriching to the national 
culture, but are uncertain that it brings economic gains. Ireland, 
Portugal and Denmark combine similarly balanced attitudes to the 
economic impact with a comparatively middling view on the cultural 
impact. The UK, along with Austria, has a balanced and mid-ranking 
view on economic impacts, but a comparatively sceptical view of the 
positive cultural effects. Finally, ive countries have comparatively 
negative aggregate views on the economic and (aside from Belgium) 
cultural impacts. France, where the anti-migrant Front National 
recently secured its strongest-ever presidential election performance 
joins a cluster of low immigration central European countries 
(Hungary, Czechia and Slovenia) in expressing the most negative 
views about both effects of immigration. 
Interestingly, while there is a large cluster of countries that are on 
aggregate positive about the cultural effects of immigration but 
negative about the economic impacts, whereas the opposite pattern 
– positive about the economic impact but on balance negative about 
the cultural impact - never occurs (though the UK comes close). The 
continuing economic struggles in many parts of Europe following the 
inancial crisis and the Eurozone crisis may have reinforced anxieties 
about the economic effects of migration, but they do not seem to 
have undermined the broadly positive stance about cultural impacts 
in most of the continent. However, it is important to remember that 
these views were gathered before the refugee crisis of 2015-16, 
which affected many parts of Europe, and may have further changed 
patterns of attitudes. 
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Source: respondents to the European Social Survey wave 7 (2014)
Social divides over immigration in the UK 
and Europe
Overall UK views about the effects of migration are not a major 
departure from European norms. Partly, this is because there is 
no consistent European norm to depart from; immigration views 
vary widely across the continent. But it is also because where UK 
attitudes have shifted, the change has made the UK more typical: 
the public was unusually negative about the economic effects of 
migration in 2002, when the British economy was booming and 
migration was relatively low. In 2014, after a major economic crisis 
and a massive inlow of migrants, the public became comparatively 
more positive on migration’s economic impact while many European 
countries moved in the opposite direction (though the UK’s aggregate 
view was overall neutral). However, as we have seen earlier, a focus 
on the overall changes to UK migration attitudes risks masking 
growing social polarisation on the issue. Perhaps it is the divisiveness 
of immigration that sets the UK apart?
Summarising the full range of social divisions in the full range of 
immigration attitudes across many nations is a major task, beyond 
the scope of this chapter. So we focus on two of the social factors 
that have been most strongly associated with immigration attitudes 
in past research: age and education. To get a sense of the depth of 
social divides, we combine these measures to compare two large 
social groups on opposite sides of the immigration debate: university 
graduates under the age of 45 (9% of respondents in the overall 2014 
ESS sample) and those with lower secondary education over the age 
of 65 (11% of respondents). Given limited space, we focus on views 
about the economic and cultural impact of immigration, which have 
been central in both academic and political debates about the issue. 
Figures 2 and 3 take a look at the social divide in views about the 
economic and cultural impacts of migration in the UK and a selection 
of nearby European countries - France, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden - using the 2014 ESS data. Divisions over 
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immigration in the UK are certainly not unique: deep divides exist 
in every country charted. Between half and three-quarters of young 
graduates in all six countries said they think immigration is good for 
their country’s economy. The percentage of older school-leavers who 
feel similarly ranges from a ifth to a third in every country except 
Germany - and even there only 46% of older school-leavers see 
immigration as economically beneicial. 
Figure 2 Proportion who are positive about the economic impact of immigration, comparing 
graduates under 45 years old and school leavers over 65 years old, by country
Source: respondents to the European Social Survey wave 7 (2014)
The data on which Figure 2 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
The divides on cultural effects are even deeper. The vast majority 
of young graduates across all these countries see immigration as 
enriching their national cultures, with even the lowest proportion 
being 67% in Ireland, and the highest being 95% in Sweden. Older 
school-leavers by contrast are much more sceptical. Around a 
quarter see migration as culturally enriching in the UK and France 
(22%), a third (34%) in Ireland, 39% in Germany and 43% in the 
Netherlands. Only in Sweden do older school-leavers have a majority 
of positive views about the cultural impact of migration - and even in 
Sweden they are much more sceptical than young graduates.
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Divisions over 
immigration in the UK are 
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country charted
Figure 3 Proportion who are positive about the cultural impact of immigration, comparing 
graduates under 45 years old and school leavers over 65 years old, by country
Source: respondents to the European Social Survey wave 7 (2014)
The data on which Figure 3 is based can be found in the appendix to this chapter
In Table 8 we look at these social divides in a bit more depth, 
examining the difference in the prevalence of positive views about 
immigration across the full range of ESS countries, and seeing how 
it has changed since 2002. Including details on the changes in each 
social group’s attitudes would make the table unmanageably large 
and complicated, so instead we discuss the drivers of the changes in 
levels of social division below. 
Here we see that the UK is among the most deeply divided nations 
of those covered by the ESS in 2014. Concerning views on the 
economic impact of immigration, the social divide in the UK has 
grown more rapidly since 2002 than in any other country. While this 
division in attitudes is strong in the UK, it is found in many other 
countries too. 
Where the division within a country on the economic impact has 
grown, such as in the UK, Sweden, Spain and Ireland, we ind this 
is due to young university graduates becoming more positive, while 
the more sceptical views of older school-leavers have changed little, 
or not at all. A similar trend explains the growing divides in attitudes 
to the cultural impact found in Slovenia, France, Denmark, Spain, 
Ireland and Portugal. 
In Germany, Switzerland and Norway, immigration remains divisive 
but the divides have on the whole reduced, and views are positive 
on aggregate. Perhaps not coincidentally, these are three of Europe’s 
richest nations, and three of the countries whose economies 
weathered the inancial crisis best. 
At the bottom of both tables we ind the two countries, Czechia and 
Hungary, with the smallest divides in opinion and the most negative 
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overall views on the impacts of immigration. In both countries the 
reduction in divide on the economic impact is due to aggregate 
positivity of young graduates having disappeared. Scepticism in 
these two countries - where immigration is very low - is now near 
universal.
Table 8 Social divides (percentage point difference) over the economic and cultural impact 





Difference between younger graduates and older school-
leavers in attitudes about economic impact of immigration 
(% graduates under 45 positive – 
% school-leavers over 65 positive)
UK++ +27 +46 +19
Sweden +27 +43 +16
Slovenia +25 +42 +16
France +34 +41 +8
Denmark +27 +36 +10
Austria +26 +35 +9
Finland +30 +34 +3
Spain +26 +32 +6
Norway+ +37 +31 -6
Germany+ +37 +30 -7
Switzerland+ +45 +28 -16
Netherlands +21 +28 +7
Ireland +18 +26 +8
Poland +25 +22 -3
Belgium +23 +21 -2
Portugal +23 +19 -4
Czechia+ +41 +13 -28
Hungary +15 +4 -12
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Table 8 Social divides (percentage point difference) over the economic and cultural impact 





Difference between younger graduates and older school-
leavers in attitudes about cultural impact of immigration (% 
graduates under 45 positive – 
% school-leavers over 65 positive)
Slovenia +24 +57 +33
France +50 +55 +6
Denmark +43 +50 +6
UK++ +46 +49 +3
Spain +39 +45 +7
Austria +40 +44 +5
Germany +45 +41 -4
Switzerland +39 +39 1
Finland +34 +39 +6
Belgium +45 +37 -8
Netherlands +44 +36 -8
Portugal +27 +34 +8
Poland +45 +32 -13
Ireland +26 +33 +7
Norway +46 +33 -13
Sweden +38 +30 -8
Hungary +47 +26 -21
Czechia +37 +21 -16
Source: respondents to the European Social Survey wave 1 (2002) and wave 7 (2014)
Bases for this table can be found in the appendix to this chapter




We set out to answer three questions about how attitudes to 
immigration have changed in response to the largest inlow of 
migrants in British history. Firstly, has the UK reacted to the recent 
increases in immigration by becoming signiicantly more negative 
overall about migration and its effects? We ind they have not. 
Attitudes on the economic impacts of immigration have instead 
become more positive (while neutral overall),and views on the cultural 
impact of migration have become slightly more negative. Attitudes to 
the impact of immigration on crime have also become more positive, 
but nonetheless remain strongly negative overall. It is possible 
therefore that the UK’s comparatively well-performing labour market 
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during this period did enough to neutralise any growing concern 
about immigration’s impact on the economy, jobs and crime, but 
understandably did not halt the slight growth in concern about its 
cultural impact.
We ind that views about the admission of different migrant groups 
are also largely stable, though we note a small increase in opposition 
to migration from poorer countries. The UK has, however, become 
more selective, placing an ever-stronger emphasis on acquired skills 
such as language, work skills and educational qualiications, as well 
as a commitment to a British “way of life”. 
This continues a trend identiied in earlier research: the UK public 
has responded to high migration not by demanding migration be 
halted across the board, but by intensifying their demands for greater 
selection in immigration policy (see also Ford  et al., 2012; Ford and 
Heath, 2014). It is migrants’ skills and their commitment to a British 
way of life, not whether they are white or Christian or where they 
migrate from that chiely matter to the public in the UK. Support for 
selecting migrants on ascribed criteria such as religion or race, which 
was already low in 2002, has declined further since. 
We do however ind that the public’s views on the economic impact 
of immigration have become more polarised, and views on the 
cultural impact are also divided but not more or less so than they 
were in 2002. This, in turn, may explain a paradox about immigration 
over the past 15 years; that its political importance has increased 
dramatically even though public attitudes on average have not shifted 
in a negative direction. There are big social divides in views about 
immigration. These divides fuel political conlict between groups such 
as graduates, the young and the middle class who see immigration 
increasingly positively and those, such as pensioners, the working 
class and school-leavers, who see it in a more negative light. Where 
the divide has deepened, this is not the result of mounting hostility in 
the sceptical groups but instead because the social groups with more 
positive views have become even more positive about migration. 
In 2002, public opinion about immigration was more negative than 
practically every other large west European country with a signiicant 
migrant population. Since then the UK has shown the biggest 
positive change in attitudes on the economic impact of migration. 
As a result, the UK’s aggregate view is now mid-ranking in the list of 
European countres analysed. By contrast, the UK public’s aggregrate 
view on the cultural impact of immigration remains towards the 
sceptical end of this table of countries.
What sets the UK apart from the rest of Europe is the depth of the 
social divides over views on the economic impact of immigration, 
and the degree to which this divide has increased. The UK is more 
divided over migration on this measure than any other European 
society measured, and the divide has grown more here than 
anywhere else. These attitude changes were visible well before the 
debate over Brexit got underway - ESS data are from 2002 and 2014. 
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The UK public has 
responded to high 
migration not by 
demanding migration 
by intensifying 
their demands for 
greater selection in 
immigration policy
Yet the social divides over immigration we ind map well onto the 
social divides researchers analysing the Brexit vote have also found 
(see the chapter on ‘The vote to leave the EU’; Goodwin and Heath, 
2016; Clarke et al., 2017). The deep Brexit divide between Remain 
young graduates and Leave older school-leavers already existed in 
2002 on attitudes to immigration’s economic impact and was even 
deeper in 2014. While the Brexit decision did not create these social 
divides, the EU referendum campaign and the vote to leave the EU 
have politically mobilised them. Policy makers looking to build a 
new immigration settlement for the post-EU era will face a major 
challenge in bridging the huge and longstanding gap between the 
UK’s migration supporters and sceptics. 
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Appendix
The bases for Tables 4 and 5 can be found below.
Table A.1 Views on levels of immigration from different migrant groups, and impacts of 










GCSE or less 771
Heritage
Born abroad 314
UK born, UK-born parents 1747
Social Trust
Most people can be trusted 1099
You can't be too careful 653
Satisfaction with the economy
Satisied 861
Not satisied 979
Source: UK respondents to the European Social Survey wave 7 (2014)
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Full question wording for the attitudinal questions in Tables 4 and 5 is 
shown below.
Social trust: 
Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, 
where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that 
most people can be trusted.
Satisfaction with the economy:
On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of 
the economy in [Britain / the UK]? Still use this card. [where 
0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely 
satisfied.]
The data for Figure 1 are shown below.
Table A.2 Differences between social groups in attitudes about the economic impact of 
immigration, 2002 and 2014
  2002 2014
Age: gap between youngest (18-29) and oldest (70+) 5 18
18-29 Unweighted base 283 253
70 plus Unweighted base 338 458
Class: gap between higher service class and unskilled 
workers
23 30
Higher service unweighted base 368 378
Unskilled workers unweighted base 484 456
Education level: gap between those with degree or 
higher and GCSEs or below
28 34
Degree unweighted base 480 569
GCSE or less unweighted base 1140 771
Heritage: gap between those born abroad and those 
UK born with UK-born parents
27 26
Born abroad unweighted base 191 314
UK born, UK-born parents unweighted base 1716 1747
Social trust: gap between those saying “most people 
can be trusted” and those saying 
“you can’t be too careful”
12 23
Most people can be trusted unweighted base 884 1,099
You can't be too careful unweighted base 707 653
Satisfaction with the economy: gap between those who 




Source: UK respondents to the European Social Survey wave 1 (2002) and wave 7 (2014)
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The bases for Table 6 can be found below.
Table A.3 European views about cultural and economic impact of immigration, by country, 
2002 and 2014
  2012 2014



















Source: respondents to the European Social Survey wave 1 (2002) and wave 7 (2014)
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The data for Figure 2 are shown below.
Table A.4 Proportion who are positive about the economic impact of immigration, 
comparing graduates under 45 years old and school leavers over 65 years old, by country




over 65 years old
Country
UK 67 21
Unweighted base 291 342
France 59 18
Unweighted base 196 214
Germany 75 46
Unweighted base 262 95
Ireland 57 31
Unweighted base 264 382
Netherlands 51 23
Unweighted base 240 292
Sweden 74 31
Unweighted base 233 204
Source: respondents to the European Social Survey wave 7 (2014)
The data for Figure 3 are shown below.
Table A.5 Proportion who are positive about the cultural impact of immigration, comparing 
graduates under 45 years old and school leavers over 65 years old, by country




over 65 years old
Country
UK 74 25
Unweighted base 291 342
France 78 22
Unweighted base 196 214
Germany 80 39
Unweighted base 262 95
Ireland 67 34
Unweighted base 264 382
Netherlands 79 43
Unweighted base 240 292
Sweden 95 64
Unweighted base 233 204
Source: respondents to the European Social Survey wave 7 (2014)
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The bases for Table 8 are shown below.











Country Unweighted base Unweighted base Unweighted base Unweighted base
Austria 163 194 114 127
Belgium 303 191 203 173
Switzerland 289 126 133 96
Czechia 67 105 132 62
Germany 300 99 262 95
Denmark 218 97 217 106
Spain 166 408 186 339
Finland 253 257 257 273
France 257 228 196 214
UK 338 360 291 342
Hungary 94 194 124 167
Ireland 381 237 264 382
Netherlands 279 305 240 292
Norway 295 132 233 98
Poland 138 197 218 213
Portugal 104 346 110 377
Sweden 220 264 233 204
Slovenia 117 140 137 102
Source: respondents to the European Social Survey wave 1 (2002) and wave 7 (2014)
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The vote to leave the EU 
Litmus test or lightning rod? 
We are more Eurosceptic than ever, with long term trends in Euroscepticism continuing to 
rise after the referendum in June 2016.
Post Brexit, Britain is more Eurosceptic than ever
*Data collected between July and November 2016
Maastricht 
treaty 1992
UK votes to leave 
the EU* 2016






Ten new countries in 
Eastern and Central
Europe join the EU 2004
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Social consequences of EU membership
Concerns about the social consequences of EU membership were key in inluencing how 
people voted in the EU referendum. 
• 73% of those who are worried about immigration voted Leave, compared with 36% of those 
who did not identify this as a concern. 
• 72% of those holding ‘authoritarian’ views voted to leave, compared with 21% of those 
holding ‘libertarian’ views. 
• Multivariate analysis found that, for the most part, only items associated with people’s sense 
of national identity and cultural outlook were signiicantly associated with vote choice.
Dissatisfaction with politics
Dissatisfaction with politics was less important in inluencing how people voted in the EU 
referendum.
• 45% of those who trust government a great deal or tend to trust it voted to leave, compared 
with 65% of those who distrust it greatly. 
• However, there was a greater increase in turnout among those with little interest in politics, 
as compared with the 2015 general election. 43% of those with no interest in politics voted 
in the EU referendum, up from 30% in the 2015 general election. Nevertheless, these 
proportions remain markedly lower than those for people with a “great deal” (90% in 2016 
and 88% in 2015) or “quite a lot” of interest in politics (89% and 86%).
Overview
This chapter considers two popular explanations for the vote by the British public in June 
2016 to leave the EU. The irst is that the vote relects the concerns of more ‘authoritarian’, 
socially conservative voters about the social consequences of EU membership – and 
especially about immigration. The second is that the vote was occasioned by general public 
disenchantment with politics. The chapter suggests that the irst of these two provides the 
better explanation. The EU referendum can therefore be characterised as a litmus test of 
the merits of the EU project, and perhaps of globalisation more generally, rather than as a 
lightning rod for wider political discontent.
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Why in the end did a 
majority of voters back 
leaving the EU, thereby 
instigating the most 
important rejection of a 
government policy in any 
referendum held to date 
in the UK?
Introduction
The outcome of the European Union (EU) referendum, in which a 
majority of 52% to 48% voted to leave the EU, came as a surprise 
to most commentators and many voters. Indeed, although previous 
chapters in the series had reported an increase in scepticism 
about Europe, they also suggested that the majority of voters 
were still minded to stay in the EU (Curtice and Evans, 2015; 
Curtice, 2016). Scepticism was expressed primarily in support for 
the proposition that Britain should stay in the EU while trying to 
reduce its powers rather than in the form of outright opposition to 
continued membership. And it was that sentiment to which the then 
Prime Minister, David Cameron, appeared to be appealing when 
he prefaced the referendum with a renegotiation of the UK’s terms 
of membership, on which agreement was reached with the EU in 
February 2016 (European Council, 2016). So why in the end did a 
majority of voters back leaving the EU, thereby instigating the most 
important rejection of a government policy in any referendum held 
to date in the UK? That is the question this chapter endeavours to 
address.
In so doing we focus in particular on two principal explanations, both 
of which are rooted in previous research on why people (not just in 
Britain, but across the EU) express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the EU. While one of these suggests that the explanation lies – as 
one might immediately anticipate -  in people’s evaluations of the 
EU itself, the other suggests – less obviously - that it may have little 
or nothing to do with the purpose or operation of the institution at 
all. So, in part we are going to examine whether the outcome of the 
referendum necessarily represents a rejection of the EU at all.
Our irst possible explanation starts from the observation that the 
EU is a supra-national organisation that distributes resources across 
sovereign nation states and creates regulations with which those 
states have to comply. It has also created a single market that not 
only means that goods manufactured in one country can be sold in 
any other EU country but also that citizens of any one EU country 
have the right to live and work in any other part of the EU. It has thus, 
to some extent at least, taken on powers and responsibilities that 
would usually be regarded as the preserve of individual states, while 
acting as a conduit through which some of the forces of globalisation 
have been able to low.
Not everyone is necessarily happy with this development, however. 
In taking on some of the attributes and characteristics of a state 
and creating a degree of uniformity across Europe, people may 
feel that their distinctive national identity and the culture that they 
associate with that identity are being undermined (Carey, 2002; 
Delem and Pampel, 1996; McLaren, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 
2009; Taggart, 1998). That might particularly prove to be the 
case if, as has happened recently in the UK, the EU’s freedom of 
movement provisions have served to facilitate relatively high levels 
of immigration (Vargas Silva and Markaki, 2016). The new migrants 
may well speak their own language among themselves and certainly 
may not be immediately well acquainted with the cultural peculiarities 
and social mores of the society that they have now joined. For 
some existing residents at least, this social change may represent 
a challenge that makes them feel uncomfortable – and a litmus test 
for what they think of the European Union (Ford and Goodwin, 2017; 
Sides and Citrin, 2007).1
However, the EU is for the most part a relatively remote institution. 
Few voters have a deep appreciation of what it does, of how it 
operates, or of the personnel that occupy its principal political 
positions. In contrast, most will have at least some acquaintance with 
their principal domestic politicians and political institutions. So when 
they are asked what they think about the EU, voters might be inclined 
to think about how they are being governed in general, rather than 
about the EU in particular. And if their view is that they are not in fact 
being governed that well, they may decide that at least part of the 
blame lies with an EU they do not understand but seemingly enables 
its politicians and bureaucrats to enjoy a comfortable life. In short, 
the EU becomes a lightning rod for their discontent (Anderson, 1998).
So, perhaps on the one hand, a majority of voters in the UK wanted 
to leave the EU because they were concerned about the cultural 
consequences of EU membership, including not least what they 
regard as the adverse consequences of immigration. Or perhaps the 
vote represented a more general dissatisfaction with the way in which 
voters feel that they are being governed. Moreover, not only might 
these perspectives help us understand what distinguished Leave and 
Remain voters as they cast their ballots in the referendum, but also 
how voters’ views evolved and developed during the course of the 
referendum campaign.
We begin our analysis by looking at who turned out to vote, before 
turning to examine who voted to Remain and Leave and why they 
appeared to do so. We then consider how attitudes shifted during 
the course of the referendum campaign before considering the 
implications of the referendum result for the political parties and the 
debate about what relationship the UK should seek to have with the 
EU after it has left.
Turnout
According to the oficial result declared by the Electoral Commission 
no less than 72% of those eligible to vote participated in the 
referendum. By historical standards, this is not particularly impressive 
– until 2001 post-war elections were always graced by a turnout of 
more than 70%. However, turnout at each of the last four general 
elections was well below that level. Further, when the UK as a whole 
was last invited to vote in a referendum – on whether the House of 
1  Of course, immigration may also be thought to pose an economic challenge, both in 
terms of its impact on the labour market and on public services. Such concerns can also lead to the 
‘othering’ of migrants, and a concern about a loss of national control over immigration.
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Commons should be elected using the Alternative Vote (AV) rather 
than the existing single member plurality system – just 42% made it 
to the polls. In short, by recent standards at least, a relatively large 
number of voters voted in the referendum.
But if more people voted in the referendum than at other recent 
ballots, does this also mean that the kind of voter who made it to 
the polling station was a little different too? Perhaps those with little 
interest or engagement in the political process regarded the ballot as 
an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with the way they were 
governed and thus turned up in greater numbers than was previously 
the case. Such a pattern is certainly what we might anticipate if 
voters were using the referendum to express their dissatisfaction with 
how they were governed in general.
The role of political interest 
Of this, Table 1 suggests that there is some evidence. Nearly all of the 
increase in turnout as compared with the 2015 UK general election 
occurred among those with “not very much” or no interest in politics 
at all. In contrast, turnout barely increased at all among those with 
at least some interest in politics. This, of course, to some extent is 
almost arithmetically inevitable, as turnout among those with “a great 
deal” or “quite a lot” of interest in politics was already close to 90% 
and thus could not increase much further. Indeed, we can see that as 
compared with the 2011 referendum on the Alternative Vote, when 
turnout was much lower irrespective of how interested someone 
was in politics, the participation rate this time around was more than 
20 points above what it was in 2011 across all categories in Table 
1. Still, even this comparison suggests that those with less interest 
in politics were relatively speaking a little more likely to have voted 
in the referendum on the EU than in the one on AV – though it was 
still the case that those with “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of interest 
in politics were much more likely to have voted than those with no 
interest at all.
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If more people voted in 
the referendum than at 
other recent ballots, does 
this also mean that the 
kind of voter who made it 
to the polling station was 
a little different too?
Nearly all of the increase 
in turnout occurred 
among those with not 
very much or no interest 
in politics at all
Table 1 Turnout in 2011 AV Referendum, 2015 UK General Election and 2016 EU 










Great deal 69 88 90 +21 +1
Quite a lot 67 86 89 +22 +3
Some 55 77 78 +23 +2
Not very much 40 54 65 +25 +11
None at all 14 30 43 +28 +13
Bases for this table can be found in the appendix to this chapter
+ Respondents who did not know or refused to say how they had voted in the referendum were 
excluded from the analysis of turnout. 
Older people tend to be more interested in politics than their younger 
counterparts. We thus might anticipate from the evidence that we 
have seen so far that the increase in turnout among younger people 
was more marked than among older people. Of this however, there 
is no more than a hint, as Table 2 shows. Turnout was up by 9 points 
as compared with the general election among those aged under 
35, while it increased by a more modest 5 points among those 
aged 65 or over. Comparison of the increase in turnout on the 2011 
referendum in these two groups also points to a somewhat bigger 
increase among younger people. That said, it remained the case 
that younger people were much less likely to vote than their older 
counterparts, even though it might be felt that it was their futures 
above all that would be affected by the outcome of the referendum.
Table 2 Turnout in 2011 AV Referendum, 2015 UK General Election and 2016 EU 








18-34 33 55 64 +31 +9
35-64 53 73 80 +26 +7
65+ 69 84 89 +21 +5
Bases for this table can be found in the appendix to this chapter
+ Respondents who did not know or refused to say how they had voted in the referendum were 
excluded from the analysis of turnout. 
Thus it appears that the EU referendum was somewhat more 
successful at bringing the reactively uninterested and disengaged 
to the polls, including some younger voters – but no more than that. 
Many of the demographic differences in turnout that are in evidence 
2 Figures showing change over time in this table are calculated from the exact data, rather 
than the rounded igures that appear in the table. As a result they will sometimes appear to be 
incorrect by +/-1%. This applies to all similar tables in this chapter.
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It remained the case 
that younger people 
were much less likely 
to vote than their 
older counterparts
in almost every ballot in the UK once again made an appearance. 
Thus, for example, not only were younger voters still much less 
likely to vote than older voters, but so equally were graduates (83% 
of whom voted) more likely to participate than those without any 
educational qualiications (68%). And in this case, there is little 
evidence that the demographic divide in participation narrowed much 
at all.
The importance of education and age 
Traditional though they might have been, these demographic 
differences in turnout by age and education potentially had particular 
signiicance in the EU referendum. For among those who did vote, 
younger voters were far more likely than older voters to say they 
voted Remain, while graduates were more likely to do so than were 
those without any educational qualiications. As Table 3 shows, just 
22% of graduates voted to leave the EU, compared with 72% of 
those without any educational qualiications. Equally, if only a little 
less dramatically, just 28% of those aged 18 to 24 voted to leave 
whereas 63% of those aged 65 and over did so. This was evidently a 
referendum marked by some strong social divisions.
Table 3 EU Referendum vote, by age group and highest educational qualiication+ 
EU Referendum vote
Leave Remain Unweighted base
Age group
18-24 % 28 72 108
25-34 % 37 63 254
35-44 % 37 63 326
45-54 % 47 53 406
55-64 % 55 45 425
65+ % 63 37 732
Highest educational 
qualiication
Degree % 22 78 569
Higher education below 
degree
% 53 47 271
A-level % 41 59 387
GCSE A-C % 62 38 419
GCSE D-G % 69 31 166
None % 72 28 405
+ Respondents who did not know or refused to say how they had voted in the referendum were 
excluded from the analysis of voting behaviour.  
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Younger voters were far 
more likely than older 
voters to say they voted 
Remain, while graduates 
were more likely to 
do so than were those 
without any educational 
RVBMJæDBUJPOT
Education is, of course, linked to social class. Someone with 
a degree is quite likely to be in a professional or managerial 
occupation, while someone without any qualiications at all is 
most likely employed in a routine or semi-routine (working class) 
occupation. However, the differences in referendum vote choice by 
social class are less marked than those in respect of education. While 
36% of those in a professional or managerial occupation voted to 
leave, the proportion among those in a routine or semi-routine job 
was 60% - the resulting difference between these two groups of 24 
points is much less than the 50 point difference evident in Table 3 
between graduates and those without any educational qualiications. 
Thus, it would seem that it is educational experience rather than 
class position that primarily shaped people’s attitudes towards the 
EU.
At the same time though education is also intertwined with age – 
younger voters are more likely than older voters to have been to 
university and less likely not to have any qualiications at all. We thus 
might wonder whether one of the patterns that we can see in Table 3 
is simply occasioned by the other. To examine whether or not this is 
the case in Table 4 we show the level of support for Remain broken 
down by age and highest educational qualiication combined. From 
this it is clear that, of the two, it is educational background that is 
by far the more important. Within each age group, there is a big 
difference between graduates and those whose highest qualiication 
is a GCSE or less in the level of support registered for staying in the 
EU. In the case of those aged between 35 and 54, for example, as 
many as 81% of graduates voted to remain, compared with just 37% 
of those whose highest qualiication is a GCSE or less; a difference of 
44 points. In contrast, older graduates were only 10 points less likely 
than younger ones to vote for Remain, while the age gap among 
those with a GCSE or less is only 7 points. Only among those whose 
highest qualiication is less than a degree but more than a GCSE is 
there a substantial age difference. Even so, at 30 points, it is less 
than the gap within all of our age groups between graduates and 
those with a GCSE or less.
Table 4 Percentage voting Remain, by age and highest educational qualiication combined
Age group
% Remain 18-34 35-54 55+
Highest educational qualiication
Degree 80 81 70
Higher below degree/A-level 71 54 41
GCSE or less 37 37 30
Bases for this table can be found in the appendix to this chapter
+ Respondents who did not know or refused to say how they had voted in the referendum were 
excluded from the analysis of turnout. 
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The pattern of voting in the EU referendum relected then, above all, 
an educational divide. At one end of the spectrum most graduates 
voted to remain in the EU – at the other, most with few, if any 
educational, qualiications voted to leave. To that was then added 
something of a generational divide. Such a pattern is precisely 
what we would expect to ind if voters’ choices relected their views 
about immigration. Graduates and younger people tend to be less 
concerned about both the economic and cultural consequences of 
immigration (Ford and Heath, 2014), a pattern that is consistent with 
their tendency to have more liberal views generally about social and 
moral issues (Park and Rhead, 2013; Park and Surridge, 2003). On 
the other hand, those with fewer educational qualiications also tend 
to be less interested in politics or to feel that they cannot do much 
to inluence politics (Lee and Young,  2013), and indeed it can also 
be shown that they are rather less likely to trust politicians. So the 
demographic division in the referendum appears to be consistent 
with both of the possible explanations of the referendum vote that we 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter. We thus need to look more 
directly at which appears to provide the better explanation.
Motivations
Views on the implications of EU membership  
Our irst potential explanation is that those who voted for Remain and 
those who voted Leave can best be distinguished by their attitudes 
towards the implications of EU membership for the country’s culture 
and identity, as epitomised above all by people’s attitudes towards 
immigration. That those who voted for Remain and those who voted 
to leave have very different views about immigration is certainly clear. 
In our survey, respondents were presented with a list of a dozen 
items about which they might possibly be worried, ranging from more 
immediate personal issues such as their health and their family, to 
wider social issues such as crime and immigration. Among those 
who named immigration, as many as 73% voted to leave; among 
those who did not cite this as a concern just 36% did so.
One of the particular issues in the debate about migration from the 
EU has been the level of access that EU citizens living in the UK 
should have to welfare beneits. Willingness to grant someone access 
to welfare may be regarded as an indication that they are thought to 
be part of the same society and thus as someone who is entitled to 
support from the rest of that society in a time of need. Conversely, 
those who consider EU migrants to be ‘different’ may well be 
reluctant to extend such support. Indeed, this issue was one of the 
central topics in the renegotiation of Britain’s terms of membership 
in which David Cameron engaged in advance of the EU referendum. 
Those talks secured the concession that EU citizens would have to 
have lived in the UK for at least four years before they could have the 
same level of entitlement as a British citizen.
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Attitudes towards this aspect of the immigration debate were also 
related to how people voted in the referendum. The longer a voter 
felt that an EU migrant should have to have lived here before being 
entitled to the same level of welfare beneit as a British citizen, the 
more likely they were to vote to leave the EU. Among those who felt 
that EU citizens should had to have lived here for four years, or who 
felt that they should never be granted the same level of entitlement, 
67% voted to leave the EU. In contrast, among those who felt the 
time period should be no more than two years (including, perhaps, 
not at all), just 31% voted to leave. Meanwhile, among those who lay 
between these two extreme positions and reckoned a three to four 
year time period was appropriate, 54% voted to leave.
Concern about immigration can also be thought to be an indicator 
of a wider set of attitudes about the kind of society in which people 
wish to live. Some may feel that everybody in society should 
acknowledge and accept a common set of social mores and cultural 
practices, as this helps to maintain a more cohesive society. Others 
may feel that people should largely be free to choose their own moral 
and cultural compass and thus feel relatively happy about living in a 
diverse society. This distinction has long been captured by BSA in 
a set of questions that are designed to tap whether somebody is an 
‘authoritarian’ or a ‘libertarian’. Full details of these questions can 
be found in the technical appendix to this report. Here we use these 
questions to divide our respondents into three groups: those whose 
responses to our questions place them among the one-third or so 
who are most ‘authoritarian’; those who by the same criterion belong 
to the one-third most ‘libertarian’; and the remaining one-third who 
fall in between.
There is a sharp difference between the voting behaviour of these 
three groups. No less than 72% of the most ‘authoritarian’ group 
voted to leave, while just 21% of the most ‘libertarian’ group did 
so. Meanwhile, those falling in between these two groups leaned 
just slightly in favour of leaving, with 53% voting that way. How 
people voted in the referendum thus not only exposed a big social 
divide between graduates and those with few, if any, educational 
qualiications, but also a major cultural divide between those who 
prefer a relatively homogenous society and those who are content 
with a more diverse one.
But there is also clearly a link between how people voted in the EU 
referendum and their sense of identity more broadly. Every year BSA 
presents its respondents with a list of all of the national identities 
associated with one or more parts of the islands of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, and invites them to select as many of them 
as they wish as applying to themselves. Among those who included 
European in their selection, just 15% voted to leave. However, this 
group represented just 18% of all respondents to the latest survey 
and thus had relatively little inluence on the eventual outcome. Still, 
the fact that relatively few feel that way – albeit that slightly more do 
so now than ever before (Curtice, 2016) – helps explain why for many 
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voters membership of the EU might be felt to represent a challenge 
to their sense of identity.
However, whether or not someone felt European was not the only 
way in which their attitudes were linked to their sense of identity. 
Among those who described themselves as ‘British’, only 45% voted 
to leave the EU. In contrast, among those who included ‘English’ 
among their selection of identities, 54% voted to leave. This is not 
simply a relection of the fact that a majority of voters in England 
voted to leave, whereas in Scotland the opposite was the case. 
Within England itself, those who felt British (46%) were less likely 
than those who felt English (54%) to vote to leave.
This link between feeling English and feeling British becomes even 
clearer if we look at the link between how people in England voted 
and a different measure of national identity, the so-called Moreno 
question (Moreno, 2006) that asks:
Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see 
yourself?
English, not British,
More English than British
Equally English and British
More British than English
British, not English
Table 5 shows that those who said their sense of being English was 
more important than their sense of being British were more likely to 
vote to leave than were those whose British identity was the more 
important. Indeed, among those who said they were English and 
denied that they were British, nearly three-quarters (74%) voted to 
leave, whereas less than two in ive (38%) of those who rejected 
feeling English did so. This should not come as a surprise. Within 
England at least, Britishness rather than Englishness has long been 
promoted as a ‘multi-cultural’ identity, and thus there has also long 
been a link between feeling British and holding a more liberal attitude 
towards migrant minorities (Curtice and Heath, 2000). It is thus 
unsurprising that this group should also be more inclined to back the 
EU. Even so, we should also bear in mind that for many people their 
sense of Britishness is closely intertwined with their sense of being 
English, with as many as 42% saying they feel equally both, and thus 
this aspect of identity can hardly be said to have played an important 
role for many voters.  
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Table 5 Referendum vote, by national identity (England only)
EU Referendum vote
Leave Remain Unweighted base
National identity (England 
only)
English, not British % 72 28 306
More English than British % 57 43 212
Equally English and British % 53 47 853
More British than English % 50 60 171
British, not English % 38 62 269
+ Respondents who did not know or refused to say how they had voted in the referendum were 
excluded from the analysis of voting behaviour.  
So there does then appear to be considerable support for the 
expectation that how people voted in the referendum relected their 
sense of national identity and the extent to which EU membership 
might have been regarded as a challenge to that sense of identity, 
not least as a result of migration. But that, of course, does not mean 
that people’s vote in the referendum also relected wider concerns 
about the way they are being governed.
Views on how we are being governed   
There certainly does appear to be some link. This emerges irst of all 
if we look at the link between how people voted in the referendum 
and the extent to which people say they trust some of the country’s 
political institutions. Respondents were asked whether they tended 
to trust or distrust (a) government, and (b) parliament. As can be seen 
in Table 6, in both cases those who said they distrust the institution 
greatly were around 20 points more likely to have voted Leave than 
were those who said they trusted the institution. However, this gap 
is rather less than we have seen so far when we have divided people 
according to their sense of identity or their attitudes to immigration, 
where we have observed differences of up to 50 points.3
3  The BSA survey asks respondents a second question about trust in government in which 
they are asked whether they trust “British governments of any party to place the needs of the nation 
above the interests of their own political party”. The pattern of voting in the EU referendum when 
broken down by responses to this question proved to be much the same; just 37% of those who 
said they trusted governments “just about always” or “most of the time” voted to leave the EU, 
compared with 60% of those who said they “almost never trusted governments”.
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Table 6 Percentage voting Leave, by trust in government and Parliament
% voting Leave Unweighted base
Trust in Government
Trust a great deal/tend to trust 45 638
Tend to distrust 46 554
Distrust greatly 65 266
Trust in Parliament
Trust a great deal/tend to trust 43 698
Tend to distrust 50 541
Distrust greatly 62 215
+ Respondents who did not know or refused to say how they had voted in the referendum were 
excluded from the analysis of voting behaviour.  
A similar picture of a clear but rather weaker link emerges when we 
look at the link between how people voted in the referendum and 
their sense of ‘political eficacy’, that is, the extent to which they feel 
able to have some inluence on what politicians and government do. 
For example, among those who agree with the statement that “voting 
is the only way people like me can have any say about how the 
government runs things”, 50% voted to leave, whereas among those 
who disagreed just 34% did so. Similarly, among those who agree 
that “People like me don’t have any say about what the government 
does” 55% voted to leave, while among those who disagreed, 37% 
did so. Meanwhile, in a similar vein, perhaps, while 62% of those with 
not very much or no interest at all in politics voted to leave, only 40% 
of those with quite a lot or a great deal of interest did so.  Meanwhile 
when it came to questions that asked people to agree or disagree 
that “I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important 
political issues facing our country” or that “people we elect as MPs 
try to keep the promises they have made during the election”, the 
difference in their level of support for leaving the EU between those 
who agreed and those who disagreed was no more than ive points.
Still, perhaps there is another sense in which how people voted in 
the referendum relected discontent with the direction of government 
in Britain, as opposed to their views about the EU. Perhaps, for 
example, those who would like the government to be more active 
in creating a more equal society or to improve the economy took 
the opportunity to protest about that? Of the former possibility 
there is certainly little sign. As in the case for ‘libertarianism’ versus 
‘authoritarianism’, each year the BSA survey carries a suite of 
questions designed to ascertain whether or not people would like 
to see greater equality and whether they would like the government 
to do something about it. Those who would like greater effort at 
reducing inequality can be regarded as being on the ‘left’ while those 
who take the opposite view may be described as being on the ‘right’ 
(again, the details can be found in the technical appendix to this 
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report). But if as in the case of our ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ scale we 
divide our sample into the one-third most ‘left-wing’ and the one-
third most ‘right-wing’, we ind relatively little difference between 
them in terms of how they voted in the EU referendum. The 52% level 
of support for leaving among those with left-wing views is only a little 
higher than the 45% support to be found among those with right-
wing views.
Meanwhile, there is little sign that the Leave vote was motivated by 
a wish to see greater government intervention in the economy. If 
anything, the opposite was the case. Support for leaving was actually 
rather higher among those who favour “less government regulation 
of business” (55%) than oppose the idea (34%). Equally, support 
was also rather higher among those who favour “cuts in government 
spending” (55%) than among those who are opposed (37%). In 
any event the differences are rather small, while we might note that 
support for leaving was actually higher among those who favour 
“support for declining industries to protect jobs” (50%) than it was 
among those who are opposed (39%).
But to establish more clearly which of our two sets of motivations are 
the more strongly associated with which way people voted in the EU 
referendum we need to undertake a multivariate analysis in which we 
can assess the strength of the relationship between vote choice and 
each of the variables discussed above4, after taking into account all 
of the other important relationships we identify. Might it be the case, 
for example, that the links that we have found between people’s 
attitudes towards politics and government and the way that they 
voted in the referendum actually prove to be relatively important once 
we take into account people’s sense of identity and their cultural 
attitudes? Or, weaker though they may be at irst glance, did they 
still play an independent role in shaping the way people voted in the 
referendum?
The full results of the multivariate analysis are shown in the appendix 
to this chapter. The headline, however, is straightforward. For the 
most part, only those items associated with national identity and 
cultural outlook proved to be signiicantly associated with vote 
choice. Where someone stands on the libertarian-authoritarian scale, 
whether they are concerned about immigration, whether or not they 
feel European, and how long they think an EU citizen should have to 
have lived here before being entitled to welfare beneits all prove to 
be signiicantly and independently associated with which way people 
voted. Otherwise only the extent to which people trust government 
4  All the variables discussed in the section on motivations were available for inclusion in 
the model except Moreno national identity (only available for respondents in England) and the item 
on whether voting is the only way that people can inluence things (asked on a different version of 
the questionnaire from other variables). The initial stepwise analysis only selected for inclusion in 
the model items that had all appeared on the same two versions of the questionnaire and excluded 
those that had only appeared on one of those versions. In order to increase the sample size on 
which it was based the model was then re-run with only those items that appeared in the same two 
versions being eligible for inclusion on the model. It is this version for which full detail are given in 
the appendix to this chapter.
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made an entry into our model, suggesting that people’s attitudes 
towards government only played a small role in shaping the outcome 
of the EU referendum.
Dynamics
But leaving aside what motivated voters to make the choices they 
did, what impact did the debate about European membership have 
on attitudes towards the EU? In particular, is there any reason to 
believe that, in the end, Britain voted to leave because public opinion 
moved in a more sceptical direction in the weeks and months 
leading up to the ballot? To address this issue, we need to look at 
the answers to a broader question than whether people were for or 
against EU membership and one that has been asked on a regular 
basis over many years. We ask respondents: 
Do you think Britain’s long-term policy should be…
... to leave the European Union,
to stay in the EU and try to reduce the EU’s powers,
to leave things as they are,
to stay in the EU and try to increase the EU’s powers,
or, to work for the formation of a single European government?
The only minor change that had to be made to this question for our 
most recent, post-referendum survey was to introduce the question 
by saying, “Leaving aside the result of the referendum on Britain’s 
membership of the European Union, what do you think Britain’s 
policy should be…”. 
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Table 7 Attitudes towards Britain’s relationship with the EU, 1992-2016 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
% % % % % % % % % % %
Leave the EU 10 11 11 14 19 17 14 13 17 14 15
Stay in EU but 
reduce its 
powers
30 27 25 23 39 29 36 43 38 38 35
Leave things 
as are
16 22 20 20 19 18 23 20 19 21 23
Stay in EU and 
increase its 
powers
28 22 28 28 8 16 9 11 10 10 12
Work for single 
European 
government
10 9 8 8 6 7 8 6 7 7  7
Unweighted base 2855 1461 1165 1227 1180 1355 1035 1060 2293 1099 3435
2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
% % % % % % % % % %
Leave the EU 15 18 16 15 20 30 26 24 22 41
Stay in EU but 
reduce its 
powers
32 38 36 36 35 37 39 38 43 35
Leave things 
as are
27 23 24 27 24 16 19 18 19 16
Stay in EU and 
increase its 
powers
11 7 10 9 9 9 6 10 8 4
Work for single 
European 
government
 6 5 4 4 3 2 3  4 3 2
Unweighted base 2293 3199 4268 1077 1128 1103 2147 971 1105 1965
Source: 1992: British Election Study
Table 7 reveals that Britain emerged from the referendum far more 
sceptical about the EU than it had ever been previously. By the time 
the referendum was over, as many as three in four voters (75%) 
felt that Britain should either leave the EU or that if it stayed the 
institution’s powers should be reduced. This represented an increase 
of 11 points in the proportion feeling that way as compared with 12 
months earlier, and a 9 point increase on the previous all-time high 
recorded by the BSA survey, of two-thirds (67%) in 20125. More 
importantly, however, whereas previously most Eurosceptics said 
that Britain should stay in the EU while endeavouring to reduce its 
powers, by the time that the referendum was over the majority felt 
that we should leave – and as a result the proportion who took that 
5  It should of course be borne in mind that as our most recent survey was conducted after 
the referendum, people’s responses may have been inluenced by the outcome of the ballot as well 
as the campaign beforehand, even though they were asked to leave that consideration behind. Even 
so, it is unlikely that the referendum campaign did anything but reinforce the already predominantly 
Eurosceptic mood among the electorate.
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view (41%) was nearly double the proportion recorded in the previous 
year (22%). As one might anticipate, no less than 95% of this group 
voted to leave the EU, and unsurprisingly they constituted the vast 
bulk (87%) of all those in our sample who voted to leave.
The increase in support for leaving the EU, as measured by this 
question was far from uniform. Rather, as Table 8 exempliies, it 
increased most among those groups, such as those with relatively 
few educational qualiications and those with a relatively authoritarian 
outlook, where support for leaving was already relatively high. The 
social and ideological division that we have seen underpinned 
how people voted in the EU referendum seems to have sharpened 
considerably during the referendum campaign.
Table 8 Support for leaving the EU, by highest educational qualiication and position on the 
libertarian-authoritarian scale, 2015 and 2016
Britain’s long-term policy should be to leave the EU 2015 2016
Change 
since 2015
Highest educational qualiication % %
    Degree 13 20 +7
    At least GCSE A-C 23 43 +20
    GCSE D-G or less 28 58 +30
Libertarian—authoritarian scale
    Libertarian 8 21 +12
    Neither 20 45 +25
    Authoritarian 36 63 +28
Bases for this table can be found in the appendix to this chapter
So it appears that the referendum campaign had profound 
consequences. First, it seems to have moved public opinion as a 
whole in a more sceptical direction. Given the fact that in the event 
there was a small majority in favour of leaving the EU, it seems quite 
possible that this movement was crucial in determining the overall 
outcome of the referendum. Second, the campaign seems to have 
exacerbated the social and cultural division about the merits of EU 
membership that already existed in British society and which appears 
to be rooted in concerns about the social consequences of the UK’s 
membership.  As a result, the country emerged from the referendum 
not only split almost evenly down the middle but also seriously 
divided about the merits of the decision that was eventually made.
The partisan divide
We have already seen that how people voted in the EU referendum 
was related above all to whether people have a libertarian or an 
authoritarian outlook, together with their sense of identity and 
degree of concern about immigration. In contrast, there was little 
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or no relationship with whether someone holds views that put them 
on the left or on the right of the political spectrum. Yet at general 
elections the issues that tend to predominate are ones about equality 
and fairness and what the government should do about them, not 
questions about whether the country should become a little more or a 
little less liberal. This is relected in the pattern of voting in elections. 
For example, in 2015 there was as much as a 22 point difference 
between those on the left and those on the right in the proportion 
who voted Conservative in the general election, whereas there was 
only a three-point difference between those who might be regarded 
as libertarian and as authoritarian.
The EU referendum therefore presented a challenge to nearly all 
of the parties as they attempted to persuade their supporters 
to vote one way or the other. In fact, the only party of any size 
that recommended that people should vote to leave was UKIP; 
withdrawing from the EU was, after all, the party’s raison d’être, and 
it was remarkably successful in persuading its supporters to do so. 
In our survey, every single respondent who said they identiied with 
or supported UKIP and who turned out to vote in the referendum 
stated that they voted to leave. Labour, the Liberal Democrats and 
the Greens all recommended that people voted to remain in the EU, 
but in each case substantial minorities of their supporters, including 
not least one in three Labour identiiers, voted to leave6. Still, they 
were all more successful than the Prime Minister in persuading their 
supporters to vote to stay. The Conservative party itself remained 
oficially neutral on which way to vote, despite the fact that the 
oficial recommendation of the Conservative government was to 
vote to remain in the EU. In the event rather more Conservative 
identiiers voted to leave the EU than to remain. Contrary to the 
experience of many referendums, this was not a ballot in which 
the recommendations or cues from the parties had a great deal of 
inluence (Hobolt, 2009; Le Duc, 2003).
6  Caution needs to be applied to this statement in respect of Green Party supporters as 
fewer than 100 of them took part in BSA 2016.  
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Table 9 EU Referendum vote, by party identiication
EU Referendum vote
Leave Remain Unweighted base
Party Identiication
Conservative % 54 46 880
Labour % 33 67 688
Liberal Democrat % 27 73 139
UKIP % 100 - 125
Green % 21 79 54
Other % 42 58 106
None % 64 36 237
+ Respondents who did not know or refused to say how they had voted in the 
referendum were excluded from the analysis of voting behaviour.  
Given that Conservative supporters were the most divided of all 
in how they voted in the referendum, we might anticipate that the 
Conservative party would have found it relatively dificult to heal its 
wounds after the referendum. In practice, the opposite proved to 
be the case. In the months after the referendum the Conservative 
party largely united around the idea that the United Kingdom should 
not only leave the EU, but also that in so doing it should also leave 
the single market and the Customs Union (HM Government, 2017). 
Labour, in contrast was divided in what stance to take, with some 
MPs concerned to reconnect with the party’s traditional working-
class base that seems to have been inclined to vote to leave because 
of concerns about immigration, while others wanted to oppose the 
government’s supposedly ‘hard’ interpretation of what Brexit should 
mean (O’Hara, 2017).
However, a closer look at the views of those Conservative supporters 
who voted to remain in the EU helps explain why the division in the 
party’s ranks was perhaps not as serious as irst seems. In Table 10, 
we present the proportions of people identifying with each political 
party who were ‘keen’ Remainers (that is, those who in response 
to our more nuanced question said that Britain’s long-term policy 
should be to leave things as they are or to increase the EU’s powers) 
and who were ‘Reluctant’ Remainers (that is, those who said they 
favoured leaving the EU or trying to reduce its powers). Of those 
Conservative identiiers who voted to remain, over half (53%) can be 
classiied as ‘reluctant Remainers’ – in most cases saying in response 
to our more nuanced question about the EU that, while Britain should 
remain in the EU, it should seek to reduce the institution’s powers. 
This means that, overall, no less than 78% of Conservative identiiers 
either voted to leave or can be regarded as ‘reluctant Remainers’. 
In short, relatively few Conservative supporters showed much 
enthusiasm for the EU.
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Table 10 The character of the Remain vote, by party identiication
Keen Reluctant Unweighted base
Party Identiication
Conservative % 47 53 390
Labour % 62 38 432
Liberal Democrat % 64 36 97
None % 50 50 83
In contrast, less than two in ive Labour Remain voters (38%) were 
‘reluctant Remainers’. As a result, a little under three in ive of all 
Labour identiiers (59%) either voted to leave the EU or voted to 
remain in the EU while wanting to see it become less powerful. 
Meanwhile, over two in ive (41%) not only wanted to remain in the 
EU but did so with a degree of enthusiasm. Looked at in this way, it is 
perhaps rather less surprising that Labour should have found it more 
dificult to identify a stance on Brexit with which it was comfortable.
Conclusion
Suggestions that the EU referendum represented a lightning rod for 
a general disenchantment with politics are largely wide off the mark. 
True, those with less interest in politics may have, relatively speaking, 
been a little more likely than usual to make it to the polls, while those 
who trust government less were a little more likely to vote to leave. 
But for the most part the outcome of the referendum relected the 
concern of more ‘authoritarian’, socially conservative voters in Britain 
– that is, primarily older voters and those with few, if any, educational 
qualiications – about some of the social consequences of EU 
membership, most notably in respect of immigration. In a society 
in which relatively few have ever felt a strong sense of European 
identity, the debate about EU membership seems to have brought 
that concern to the fore such that in the event a narrow majority 
voted to leave. In short, the EU referendum was a litmus test of the 
merits of the EU project, and perhaps indeed of globalisation more 
generally – a test that, on this occasion, the EU was deemed by a 
majority to have failed.
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It is perhaps rather 
less surprising that 
Labour should have 
GPVOEJUNPSFEJGæDVMU
to identify a stance on 
Brexit with which it 
was comfortable
Suggestions that the EU 
referendum represented a 
lightning rod for a general 
disenchantment with 
politics are largely wide 
off the mark
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Appendix
The bases for Table 1 can be found below.
Table A.1 Turnout in 2016 EU Referendum. 2015 UK General Election and 2011 AV 
Referendum, by interest in politics
2011 2015 2016
Interest in Politics
Great Deal 253 482 417
Quite a Lot 531 1054 795
Some 661 1403 916
Not very much 464 852 530
None at all 275 369 244
The bases for Table 2 can be found below.
Table A.2 Turnout in 2016 EU Referendum, 2015 UK General Election and 2011 AV 
Referendum, by age group
2011 2015 2016
Age group
18-34 474 924 587
35-64 1119 2202 1462
65+ 580 1190 846
The bases for Tables 4 can be found below.
Table A.3 Percentage voting Remain, by age and highest educational qualiication 
combined
Age group
% Remain 18-34 35-54 55+
Highest educational qualiication
Degree 136 138 83
Higher below degree/A-level 238 242 244
GCSE or less 192 278 663
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The bases for Table 8 can be found below.
Table A.4 Support for Leaving the EU, 2015 and 2016, by highest educational qualiication 
and libertarian-authoritarian scale position, 2015 and 2016




At least GCSE A-C 514 889












Libertarian **-1.44 .19 .00
Neither **-0.58 .17 .00
(Authoritarian)
Concern about immigration
Concerned **-1.08 .15 .00
 (Not concerned)
European identity
Yes **-1.43 .21 .00
No)
EU citizen welfare wait
2 years or less **-0.77 .17 ‘00
3-4 years -0.06 .18 .74
 (More than 4 years/never)
Trust in government
Trust **-0.80 .21 .00
Tend to distrust **-0.78 .22 .00
(Distrust greatly)
Constant -0.11 .11 .33
Naglelkere R-squared = 37%
Unweighted base: 1203
$ZPNUPÄJHU[H[ SL]LS$ZPNUPÄJHU[H[  SL]LS
+ Variables shown in the order in which they were entered via a forward stepwise procedure. Only 
[OVZL ]HYPHISLZ [OH[ ^LYL ZPNUPÄJHU[S` HZZVJPH[LK ^P[O [OL KLWLUKLU[ ]HYPHISL H[ [OL  SL]LS VM
ZPNUPÄJHUJL^LYLHJ[\HSS`PUJS\KLK
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Technical details
In 2016, the sample for the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey 
was split into three equally-sized portions. Each portion was 
asked a different version of the questionnaire (versions A, B 
and C). Depending on the number of versions in which it was 
included, questions were thus asked either of the full sample (2,942 
respondents) or of a random third or two-thirds of the sample. 
Sample design
The BSA survey is designed to yield a representative sample of 
adults aged 18 or over. Since 1993, the sampling frame for the survey 
has been the Postcode Address File (PAF), a list of addresses (or 
postal delivery points) compiled by the Post Ofice.1
For practical reasons, the sample is conined to those living in 
private households. People living in institutions (though not in private 
households at such institutions) are excluded, as are households 
whose addresses were not on the PAF.
The sampling method involved a multi-stage design, with three 
separate stages of selection.
Selection of sectors
At the irst stage, postcode sectors were selected systematically 
from a list of all postal sectors in Britain. Before selection, any 
sectors with fewer than 500 addresses were identiied and grouped 
together with an adjacent sector; in Scotland all sectors north of the 
Caledonian Canal were excluded (because of the prohibitive costs 
of interviewing there). Sectors were then stratiied on the basis of: 37 
sub-regions; population density, (population in private households/
area of the postal sector in hectares), with variable banding used in 
order to create three equal-sized strata per sub-region; and ranking 
by percentage of homes that were owner-occupied.
This resulted in the selection of 271 postcode sectors, with 
probability proportional to the number of addresses in each sector.
Selection of addresses
Twenty-six addresses were selected in each of the 271 sectors or 
groups of sectors. The issued sample was therefore 271 x 26 = 7046 
addresses, selected by starting from a random point on the list of 
addresses for each sector, and choosing each address at a ixed 
interval. The ixed interval was calculated for each sector in order to 
generate the correct number of addresses.
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The Multiple-Occupancy Indicator (MOI) available through PAF was 
used when selecting addresses in Scotland. The MOI shows the 
number of accommodation spaces sharing one address. Thus, if 
the MOI indicated more than one accommodation space at a given 
address, the chances of the given address being selected from 
the list of addresses would increase so that it matched the total 
number of accommodation spaces. The MOI is largely irrelevant 
in England and Wales, as separate dwelling units (DUs) generally 
appear as separate entries on the PAF. In Scotland, tenements with 
many lats tend to appear as one entry on the PAF. However, even 
in Scotland, the vast majority (99.8%) of MOIs in the sample had a 
value of one. The remainder had MOIs greater than one. The MOI 
affects the selection probability of the address, so it was necessary 
to incorporate an adjustment for this into the weighting procedures 
(described below).
Selection of individuals
Interviewers called at each address selected from the PAF and listed 
all those eligible for inclusion in the BSA sample – that is, all persons 
currently aged 18 or over and resident at the selected address. 
The interviewer then selected one respondent using a computer-
generated random selection procedure. Where there were two or 
more DUs at the selected address, interviewers irst had to select one 
DU using the same random procedure. They then followed the same 
procedure to select a person for interview within the selected DU.
Weighting
The weights for the BSA survey correct for the unequal selection of 
addresses, DUs and individuals, and for biases caused by differential 
non-response. The different stages of the weighting scheme are 
outlined in detail below. 
Selection weights
Selection weights are required because not all the units covered 
in the survey had the same probability of selection. The weighting 
relects the relative selection probabilities of the individual at the 
three main stages of selection: address, DU and individual. First, 
because addresses in Scotland were selected using the MOI, weights 
were needed to compensate for the greater probability of an address 
with an MOI of more than one being selected, compared with an 
address with an MOI of one. (This stage was omitted for the English 
and Welsh data.) Secondly, data were weighted to compensate for 
the fact that a DU at an address that contained a large number of 
DUs was less likely to be selected for inclusion in the survey than a 
DU at an address that contained fewer DUs. (We used this procedure 
because in most cases where the MOI is greater than one, the two 
stages will cancel each other out, resulting in more eficient weights.) 
Thirdly, data were weighted to compensate for the lower selection 
probabilities of adults living in large households, compared with 
those in small households. 
At each stage the selection weights were trimmed to avoid a small 
number of very high or very low weights in the sample; such weights 
would inlate standard errors, reducing the precision of the survey 
estimates and causing the weighted sample to be less eficient. Less 
than 1% of the selection weights were trimmed at each stage. 
Non-response model
It is known that certain subgroups in the population are more likely 
to respond to surveys than others. These groups can end up over-
represented in the sample, which can bias the survey estimates. 
Where information is available about non-responding households, 
the response behaviour of the sample members can be modelled 
and the results used to generate a non-response weight. This non-
response weight is intended to reduce bias in the sample resulting 
from differential response to the survey. 
The data were modelled using logistic regression, with the dependent 
variable indicating whether or not the selected individual responded 
to the survey. Ineligible households2 were not included in the 
non-response modelling. A number of area-level and interviewer 
observation variables were used to model response. Not all the 
variables examined were retained for the inal model: variables 
not strongly related to a household’s propensity to respond were 
dropped from the analysis. 
The variables found to be related to response, once controlled for 
the rest of the predictors in the model, were: region, type of dwelling, 
whether there were entry barriers to the selected address, the 
relative condition of the immediate local area, the relative condition 
of the address, the percentage of owner-occupied properties in 
quintiles and population density. The model shows that response 
increases if there are no barriers to entry (for instance, if there are 
no locked gates around the address and no entry phone) and if the 
general condition of the address is better than other addresses in 
the area, rather than being about the same or worse. Response is 
also higher for lats than detached houses. Response increases if the 
relative condition of the immediate surrounding area is mainly good, 
and decreases as population density increases. Response is also 
generally higher for addresses in the North East of England. The full 
model is given in Table A.1. 
NatCen Social Research
British Social Attitudes 34 | Technical details 183
Table A.1: The inal non-response model 
Variable B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Odds
Region    55.955 11 .000  
Inner London (baseline)          
North East .733 .191 14.683 1 .000 2.082
North West .173 .158 1.200 1 .273 1.189
Yorkshire and The 
Humber
.043 .169 .064 1 .801 1.044
East Midlands .006 .177 .001 1 .972 1.006
West Midlands -.106 .168 .399 1 .528 .899
East of England -.052 .166 .100 1 .752 .949
Outer London -.222 .167 1.768 1 .184 .801
South East .149 .161 .864 1 .353 1.161
South West .328 .170 3.722 1 .054 1.388
Wales .095 .187 .258 1 .612 1.100
Scotland .012 .166 .005 1 .944 1.012
Type of dwelling     9.301 3 .026  
Detached House (baseline)          
Semi-detached house -.063 .075 .714 1 .398 .939
Terraced house (including 
end of terrace)
.058 .082 .496 1 .481 1.059
Flat or maisonette 
and other
.248 .113 4.800 1 .028 1.281
Barriers to address           
No barriers (baseline)          
One or more -.700 .106 43.811 1 .000 .496
Relative condition of the 
local area
   24.223 2 .000  
Mainly good (baseline)          
Mainly fair -.276 .057 23.473 1 .000 .759
Mainly bad or very bad -.323 .149 4.701 1 .030 .724
Relative condition of the 
address
   40.256 2 .000  
Better (baseline)          
About the same -.624 .098 40.244 1 .000 .536
Worse -.559 .137 16.708 1 .572 .437
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Table A.1: The inal non-response model (continued)
Variable B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Odds
Percentage owner-
occupied in quintiles
    9.892 4 .042  
1 lowest (constant)          
2 .155 .089 3.071 1 .080 1.168
3 .067 .097 .484 1 .487 1.070
4 .184 .098 3.522 1 .061 1.202
5 highest -.027 .102 .070 1 .791 .974
Population density
1 -.072 .027 6.962 1 .008 .932
Constant .660 .206 10.295 1 .001 1.935
The response is 1 = individual responding to the survey, 0 = non-response
6US`]HYPHISLZ[OH[HYLZPNUPÄJHU[H[[OLSL]LSHYLPUJS\KLKPU[OLTVKLS
The model R2 is 0.039(Cox and Snell)
)PZ[OLLZ[PTH[LJVLMÄJPLU[^P[OZ[HUKHYKLYYVY:,




The non-response weight was calculated as the inverse of the 
predicted response probabilities saved from the logistic regression 
model. The non-response weight was then combined with the 
selection weights to create the inal non-response weight. The top 
1% of the weight were trimmed before the weight was scaled to the 
achieved sample size (resulting in the weight being standardised 
around an average of one). 
Calibration weighting
The inal stage of weighting was to adjust the inal non-response 
weight so that the weighted sample matched the population in terms 
of age, sex and region. 
Only adults aged 18 or over are eligible to take part in the survey, 
therefore the data have been weighted to the British population 
aged 18+ based on 2015 Mid-Year Census data from the Ofice for 
National Statistics/General Register Ofice for Scotland. 
The survey data were weighted to the marginal age/sex and region 
distributions using calibration weighting. As a result, the weighted 
data should exactly match the population across these three 
dimensions. This is shown in Table A.2. 
1 Population density refers to the number of people per unit of area. This was achieved by 
calculating the ratio between the number of people in private households in each PSU divided by 
the area of each PSU in hectares.
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Region % % % % %
North East 4.2 5.7 5.5 4.2 4.2
North West 11.3 13.0 12.7 12.0 11.3
Yorks. and 
Humber
8.5 8.3 8.1 8.4 8.5
East Midlands 7.4 7.1 6.9 8.4 7.4
West Midlands 9.0 7.9 8.1 9.1 9.0
East of England 9.6 10.3 10.2 10.6 9.6
London 13.5 9.2 9.8 12.8 13.5
South East 14.1 13.6 13,7 13,2 14.1
South West 8.8 10.6 10.4 8.8 8.8
Wales 5.0 5.6 5.7 5.1 5.0
Scotland 8.7 8.6 8.7 8.9 8.7
Age & sex % % % % %
M 18–24 5.8 2.3 3.1 3.1 5.8
M 25–34 8.6 6.4 7.0 7.4 8.6
M 35–44 8.1 6.6 6.9 7.3 8.1
M 45–54 8.8 7.7 8.1 8.2 8.8
M 55–59 3.8 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.8
M 60–64 3.3 4.3 4.4 4.2 3.3
M 65+ 10.3 13.1 12.2 11.8 10.3
F 18–24 5.6 3.4 4.5 4.6 5.6
F 25–34 8.6 8.1 8.0 8.6 8.6
F 35–44 8.2 9.8 9.9 10.2 8.2
F 45–54 9.1 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.1
F 55–59 3.9 4.8 4.8 4.6 3.9
F 60–64 3.5 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.5
F 65+ 12.4 16.4 13.7 13.1 12.4
Base 49,921,573 2942 2942 2942 2942
The calibration weight is the inal non-response weight to be used in 
the analysis of the 2016 survey; this weight has been scaled to the 
responding sample size. The range of the weights is given in Table 
A.3. 
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Table A.3 Range of weights
N Minimum Mean Maximum
DU and person selection weight 2942 .56 1.00 2.25
Un-calibrated non-response and 
selection weight 
2942 .32 1.00 3.87
Final calibrated non-response weight 2942 .30 1.00 5.84
Effective sample size
The effect of the sample design on the precision of survey estimates 
is indicated by the effective sample size (neff). The effective sample 
size measures the size of an (unweighted) simple random sample 
that would achieve the same precision (standard error) as the design 
being implemented. If the effective sample size is close to the actual 
sample size, then we have an eficient design with a good level of 
precision. The lower the effective sample size is, the lower the level 
of precision. The eficiency of a sample is given by the ratio of the 
effective sample size to the actual sample size. Samples that select 
one person per household tend to have lower eficiency than samples 
that select all household members. The inal calibrated non-response 
weights have an effective sample size (neff) of 2,276 and eficiency of 
77%.
Weighted bases
All the percentages presented in this report are based on weighted 
data. Only unweighted bases are presented in the tables. Details of 
weighted bases for standard demographics are shown in Table A.4.
NatCen Social Research
British Social Attitudes 34 | Technical details 187
Table A.4 Weighted bases for standard demographics, 2016














Black and Minority Ethnic 328 247
Religion
No religion 1551 1487
Church of England/Anglican 442 528
Other Christian 501 518
Non-Christian 185 137
Roman Catholic 252 260
Class group (NSSEC)
Managerial & professional occupations 1133 1142
Intermediate occupations 379 403
Employers in small org; own account workers 257 274
Lower supervisory & technical occupations 214 224
Semi-routine & routine occupations 806 796
Highest educational qualiication
Degree 741 695
Higher education below degree 314 329
A level or equivalent 544 487
O level or equivalent 552 534
CSE or equivalent 207 218
Foreign or other 81 71
No qualiication 492 595
Marital status
Married 1465 1338
Living as married 347 280
Separated or divorced after marrying 280 426
Widowed 169 289
Not married 680 609
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Questionnaire versions
Each address in each sector (sampling point) was allocated to one of 
the portions of the sample: A, B or C. As mentioned earlier, a different 
version of the questionnaire was used with each of the three sample 
portions. If one serial number was version A, the next was version B 
and the third version C. There were 2349 issued addresses for two 
of the versions of the sample, and 2348 issued for the remaining 
version. 
Fieldwork
Interviewing was mainly carried out between July and October 2016, 
with a small number of interviews taking place in November 2016.
Fieldwork was conducted by interviewers drawn from NatCen 
Social Research’s regular panel and conducted using face-to-
face computer-assisted interviewing.3 Interviewers attended a 
one-day brieing conference to familiarise them with the selection 
procedures and questionnaires, with the exception of experienced 
interviewers who completed a self-brieing containing updates to the 
questionnaire and procedures.
The mean interview length was 71 minutes for version A of the 
questionnaire, 70 minutes for version B, 72 minutes for version C.4 
Interviewers achieved an overall response rate of between 46.0 and 
46.5%. Details are shown in Table A.5.
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Table A.5 Response rate on British Social Attitudes, 2016
Number
Lower limit of 
response (%)
Upper limit of 
response (%)
Addresses issued 7046
Out of scope 638
Upper limit of eligible cases 6408 100
Uncertain eligibility 70 1.1
Lower limit of eligible cases 6338 100
Interview achieved 2945 46.0 46.5
With self-completion 2400 37.5 37.9
Interview not achieved 3393 52.9 53.5
Refused 2507 39.1 39.6
Non-contacted 468 7.3 7.4
Other non-response 418 6.5 6.6
Response is calculated as a range from a lower limit where all unknown eligibility cases (for example, 
address inaccessible, or unknown whether address is residential) are assumed to be eligible and 
therefore included in the unproductive outcomes, to an upper limit where all these cases are assumed 
to be ineligible and therefore excluded from the response calculation
º9LM\ZLK»JVTWYPZLZYLM\ZHSZILMVYLZLSLJ[PVUVMHUPUKP]PK\HSH[[OLHKKYLZZYLM\ZHSZ[V[OLVMÄJL
refusal by the selected person, proxy refusals (on behalf of the selected respondent) and broken 
appointments after which the selected person could not be recontacted
Non-contacted comprises households where no one was contacted and those where the selected 
person could not be contacted
As in earlier rounds of the series, the respondent was asked to ill 
in a self-completion questionnaire which, whenever possible, was 
collected by the interviewer. Otherwise, the respondent was asked to 
post it to NatCen Social Research.
A total of 542 respondents (18% of those interviewed) did not return 
their self-completion questionnaire. Version A of the self-completion 
questionnaire was returned by 79% of respondents to the face-to-
face interview, version B of the questionnaire was returned by 86% 
and version C by 80%. As in previous rounds, we judged that it was 
not necessary to apply additional weights to correct for non-response 
to the self-completion questionnaire.
Advance letter
Advance letters describing the purpose of the survey and the 
coverage of the questionnaire, were sent to sampled addresses 
before the interviewer made their irst call.5
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Analysis variables
A number of standard analyses have been used in the tables that 
appear in this report. The analysis groups requiring further deinition 
are set out below. For further details see Stafford and Thomson 
(2006). Where relevant the name given to the relevant analysis 
variable is shown in square brackets – for example [HHincQ]
Region
The dataset is classiied by 12 regions, formerly the Government 
Ofice Regions.
Standard Occupational Classiication
Respondents are classiied according to their own occupation, not 
that of the ‘head of household’. Each respondent was asked about 
their current or last job, so that all respondents except those who had 
never worked were coded. Additionally, all job details were collected 
for all spouses and partners in work.
Since the 2011 survey, we have coded occupation to the Standard 
Occupational Classiication 2010 (SOC 2010) instead of the Standard 
Occupational Classiication 2000 (SOC 2000). The main socio-
economic grouping based on SOC 2010 is the National Statistics 
Socio-Economic Classiication (NS-SEC). However, to maintain time-
series, some analysis has continued to use the older schemes based 
on SOC 90 – Registrar General’s Social Class and Socio-Economic 
Group – though these are now derived from SOC 2000 (which is 
derived from SOC 2010).
National Statistics Socio-Economic Classiication 
(NS-SEC)
The combination of SOC 2010 and employment status for current or 
last job generates the following NS-SEC analytic classes:
• Employers in large organisations, higher managerial and 
professional
• Lower professional and managerial; higher technical and 
supervisory
• Intermediate occupations
• Small employers and own account workers
• Lower supervisory and technical occupations
• Semi-routine occupations
• Routine occupations
The remaining respondents are grouped as “never had a job” or 
“not classiiable”. For some analyses, it may be more appropriate 
to classify respondents according to their current socio-economic 
status, which takes into account only their present economic 
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position. In this case, in addition to the seven classes listed above, 
the remaining respondents not currently in paid work fall into one of 
the following categories: “not classiiable”, “retired”, “looking after 
the home”, “unemployed” or “others not in paid occupations”.
Registrar General’s Social Class
As with NS-SEC, each respondent’s social class is based on his 
or her current or last occupation. The combination of SOC 90 with 
employment status for current or last job generates the following six 
social classes:
I Professional etc. occupations 
II Managerial and technical occupations   ‘Non-manual’
III (Non-manual) Skilled occupations
III (Manual) Skilled occupations
IV Partly skilled occupations   ‘Manual’
V Unskilled occupations
They are usually collapsed into four groups: I & II, III Non-manual, III 
Manual, and IV & V.
Socio-Economic Group
As with NS-SEC, each respondent’s Socio-Economic Group (SEG) 
is based on his or her current or last occupation. SEG aims to bring 
together people with jobs of similar social and economic status, and 
is derived from a combination of employment status and occupation. 
The full SEG classiication identiies 18 categories, but these are 
usually condensed into six groups:
• Professionals, employers and managers
• Intermediate non-manual workers
• Junior non-manual workers
• Skilled manual workers
• Semi-skilled manual workers
• Unskilled manual workers
As with NS-SEC, the remaining respondents are grouped as “never 
had a job” or “not classiiable”.
Industry
All respondents whose occupation could be coded were allocated 
a Standard Industrial Classiication 2007 (SIC 07). Two-digit class 
codes are used. As with social class, SIC may be generated on the 
basis of the respondent’s current occupation only, or on his or her 
most recently classiiable occupation. 
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Party identiication
Respondents can be classiied as identifying with a particular political 
party on one of three counts: if they consider themselves supporters 
of that party, closer to it than to others, or more likely to support it 
in the event of a general election. The three groups are generally 
described respectively as ‘partisans’, ‘sympathisers’ and ‘residual 
identiiers’. In combination, the three groups are referred to as 
‘identiiers’. Responses are derived from the following questions:
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a supporter of 
any one political party? [Yes/No]
[If “No”/“Don’t know”]
Do you think of yourself as a little closer to one political party 
than to the others? [Yes/No]
[If “Yes” at either question or “No”/“Don’t know” at 2nd 
question]
Which one?/If there were a general election tomorrow, 
which political party do you think you would be most likely to 
support?
[Conservative; Labour; Liberal Democrat; Scottish National 
Party; Plaid Cymru; Green Party; UK Independence Party 
(UKIP)/Veritas; British National Party (BNP)/National Front; 
RESPECT/Scottish Socialist Party (SSP)/Socialist Party; Other 
party; Other answer; None; Refused to say]
Income
Respondent’s household income is classiied by the standard 
BSA variable [HHInc]. The bandings used are designed to be 
representative of those that exist in Britain and are taken from the 
Family Resources Survey (see http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/frs/). 
Two derived variables give income deciles/quartiles: [HHIncD] and 
[HHIncQ]. Deciles and quartiles are calculated based on household 
incomes in Britain as a whole. 
In 2016 BSA included some more detailed questions on respondent 
individual and household income. The dataset includes a derived 
variable using these data [eq_inc_quintiles] which is the net 
equivalised household income after housing costs in quintiles. More 
detailed income data can be made available to researchers on 
request. 
Attitude scales
Since 1986, the BSA surveys have included two attitude scales which 
aim to measure where respondents stand on certain underlying 
value dimensions – left–right and libertarian–authoritarian.6 Since 
1987 (except in 1990), a similar scale on ‘welfarism’ has also been 
included. Some of the items in the welfarism scale were changed in 
2000–2001. The current version of the scale is shown below.
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A useful way of summarising the information from a number of 
questions of this sort is to construct an additive index (Spector, 1992; 
DeVellis, 2003). This approach rests on the assumption that there is 
an underlying – ‘latent’ – attitudinal dimension which characterises 
the answers to all the questions within each scale. If so, scores on 
the index are likely to be a more reliable indication of the underlying 
attitude than the answers to any one question.
Each of these scales consists of a number of statements to which the 
respondent is invited to “agree strongly”, “agree”, “neither agree nor 
disagree”, “disagree” or “disagree strongly”.
The items are:
Left–right scale
Government should redistribute income from the better off to 
those who are less well off [Redistrb]
Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers 
[BigBusnN]
Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the 
nation’s wealth [Wealth]7
There is one law for the rich and one for the poor [RichLaw]
Management will always try to get the better of employees if it 
gets the chance [Indust4]
Libertarian–authoritarian scale
Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional 
British values. [TradVals]
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. 
[StifSent]
For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate 
sentence. [DeathApp]
Schools should teach children to obey authority. [Obey]
The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is 
wrong. [WrongLaw]
Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold 
moral standards. [Censor]
Welfarism scale
The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each 
other. [WelfHelp] 
The government should spend more money on welfare benefits 
for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes. [MoreWelf]
Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they 
really wanted one. [UnempJob]
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Many people who get social security don’t really deserve any 
help. [SocHelp]
Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another. 
[DoleFidl]
If welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people would learn to 
stand on their own two feet. [WelfFeet]
Cutting welfare benefits would damage too many people’s 
lives. [DamLives]
The creation of the welfare state is one of Britain’s proudest 
achievements. [ProudWlf]
The indices for the three scales are formed by scoring the leftmost, 
most libertarian or most pro-welfare position, as 1 and the rightmost, 
most authoritarian or most anti-welfarist position, as 5. The “neither 
agree nor disagree” option is scored as 3. The scores to all the 
questions in each scale are added and then divided by the number 
of items in the scale, giving indices ranging from 1 (leftmost, most 
libertarian, most pro-welfare) to 5 (rightmost, most authoritarian, most 
anti-welfare). The scores on the three indices have been placed on 
the dataset.8
The scales have been tested for reliability (as measured by 
Cronbach’s alpha). The Cronbach’s alpha (unstandardised items) 
for the scales in 2016 are 0.82 for the left–right scale, 0.82 for the 
libertarian–authoritarian scale and 0.77 for the welfarism scale. This 
level of reliability can be considered “good” for the left–right and 
libertarian–authoritarian scales and “respectable” for the welfarism 
scale (DeVellis, 2003: 95–96).
Other analysis variables
These are taken directly from the questionnaire and to that extent are 
self-explanatory. The principal ones are:
• Sex
• Age 
• Household income 
• Economic position 
• Religion 
• Highest educational qualiication obtained 
• Marital status 
• Beneits received
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Sampling errors
No sample precisely relects the characteristics of the population it 
represents, because of both sampling and non-sampling errors. If 
a sample was designed as a random sample (if every adult had an 
equal and independent chance of inclusion in the sample), then we 
could calculate the sampling error of any percentage, p, using the 
formula:
 s.e. (p) =    p(100 - p)
   n
where n is the number of respondents on which the percentage is 
based. Once the sampling error had been calculated, it would be 
a straightforward exercise to calculate a conidence interval for the 
true population percentage. For example, a 95% conidence interval 
would be given by the formula:
p ± 1.96 x s.e. (p)
Clearly, for a simple random sample (srs), the sampling error depends 
only on the values of p and n. However, simple random sampling is 
almost never used in practice, because of its ineficiency in terms of 
time and cost.
As noted above, the BSA sample, like that drawn for most large-
scale surveys, was clustered according to a stratiied multi-stage 
design into 271 postcode sectors (or combinations of sectors). 
With a complex design like this, the sampling error of a percentage 
giving a particular response is not simply a function of the number 
of respondents in the sample and the size of the percentage; it also 
depends on how that percentage response is spread within and 
between sample points.
The complex design may be assessed relative to simple random 
sampling by calculating a range of design factors (DEFTs) associated 
with it, where:
DEFT = Variance of estimator with complex design, sample size n
  Variance of estimator with srs design, sample size n
and represents the multiplying factor to be applied to the simple 
random sampling error to produce its complex equivalent. A design 
factor of one means that the complex sample has achieved the same 
precision as a simple random sample of the same size. A design 
factor greater than one means the complex sample is less precise 
than its simple random sample equivalent. If the DEFT for a particular 
characteristic is known, a 95% conidence interval for a percentage 
may be calculated using the formula:
p ± 1.96 x complex sampling error (p)
 = p ± 1.96 x DEFT x      p(100 - p)
                       n
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Table A.6 gives examples of the conidence intervals and DEFTs 
calculated for a range of different questions. Most background 
questions were asked of the whole sample, whereas many attitudinal 
questions were asked only of a third or two-thirds of the sample; 
some were asked on the interview questionnaire and some on the 
self-completion supplement.









Party identiication (full sample)
Conservative 33.1% 1.1% 31.0% 35.3% 1.241 1003
Labour 29.1% 1.0% 27.2% 31.2% 1.194 849
Liberal Democrat 5.4% .5% 4.4% 6.6% 1.272 160
Scottish National Party 3.5% .3% 3.0% 4.1% .813 108
Plaid Cymru .4% .1% .2% .7% 1.031 11
UK Independence Party (UKIP) 4.3% .4% 3.5% 5.3% 1.156 142
Green Party 2.6% .3% 1.9% 3.3% 1.198 70
None 14.2% .9% 12.6% 16.0% 1.341 401
Housing tenure (full sample)
Owns 63.5% 1.4% 60.8% 66.2% 1.537 1882
Rents from local authority 9.8% .9% 8.2% 11.7% 1.610 316
Rents privately/HA 25.1% 1.2% 22.9% 27.5% 1.467 706
Religion (full sample)
No religion 52.8% 1.1% 50.7% 54.8% 1.145 1487
Church of England 15.0% .8% 13.5% 16.8% 1.254 528
Roman Catholic 8.6% .7% 7.4% 10.0% 1.284 260
Age of completing continuous full-time education (full sample)
16 or under 41.4% 1.2% 39.1% 43.8% 1.314 1392
17 or 18 22.2% .9% 20.5% 24.0% 1.147 619
19 or over 31.1% 1.2% 28.9% 33.4% 1.346 850
Does anyone have access to the internet from this address?
Yes 90.8% .6% 89.5% 91.9% 1.150 2557
No 9.2% .6% 8.1% 10.5% 1.150 385
Can I just check, would you describe the place where you live as... (full sample)
...a big city 13.1% 1.3% 10.8% 15.8% 2.035 304
the suburbs or outskirts of a 
big city
23.3% 1.7% 20.1% 26.8% 2.166 648
a small city or town, 44.6% 2.1% 40.5% 48.9% 2.310 1372
a country village 15.2% 1.3% 12.9% 17.8% 1.907 495
or, a farm or home in the 
country?
3.0% .4% 2.2% 4.0% 1.424 93
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Attitudinal variables (face-to-face interview)
Beneits for the unemployed are … (full sample)
… too low 28.0% 1.1% 25.8% 30.3% 1.362 836
… too high 47.9% 1.2% 45.5% 50.3% 1.342 1381
How serious a problem is trafic congestion in towns, cities (full sample)
A very serious problem 16.5% 1.0% 14.5% 18.6% 1.512 469
A serious problem 33.0% 1.1% 30.8% 35.2% 1.273 962
Not a very serious problem 34.1% 1.3% 31.5% 36.7% 1.487 968
Not a problem at all 16.2% 1.1% 14.2% 18.5% 1.586 536
How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in politics… (full sample)
... a great deal 14.4% .7% 13.1% 15.8% 1.081 421
quite a lot 27.4% 1.0% 25.5% 29.4% 1.219 806
some 32.0% 1.0% 30.0% 34.1% 1.203 925
not very much 17.5% .8% 16.0% 19.1% 1.118 542
or, none at all? 8.7% .8% 7.3% 10.3% 1.464 248
In your opinion is the NHS facing ... (third of sample)
... no funding problem, 3.0% .6% 2.0% 4.4% 1.109 26
… a minor funding problem, 12.8% 1.2% 10.6% 15.3% 1.108 124
… a major funding problem, 48.7% 2.0% 44.8% 52.7% 1.244 467
… a severe funding problem? 33.1% 1.8% 29.6% 36.9% 1.218 338
Attitudinal variables (self-completion)
Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well 
off (full sample)
Agree 42.2% 1.3% 39.7% 44.7% 1.267 999
Neither agree nor disagree 27.5% 1.1% 25.4% 29.7% 1.196 659
Disagree 28.4% 1.1% 26.3% 30.6% 1.201 692
People should be able to travel by plane as much as they like (third of sample)
Agree 63.9% 1.7% 60.5% 67.2% .990 492
Neither agree nor disagree 20.4% 1.5% 17.5% 23.6% 1.069 162
Disagree 9.4% 1.2% 7.4% 12.0% 1.108 73
People should be able to travel by plane as much as they like (one quarter of sample)
Complete conidence 3.0% .4% 2.2% 4.0% 1.251 64
A great deal of conidence 25.3% 1.1% 23.2% 27.6% 1.270 590
Some conidence 52.2% 1.2% 49.8% 54.5% 1.147 1266
Very little conidence 10.8% .7% 9.4% 12.3% 1.160 257
No conidence at all 2.7% .4% 2.0% 3.5% 1.124 58
The table shows that most of the questions asked of all sample 
members have a conidence interval of around plus or minus two 
to four of the survey percentage. This means that we can be 95% 
certain that the true population percentage is within two to four per 
cent (in either direction) of the percentage we report.
NatCen Social Research
British Social Attitudes 34 | Technical details 198
Variables with much larger variation are, as might be expected, those 
closely related to the geographic location of the respondent (for 
example, whether they live in a big city, a small town or a village). 
Here, the variation may be as large as six or seven per cent either 
way around the percentage found on the survey. Consequently, the 
design effects calculated for these variables in a clustered sample 
will be greater than the design effects calculated for variables less 
strongly associated with area. Also, sampling errors for percentages 
based only on respondents to just one of the versions of the 
questionnaire, or on subgroups within the sample, are larger than 
they would have been had the questions been asked of everyone.
Analysis techniques
Regression
Regression analysis aims to summarise the relationship between 
a ‘dependent’ variable and one or more ‘independent’ variables. 
It shows how well we can estimate a respondent’s score on 
the dependent variable from knowledge of their scores on the 
independent variables. It is often undertaken to support a claim that 
the phenomena measured by the independent variables cause the 
phenomenon measured by the dependent variable. However, the 
causal ordering, if any, between the variables cannot be veriied or 
falsiied by the technique. Causality can only be inferred through 
special experimental designs or through assumptions made by the 
analyst.
All regression analysis assumes that the relationship between the 
dependent and each of the independent variables takes a particular 
form. In linear regression, it is assumed that the relationship can be 
adequately summarised by a straight line. This means that a one 
percentage point increase in the value of an independent variable 
is assumed to have the same impact on the value of the dependent 
variable on average, irrespective of the previous values of those 
variables.
Strictly speaking the technique assumes that both the dependent 
and the independent variables are measured on an interval-level 
scale, although it may sometimes still be applied even where this is 
not the case. For example, one can use an ordinal variable (e.g. a 
Likert scale) as a dependent variable if one is willing to assume that 
there is an underlying interval-level scale and the difference between 
the observed ordinal scale and the underlying interval scale is due 
to random measurement error. Often the answers to a number of 
Likert-type questions are averaged to give a dependent variable that 
is more like a continuous variable. Categorical or nominal data can 
be used as independent variables by converting them into dummy or 
binary variables; these are variables where the only valid scores are 
0 and 1, with 1 signifying membership of a particular category and 0 
otherwise.
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The assumptions of linear regression cause particular dificulties 
where the dependent variable is binary. The assumption that the 
relationship between the dependent and the independent variables 
is a straight line means that it can produce estimated values for the 
dependent variable of less than 0 or greater than 1. In this case it 
may be more appropriate to assume that the relationship between 
the dependent and the independent variables takes the form of 
an S-curve, where the impact on the dependent variable of a one-
point increase in an independent variable becomes progressively 
less the closer the value of the dependent variable approaches 0 or 
1. Logistic regression is an alternative form of regression which its 
such an S-curve rather than a straight line. The technique can also 
be adapted to analyse multinomial non-interval-level dependent 
variables, that is, variables which classify respondents into more than 
two categories.
The two statistical scores most commonly reported from the results 
of regression analyses are:
(TLHZ\YLVM]HYPHUJLL_WSHPULK: This summarises how well all 
the independent variables combined can account for the variation 
in respondents’ scores in the dependent variable. The higher the 
measure, the more accurately we are able in general to estimate the 
correct value of each respondent’s score on the dependent variable 
from knowledge of their scores on the independent variables.
(WHYHTL[LYLZ[PTH[L: This shows how much the dependent variable 
will change on average, given a one-unit change in the independent 
variable (while holding all other independent variables in the model 
constant). The parameter estimate has a positive sign if an increase 
in the value of the independent variable results in an increase in the 
value of the dependent variable. It has a negative sign if an increase 
in the value of the independent variable results in a decrease in 
the value of the dependent variable. If the parameter estimates are 
standardised, it is possible to compare the relative impact of different 
independent variables; those variables with the largest standardised 
estimates can be said to have the biggest impact on the value of the 
dependent variable.
Regression also tests for the statistical signiicance of parameter 
estimates. A parameter estimate is said to be signiicant at the 5% 
level if the range of the values encompassed by its 95% conidence 
interval (see also section on sampling errors) are either all positive or 
all negative. This means that there is less than a 5% chance that the 
association we have found between the dependent variable and the 
independent variable is simply the result of sampling error and does 
not relect a relationship that actually exists in the general population.
Factor analysis
Factor analysis is a statistical technique which aims to identify 
whether there are one or more apparent sources of commonality 
to the answers given by respondents to a set of questions. It 
NatCen Social Research
British Social Attitudes 34 | Technical details 200
ascertains the smallest number of factors (or dimensions) which 
can most economically summarise all of the variation found in the 
set of questions being analysed. Factors are established where 
respondents who gave a particular answer to one question in the 
set tended to give the same answer as each other to one or more of 
the other questions in the set. The technique is most useful when a 
relatively small number of factors are able to account for a relatively 
large proportion of the variance in all of the questions in the set.
The technique produces a factor loading for each question (or 
variable) on each factor. Where questions have a high loading on the 
same factor, then it will be the case that respondents who gave a 
particular answer to one of these questions tended to give a similar 
answer to each other at the other questions. The technique is most 
commonly used in attitudinal research to try to identify the underlying 
ideological dimensions which apparently structure attitudes towards 
the subject in question.
International Social Survey Programme 
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is run by a group 
of research organisations in different countries, each of which 
undertakes to ield annually an agreed module of questions on 
a chosen topic area. Since 1985, an International Social Survey 
Programme module has been included in one of the BSA self-
completion questionnaires. Each module is chosen for repetition at 
intervals to allow comparisons both between countries (membership 
is currently standing at 48) and over time. In 2016, the chosen 
subject was Role of Government, and the module was carried on the 
A and C versions of the self-completion questionnaire (SCObeyLw – 
GvOkSec).
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Notes
1. Until 1991 all British Social Attitudes samples were drawn from 
the Electoral Register (ER). However, following concern that 
this sampling frame might be deicient in its coverage of certain 
population subgroups, a ‘splicing’ experiment was conducted in 
1991. We are grateful to the Market Research Development Fund 
for contributing towards the costs of this experiment. Its purpose 
was to investigate whether a switch to PAF would disrupt the time-
series – for instance, by lowering response rates or affecting the 
distribution of responses to particular questions. In the event, it was 
concluded that the change from ER to PAF was unlikely to affect 
time trends in any noticeable ways, and that no adjustment factors 
were necessary. Since signiicant differences in eficiency exist 
between PAF and ER, and because we considered it untenable to 
continue to use a frame that is known to be biased, we decided to 
adopt PAF as the sampling frame for future British Social Attitudes 
surveys. For details of the PAF/ER ‘splicing’ experiment, see Lynn 
and Taylor (1995).
2. This includes households not containing any adults aged 18 or 
over, vacant dwelling units, derelict dwelling units, non-resident 
addresses and other deadwood.
3. In 1993 it was decided to mount a split-sample experiment designed 
to test the applicability of Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing 
(CAPI) to the British Social Attitudes survey series. CAPI has 
been used increasingly over the past decade as an alternative to 
traditional interviewing techniques. As the name implies, CAPI 
involves the use of a laptop computer during the interview, with 
the interviewer entering responses directly into the computer. One 
of the advantages of CAPI is that it signiicantly reduces both the 
amount of time spent on data processing and the number of coding 
and editing errors. There was, however, concern that a different 
interviewing technique might alter the distribution of responses and 
so affect the year-on-year consistency of British Social Attitudes 
data.
Following the experiment, it was decided to change over to CAPI 
completely in 1994 (the self-completion questionnaire still being 
administered in the conventional way). The results of the experiment 
are discussed in the British Social Attitudes 11th Report (Lynn and 
Purdon, 1994).
4. Interview times recorded as less than 20 minutes were excluded, as 
these timings were likely to be errors.
5. An experiment was conducted on the 1991 British Social Attitudes 
survey (Jowell et al., 1992) which showed that sending advance 
letters to sampled addresses before ieldwork begins has very little 
impact on response rates. However, interviewers do ind that an 
advance letter helps them to introduce the survey on the doorstep, 
and a majority of respondents have said that they preferred some 
advance notice. For these reasons, advance letters have been used 
on the British Social Attitudes surveys since 1991.
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6. Because of methodological experiments on scale development, 
the exact items detailed in this section have not been asked on all 
versions of the questionnaire each year. 
7. In 1994 only, this item was replaced by: Ordinary people get their 
fair share of the nation’s wealth [Wealth1].
8. In constructing the scale, a decision had to be taken on how to treat 
missing values (“Don’t know” and “Not answered”). Respondents 
who had more than two missing values on the left–right scale and 
more than three missing values on the libertarian–authoritarian and 
welfarism scales were excluded from that scale. For respondents 
with fewer missing values, “Don’t know” was recoded to the 
midpoint of the scale and “Not answered” was recoded to the scale 
mean for that respondent on their valid items.
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